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Institute for Bosniak Studies

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120 YEARS OF THE BOSNIAK COMMUNITY OF CULTURE “PREPOROD”

* PROF. DR. SANJIN KODRIĆ

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120 YEARS OF THE BOSNIAK COMMUNITY
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Prof. Dr. Sanjin Kodrić

Bosniak Community of Culture

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120 YEARS OF THE BOSNIAK COMMUNITY OF CULTURE “PREPOROD”

The Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” (Revival) is both the fundamental and the oldest cultural organization of Bosniaks, that is the pivotal national cultural institution and the global cultural community of the Bosniak people with a tradition stretching back 120 years. It was originally founded on February 20, 1903, as the “Gajret” (Endeavour) society – its first forerunner and legal predecessor, while its second forerunner and legal predecessor was “Narodna uzdanica” (The People’s Hope), founded on October 17, 1924. These two societies, as well as several other forms of cultural and educational organization of Bosniaks of the time, united into the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” on September 13, 1945. This society was both legally and institutionally the successor of “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica”, and existed until November 10, 1949, when the authorities of that time practically banned its work, which was only restored on October 5, 1990, after the democratic changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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The history of today’s Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” began, thus, with the establishment of the “Gajret” society, which was founded thanks to the efforts of progressive Bosniak intellectuals and cultural workers of that time on February 20, 1903, in the then Muslim Reading Society at Bentbaša, in Sarajevo, what was welcomed with great support and enthusiasm in the then Bosniak cultural and wider social context. The first elected president of “Gajret” was Dr. Safvet-beg Bašagić, the main bearer of the initiative to establish the society, the bard of Bosniak and Bosnian-Herzegovinian literature and culture, a pioneering researcher of Bosniak and Bosnian-Herzegovinian literary, cultural and social past and generally one of the most prominent and notable cultural and social figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

Considering the circumstances of that time, “Gajret” was originally founded as a “society for supporting Muslim students in secondary schools and colleges”, but from the very beginning, its role was much wider – comprehensive cultural, educational and wider social action among Bosnian Muslims, catering to the special circumstances and needs of the Bosniak community at end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, equivalently to the work of the fundamental cultural organizations of the other peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily the Croatian “Napredak”, the Serbian “Prosvjeta” and the Jewish “La Benevolencija”,

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as well as similar institutions of other South Slavic and European peoples of that time. To organize and introduce Bosniaks into modern European culture and society through institutional efforts, but without abandoning what are the basis of their identity and values of their tradition, and thus make the people capable of living in new cultural and social circumstances, was the core of “Gajret’s” cultural, educational and social role, which this organization was continuously developing during all subsequent years and decades, always for the common good, or for the “well-being of the home and people”, as “Gajret’s” essential mission was poetically summed up by its leading initiator and first president Dr. Safvetbeg Bašagić.

“Gajret” was achieving its mission firstly through scholarships, grants and loans for pupils and students, and then through boarding schools and dormitories in all major cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and beyond – in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Mostar, Bihać, Foča, Trebinje, Gacko, Novi Pazar, Prijepolje, Pljevlja and Belgrade, where the “Belgrade Gajret Osman Đikić” and student dormitory were founded. Along with a number of other forms of upbringing and educational work, including the orphanage in Sarajevo, “Gajret” founded, with the same goal, the Rug Making School in Novi Pazar, the Workshop for the Study and Production of Handicrafts in Trebinje and the Women’s Vocational and Craft School in Stolac, which had the recognized status of vocational schools, as well as numerous illiteracy courses, student tutoring, domestic chores schools, libraries, reading rooms and clubs, folklore, literary, acting, musical and other ensembles, groups and sections, while organizing diverse cultural manifestations, dramatic and other theatrical performances, concerts, exhibitions, dances, different types of festivities and folk celebrations etc. “Gajret” even developed its own publishing projects, within which the magazine *Gajret* stands out as one of the most important literary and cultural magazines for Bosniaks in the first half of the 20th century, all this in addition to dozens of local organizations in almost every place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then throughout the former Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or, later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and abroad, all the way to the United States of America.

With its cultural and educational as well as social work, especially by educating thousands of pupils and students not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in a wide area from Vienna, through Istanbul to Cairo and elsewhere, “Gajret” helped or enabled the education of as many as two thirds of Bosniak intellectuals up to in 1941, including at that time particularly marginalized women and poor children and youth, as well as non-Bosniaks, simultaneously realizing a number of other important cultural, educational and social achievements in the wider social community, which practically created the Bosniak and Bosnian-Herzegovinian cultural and educational, or practically intellectual and social elite in general and significantly shaped the modern culture and society of Bosniaks and Bosnia and

Herzegovina. In essence, precisely thanks to the insistence on adopting the values of European modernity, but without denying what are the own identity and traditional values, “Gajret” was culturally and socially the most progressive and truly avant-garde phenomenon among Bosniaks of its time, and especially in the period between the two world wars, it also had a very strong broader social influence, including political importance, which is why from 1923 its work was also under the high patronage of HRH Crown Prince Petar II Karađorđević.

Since “Gajret’s” work and activities were complex and multifaceted, in addition to idealism, enthusiasm and commitment of its leadership and activists, it also required significant financial resources. Considering the wider social circumstances at the time, and especially considering the unfavourable and difficult position of the Bosniak people, especially in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and, later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, “Gajret”, particularly during the first years, could rely almost exclusively on its own strength in a financial sense, that is, on the social self-awareness and responsibility of individuals who had the opportunity or at least felt the need to support the work of “Gajret” and its efforts for the sake of the common good. That is why from the very beginning, “Gajret” was founded as a kind of “waqf in culture”, or practically “cultural endowment”, and funds for work and property were acquired mainly from membership fees and voluntary contributions and gifts of conscious individuals, who in this way, with their awareness and responsibility, built “Gajret” into a serious and socially useful institution, although they also struggled with numerous challenges and adversities, especially during the conditions imposed by the unjust agrarian and other reforms that strongly affected and practically impoverished the former wealthiest class of Bosniak and Bosnian-Herzegovinian society. In such circumstances, it is a special curiosity that among the first waqifs or benefactors of “Gajret” there were two women – sisters Hašema and Zulejha Imširija, who immediately after its foundation endowed the land for the benefit of the society, on which the House of the “Gajret” Society will later be built – the building in which the Directorate of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” is located today, which is just an example of social responsibility and awareness of the importance of an institution such as “Gajret” and the willingness to adequately support the work of such an institution.

In addition to this, looking for ways to develop successfully and make progress in accordance with the needs of the historical moment, and especially in order to more successfully finance its numerous cultural and educational programmes, “Gajret” eventually began to develop various economic activities. Thus, among other things, it founded the Economic and Credit Cooperative and, later, the “Gajret” Bank in Sarajevo, which as a financial institution operated following the then highest European standards for institutions of this type, investing financial resources into various industrial and economic enterprises, including, for

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example, the once very successful wood industry “Varda” from Višegrad, whose majority owner at the time was the “Gajret” Bank. In this way, “Gajret” became more financially stable and independent, and was able to achieve its cultural, educational and social mission even more successfully, which explains a kind of paradox that during some of the most difficult periods in their recent history, Bosniaks had a particularly strong and effective institution in “Gajret”, capable to, despite the social and especially political circumstances that were very unfavourable for the Bosniak community, carry out all its numerous tasks and to be the initiator, bearer and advocate of the cultural, educational and social progress of the Bosniak people in general.



“Gajret’s” overall role was, therefore, historically fundamental, which ensured it a unique place in the cultural and social history of Bosniaks and Bosnia and Herzegovina in general. Having this role and importance not only in cultural and educational but also in wider social life, “Gajret”, however, almost from the very beginning became the subject of efforts to establish political control and domination over it, which was contrary to the intentions of its founders, whose goal was to work for the common good of the people and wider social community, and not for individual or anyone else’s particular interests. This was crucially important in the very complex and specific political and ideological context of the time, in which Bosniaks were perceived and positioned primarily as a foreign and alien religious group remained as a relic of the former Ottoman rule, that is exclusively as a Muslim religious community and not as a specific ethno-national group, and in order to survive at least biologically, they had the possibility of opting only for either pro-Croatian or pro-Serbian national politics and their national conception in general, which was also imposed on “Gajret” as a necessity. In this connection, along with the Austro-Hungarian authorities, who followed the work of “Gajret” with attention and caution from the beginning, attempts of political control and domination over “Gajret” came first from the side of the Movement for Religious and Educational Autonomy at the time of its foundation, and after that especially from the side of the Muslim People’s Organization, the first Bosnian Muslim political party that was founded in 1906 stemming from this movement, which shared a strong anti-Austro-Hungarian attitude with Serbian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, especially with the goal of liberation from Austro-Hungarian rule and the unification of the South Slavs, as well as certain other aspects of political orientation, although, of course, for its own reasons, particularly considering the specific position of the Bosnian Muslim community at this time. As the Muslim People’s Organization had significant political power, this political party persistently tried to impose its and pro-Serbian policies on “Gajret”, which emerged immediately after the establishment of

the Muslim People's Organization and continued throughout the following years and decades. This was the key reason why immediately after the Sarajevo assassination and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 the work of "Gajret" was banned as "pro-Serbian", especially since some "Gajret" members were also close to the assassination movement "Mlada Bosna" (Young Bosnia).

It continued in a similar way after the war and the restoration of the work of "Gajret" in 1919, with the fact that this time the attempts of political control and domination came from the side of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization as a leading Bosnian Muslim political party at that moment, but also from the then regime of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and, later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which were practically competing for "Gajret". In such circumstances, primarily due to these political struggles, on October 17, 1924, at the same place where "Gajret" was previously founded, in the Muslim Reading Society at Bentbaša in Sarajevo, at the initiative of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, the "Narodna uzdanica" society was founded, another fundamentally important Bosniak cultural and educational organization that is a forerunner and legal predecessor of today's Bosniak Community of Culture "Preporod", with Asim-beg Dugalić as the first president, while later the long-time president of this society was Edhem Mulabdić, and the secretary general, among others, was Alija Nametak. Since the Yugoslav Muslim Organization failed to establish control and domination over "Gajret", "Narodna uzdanica" was supposed to be its counterpart, with a pro-Croatian shift, but, as with "Gajret", this type of orientation was limited primarily to the narrow stratum of the social elite, while "Narodna uzdanica" as an organization acted in the same way as "Gajret". In doing so, the activity of "Narodna uzdanica" was basically the same as the activity of "Gajret" – the education of Bosniak pupils and students through scholarships, grants and loans, as well as boarding schools and dormitories in larger urban centres – Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Mostar and Zagreb, where a student dormitory was established, together with other forms of upbringing and schooling, as well as wider cultural, educational and social work among Bosniaks in general. Also, the model of work of "Narodna uzdanica" was basically the same as the model of work of "Gajret", including the concept of "waqf in culture", and later the creation of their own financial resources, so that, despite political differences mainly at higher levels and often only based on personal preferences of the social elites, "Gajret" and "Narodna uzdanica" were touching and permeating in their activities, and in life reality, especially at the level of local organizations, they also achieved direct cooperation, whereby among the people themselves both societies were perceived as common national institutions with the aim of the common good of the entire social community. Like "Gajret", "Narodna uzdanica" also insisted on the adoption of modern European cultural and social achievements among Bosniaks, so this society too opened up to cultural forms that were

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previously alien to the Bosniak cultural tradition, such as modern European theatre or classical European music, including opera and ballet, which were thus introduced into the Bosniak cultural and social context. True, “Narodna uzdanica” failed to catch up with the strength of “Gajret”, which was by all accounts superior, but also more rooted in the wider social community, but, ultimately, this society also made an extremely important contribution to the cultural and social development of the Bosniak people, thus making the overall historical role of today’s Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” even more significant.

The activities of “Narodna uzdanica” were particularly important during the Second World War, when the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) banned the work of “Gajret”, again as “pro-Serbian”, and “Narodna uzdanica” had a very demanding task of caring for the Bosniak people, which it did as best it could in difficult war circumstances, trying to resist the politics and pressures of the ISC authorities as much as was realistically feasible. In doing so, “Narodna uzdanica” worked specially to help Bosniak exiles and victims of war, particularly refugees and victims of Chetnik crimes, war orphans etc., trying to help Bosniaks in other ways as well, but also other people affected by the war’s persecutions, suffering and destruction, which included the victims of Ustasha authorities and former protégés and cadets of “Gajret”, whom “Narodna uzdanica” also was taking care of, even though it had numerous difficulties and serious problems in its work, endeavouring to preserve both itself and the people as a whole under the ISC regime. In addition, from the ranks of “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica” came several participants in the National Liberation Struggle, whereby some members of “Narodna uzdanica” publicly criticized the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia, regardless of the dangers of the ICS context in which they lived and worked.



Despite previous efforts to unite and cooperation in a large number of cases, “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica” acted side by side until the Second World War, after which they finally united into the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod”, founded as such on September 13, 1945 with Dr. Zaim Šarac as the first president, with the fact that some other forms of cultural, educational and social organizing of Bosniaks at the time, including the Muslim Charitable Society “Merhamet”, were also attached to this society. The united Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” brought together numerous important representatives of the Bosniak intelligentsia of that time, more or less all prominent former members and cadets of “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica” with the right to public action in the new political and ideological circumstances, and as such it was expected to overcome the previous parallel work of the two preceding societies and act with joint forces

with the aim of further cultural and social development of Muslims in view of the new social circumstances, with the fact that this time the new, post-war authorities had direct control over its work, as well as, after all, over the overall, and especially public and social life in general. However, despite this control and clearly defined frameworks of work and activity, the life of the united Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” was to be very short because in 1949 the authorities of the time, according to their political-ideological concept, banned the work of the fundamental cultural organizations of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, among them the work of the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” as well, simultaneously confiscating all its numerous and rich assets throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia.

In this way, having no other national cultural institutions, Bosniaks are left without their fundamental and oldest, pivotal organization of culture, which is equivalent to the wider social position of Bosniaks at this time, who until the 1970’s would officially be a “non-existent” nation. And yet, the results of the activities of “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica”, as well as the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” as a whole continued, because the Bosniak cultural and intellectual, but also the wider social elite whose creation through their work had previously encouraged, helped and enabled these societies became an extremely important basis on which the cultural, intellectual and social profile of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Second World War was built, since practically during that time there were very few cultural, intellectual and social figures who in some way, as members, collaborators, students, or in another capacity, were not connected to the activities of “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica”, or the united Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod”. These were more or less all Bosniak writers, cultural workers and artists of all kinds and intellectuals of various orientations from the end of the 19th to the mid-20th century, some of the founders and first professors of the University of Sarajevo and other universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or some of the first academicians of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina etc., but also some Bosniak politicians of the time and even 13 national heroes of Yugoslavia, including many women and a significant number non-Bosniaks, as well as thousands of other pupils and students. Along with grandiose figure of Safvet-beg Bašagić as the initiator and founder, part of institutional history of “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica” as well as the united Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” in various ways were also prominent writers such as Riza-beg Kapetanović, Edhem Mulabdić, Osman Đikić, Osman Nuri Hadžić, Musa Ćazim Ćatić, Hamza Humo, Ahmed Muradbegović, Abdurezak Hifzi Bjelevac, Hasan Kikić, Zija Dizdarević, Hamid and Mak Dizdar, Alija Nametak..., as well as Skender Kulenović, Meša Selimović, Ćamil Sijarić, Šukrija Pandžo and many others, great painters such as Ismet Mujezinović or world opera diva Bahrija Nuri Hadžić, but also, for example, prominent composer and ethnomusicologist

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Cvjetko Rihtman. These were also many later top intellectuals and scholars, for example academicians Hamdija Kreševljaković, Salko Nazečić, Hamdija Čemerlić, Midhat Šamić, Enver and Husref Redžić, Midhat Begić, Esad Pašalić, Nedim Filipović and others. The same is the case with numerous historically important figures, social entrepreneurs, dignitaries and politicians from different times, among whom were, for example, Šerif Arnautović, Ali-beg Firdus, Esad Kulović, Halid-beg Hrasnica, Mehmed Spaho and many others, including re-isul-ulemas Teufik Azabagić, Mehmed Džemaluddin Čaušević, Fehim Spaho and Sulejman Kemura, but also Husaga Ćišić, Suljaga Salihagić, Šukrija Kurtović, Hasan Rebac or Akif Šeremet, as well as Husein and Hasan Brkić, Dr. Zaim Šarac, Major General Sulejman Filipović, Pašaga Mandžić, Osman Karabegović, Avdo Humo, Džemal Bijedić, Hakija and Hamdija Pozderac and others, or revolutionaries such as Avdo Sumbul, Muhamed Mehmedbašić, Behdžet Muteveli or Mustafa Golubić, or national heroes such as Mahmut Bušatlija, Ahmet Fetahagić, Rifat Burdžović, but also Ognjen Prica and Vladimir Perić Valter..., who were mostly scholarship holders of “Gajret”. It was, therefore, the intellectual and social capital that will fundamentally continue the operation of the institution from which it originated even after it has formally ceased to exist, and which, either indirectly or directly, was the basis on which, many years later, the work of that same institution was restored, the institution which nevertheless managed to out-live politics, governments and regimes that sought to abolish it.



The work of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” as the legal successor of the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod”, including the preceding societies “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica”, was restored only during the beginning of democratic changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia – on October 5, 1990, at the Restoration Assembly held in the Sarajevo City Hall, in what was then the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Restoration Assembly itself was also a sign and indicator of democratic changes, and it brought together the Bosniak cultural and intellectual elite of the time, whereby, like the original establishment of “Gajret” in 1903, the very act of restoring the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” was a first-rate social event. The first president of the restored society became Prof. Dr. Muhsin Rizvić, a full professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo and a distinguished historian of Bosniak and Bosnian-Herzegovinian literature, himself a former associate of “Narodna uzdanica”, who in his opening speech at the Restoration Assembly characterized the restoring of the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” as precisely the moment of “our cultural renaissance”, that is as an act that establishes “the basics of the integration of our creative forces in the noble work of nurturing, developing and studying our culture and history,

science and art”, “all this in an equal and fruitful relationship with the cultures and scholarly achievements of other nations and civilizations”. It was, therefore, an act of continuing the former cultural and social mission of both “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica”, or the quondam Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” in a manner appropriate to the contemporary moment, as well as an act based on which it was necessary to finally institutionally and systematically work on cultural and identity, that is, the overall social revival of the Bosniak people, which meant a broad reaffirmation of culture and identity of Bosniaks, and above all freedom in their own cultural and identity understanding and expression.

Almost all significant Bosniak cultural workers and prominent intellectuals gathered under the auspices of the restored Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod”, and immediately after the Restoration Assembly, the restoring of local branches throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia began, which not only expanded the society’s network but also sparked a real Bosniak cultural and identity rebirth. In doing so, the recently restored Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” played a very important role in the preparations for the population census in 1991, the first census in democratized social circumstances, and made a crucially important contribution to the effort to freely define the Bosniak people in terms of identity during the census, and especially to restore their own, Bosnian designation of the mother tongue, for the first time after the abolition of the Bosnian language designation in 1907. At the same time, in accordance with its immanent academic character, the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” initiated several important cultural and identity scholarly projects as well, including the then Centre for Bosnian Muslim Studies, which was founded as its organizational unit in 1991 with the aim of engaging in scholarly work in the field of national humanities and social disciplines, representing the forerunner of today’s Institute for Bosniak Studies of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”.

Aggression and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 had a significant impact on the development of the newly restored Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod”, but it will not be stopped, so, in a manner adapted to the circumstances of the war, activities continued wherever possible, including among soldiers, refugees and other war victims, and later also among returnees, whereby the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” functions as a key bearer of the cultural and identity upliftment of Bosniaks. In this sense, in addition to numerous other activities of a cultural and broader social nature, within the framework of the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” there was also an action to organize the War Congress of Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals in 1992, at which the decision was made to establish the present-day Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals, as well as the action of organizing the First Bosniak Assembly in 1993, historically important gatherings with which the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” responded to the challenges and needs of the historical

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moment, while also restoring the tradition of this type of gathering of Bosniak intelligentsia following the Congress of Muslim Intellectuals from 1928, as in general the first ever gathering of the Bosniak intellectual elite, which was organized by the “Gajret” society on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, also with the aim of comprehending and dealing with the key issues of the Bosniak people at that time.

In the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod”, an action was being taken to reclaim the national name “Bosniak”, which was finally restored at the First Bosniak Assembly, and as a result of which this society itself was renamed as the Cultural Society of Bosniaks “Preporod”, which was confirmed at the Assembly in 1995, after which, in 1997, it was named as the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”, appropriate to the character of the pivotal national cultural institution and the global cultural community of the Bosniak people. At the same time, intensive work was done to further affirm the Bosnian language as such, as well as on the affirmation of Bosniak literature, the history of Bosniaks and other cultural and identity values of the Bosniak people. Thus, it was precisely in the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”, that is, in the Institute for Bosniak Studies as its organizational unit, that the Orthographic Commission headed by Alija Isaković was formed and the preparation of the first Orthography of the Bosnian language was carried out, which was entrusted to Prof. Dr. Senahid Halilović, and the Orthography itself was published in 1996, which enabled both domestic and international institutionalization of the Bosnian language. Considering that it had also been marginalized and denied, Bosniak literature was also the focus of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”, so in 1995 the Institute for Bosniak Studies started work on the book series *Bošnjačka književnost u 100 knjiga (Bosniak Literature in 100 books)*, which in accordance with the highest literary studies standards represents the most significant achievements of Bosniak literature in its entirety, from the Middle Ages to modern times, and which at the time of its launch was and remains the largest publishing project in the history of Bosniak culture in general. Simultaneously, the preparation of *Historija Bošnjaka (The History of Bosniaks)* was initiated, a project entrusted to Prof. Dr. Mustafa Imamović, and the *History* itself, as also the first such publication among Bosniaks, was published in 1997, which gave Bosniaks, for the first time, a historiographical description of the totality of their past and historical existence. Also, work was initiated on the preparation of *Enciklopedija Bošnjaka (Encyclopedia of Bosniaks)*, a generational project of the highest level, which was sadly, however, repeatedly suspended due to a lack of conditions for its realization, primarily due to a lack of financial resources.

Alongside these capital cultural and scholarly projects, other important projects were realized, including the *Culture of Bosniaks* audio series, in which dozens of experts for certain areas of Bosniak culture participated, all this in addition to the

realization of numerous other individual projects in all areas of culture and national scholarly disciplines. At the same time, work was also done on strengthening local branches and profiling their activities, as well as on the establishment of other organizational units, including the musical ensembles Sarajevo Vocal Octet “Preporod” and Academic Women’s Vocal Ensemble “Preporod”, as well as professional and social associations such as the Bosniak Association of Philosophers and Sociologists and the Bosniak Association of Students, but also the Bosniak Association of Businessmen, Bosniak Association of Engineers and Technicians, Bosniak Association of Lawyers etc. Also, with the aim of raising to the highest level the scholarly and cultural work and activities of Bosniaks as a people, in 1995 the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” made a decision to establish the Bosniak Academy of Sciences and Art, bringing together Bosniak scholarly and cultural dignitaries in this regard, but, unfortunately, the decision itself was not implemented for organizational reasons.



As the pivotal national cultural institution and the global cultural community of the Bosniak people, the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” deals today with all areas of Bosniak culture, including cultural heritage, contemporary cultural practices and scholarly research, as well as work with children and youth. The Directorate of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” is located in Sarajevo, in the former House of the “Gajret” Society, while throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Europe and the world there are more than 60 branches – municipal / city and cantonal / regional societies and other organizational units of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”. All these branches and organizational units significantly participate in the cultural and social life of their communities, responding to their immediate cultural and social needs, and in some cases they are the backbone of the cultural and social life of Bosniaks, while simultaneously being open to everyone else, that is, to the entire social community. After Prof. Dr. Muhsin Rizvić as the first president after the restoration of the work and activity of the Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” (1990–1993), in the following year presidents of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” were Prof. Dr. Enes Duraković (1993–1994), Prof. Dr. Munib Maglajlić (1994–2001), Prof. Dr. Šaćir Filandra (2001–2010) and Prof. Dr. Senadin Lavić (2010–2019), while the current president is Prof. Dr. Sanjin Kodrić, all full professors at the University of Sarajevo.

At the Directorate in Sarajevo, the Institute for Bosniak Studies plays a special role as an organizational unit with the aim of realizing scholarly research and other projects in the fields of the Bosnian language, Bosniak literature, history, history of art, folkloristics, ethnology and cultural anthropology, musicology

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and ethnomusicology, philosophy, sociology and political science and other humanistic and social disciplines related to Bosniaks and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As in the case of the earlier capital and other projects, the Institute keeps on working on projects of a fundamental nature, including the continuation of the book series *Bosniak literature in 100 books*, the realization of which was slowed down for years due to both the demands of the project itself and the lack of financial resources, as well as continuation of even more demanding work on the *Encyclopedia of Bosniaks*, also with all, especially financial difficulties that slow down and make its realization difficult too. In addition to the previously started projects, and despite the ever-present difficulties, primarily of a financial nature, the Institute for Bosniak Studies is also implementing numerous new projects, among others the project of a new Bosnian Orthography, a fundamental project which is being realized in cooperation with the Language Institute of the University of Sarajevo, and which has the aim to further the institutional care for the standard of the Bosnian language. There is also a very rich and valuable publishing activity, which, in addition to several capital and other significant individual editions, includes the *Drama* book series, related to the biennial Alija Isaković Award for the best drama text in the Bosnian language, and the specialist book series *Studia Bosniaca*, *Literatura Bosniaca* and *Musica Bosniaca*, as well as the journals *Godišnjak* (*Yearbook*) and *Radovi Instituta za bošnjačke studije* (*Papers of the Institute for Bosniak Studies*) in Bosnian and *Bosnian Studies* in English, or online magazine for culture and society *Biserje* (*Pearls*), all this with publishing activities and other projects of local branches and other organizational units.

Alongside the Institute for Bosniak Studies, the Directorate of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” also operates several centres and foundations: Library and Information Centre, Centre for Digitization and Digital Humanities – Bosniak House of Knowledge, Centre for Publishing and Media – Radio-television “Preporod”, Centre for Stećak and Nišan, Centre for Traditional Art and Old Crafts, Centre for Music, Performing and Fine Arts, Gallery “Preporod” – Creative Centre of Visual Arts, Collection of Works of Art and Ethnographic Collection, as well as Muhsin Rizvić Fund and Alija Isaković Foundation. In addition to the Office of the President and the Service for Organizational, Financial-Accounting, Legal and General Affairs, as well as new organizational units in the process of establishment, the Directorate also operates the Centre for Children and Youth, where children and youth projects, programs and activities are realized, among which the award competition for literary and artistic works of preschool and elementary school students is especially important, which for the past 20 years has included nearly 40,000 participants from all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, homeland countries and the diaspora, as well as the “Preporod” Mountaineering Society, connected to the Mountain Lodge of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” on the Vranica mountain. It is, therefore, an extremely complex and

demanding organizational structure, whose work and operations are also continuously hampered primarily by a lack of financial resources, which is also the case with the work of numerous local branches and other organizational units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, homeland countries and the diaspora.

Like “Gajret” and “Narodna uzdanica” at their time, today’s Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” is also a “waqf in culture” – “cultural endowment” and, in this sense, is the property of the entire Bosniak people, but also an obligation that should be dealt with by government institutions at all levels. And yet, despite this, despite the 120-year-long tradition and the character of the pivotal national cultural institution and the global cultural community of the Bosniak people, the work and activities of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” are still, unfortunately, more a matter of idealism, enthusiasm and engagement of individuals, and much less, often even minimal, awareness and responsibility within the wider social community, and especially within government institutions. Not even 120 years after its foundation, or more than 30 years after the restoration, the social position and the mode of financing the work and activities of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” have not been adequately resolved, especially not in a systematic way, but mainly depend on the (mis)understanding of the decision makers within the social and political system. True, based on persistent and tireless insistence on solving these problems, promising progress in this sense has been achieved in the last few years, which has improved the condition and possibilities for the work and activities of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”, but this is still not a necessary systemic solution. It is even more difficult when it comes to the numerous and rich property that was confiscated from the former Cultural Society of Muslims “Preporod” in 1949, which still has not been returned to the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” as its real owner, not even in a minimal part, but has been used for over 70 years mainly by various public and other government institutions of various levels, without any reimbursement or compensation to the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”. All in all, the general social attitude towards the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” is mostly very modest and unsuitable, and sometimes completely worthless and inappropriate compared to its both historical and contemporary role and importance, so that every exception in this sense is pleasing and encouraging. An exceptional example of this kind is the personal decision of two women again – Marija and Esma Bećirević to, in accordance with the wishes of their deceased spouses Nedžad and Sead Bećirević, endow a family house with a garden and other property for the needs of the Brčko local branch of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” with an estimated value of at least 500,000 BAM, where today the Bećirević Family Foundation operates in their honour as an organizational unit of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” in Brčko.

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Despite all these and other challenges, difficulties and problems with which it continuously struggles, the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” has received numerous awards and recognitions for its work and activities, including the April 6 Award of the City of Sarajevo on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of its foundation and the Sarajevo Canton Plaque. Along with several other municipalities and cities, the City Council of the City of Sarajevo has declared the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” a cultural organization of special importance to the City of Sarajevo, as well as the Bosnian Podrinje Canton of Goražde, Sarajevo Canton and Una-Sana Canton, and the same is expected soon in other cantons and at the level of the Federation and other levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These are commendable developments in relation to the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod”, the basis of which should finally, after 120 years, adequately resolve the social position and the mode of financing the work and activities of the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” as the pivotal national cultural institution and the global cultural community of the Bosniak people. The same, of course, also applies to the equivalent fundamental cultural organizations of other peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Croatian Cultural Society “Napredak”, the Serbian Educational and Cultural Society “Prosvjeta” and the Jewish Cultural, Educational and Humanitarian Society “La Benevolencija”, with which the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” has been cooperating very closely since the beginning of the 20th century, and with which in 2020 it formed the Intercultural Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an interinstitutional framework for even closer and more successful cooperation.

A greater number of books and numerous individual scholarly and professional papers have been published about the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” and its forerunners and legal predecessors, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad, including doctoral dissertations and master’s theses, among which particular important are fundamental studies *Uloga Gajreta u društvenom životu Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine (The Role of “Gajret” in the Social Life of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (1903–1941)* (Sarajevo, 1986) and *Značaj i uloga “Narodne uzdanice” u društvenom životu Bošnjaka (The Significance and Role of “Narodna uzdanica” in the Social Life of Bosniaks) (1923–1945)* (Sarajevo, 2002), both by Dr. Ibrahim Kemura, as well as *Beogradski Gajret “Osman Đikić” (Belgrade Gajret “Osman Đikić”)* (Belgrade / Sarajevo, 2016) by Dr. Nadir Dacić. These and other studies have shown a very significant, but still only one part of the history of the present-day Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” and, in this sense, undoubtedly pointed to its fundamental importance and role. Moreover, if its 120-year-long history is looked at in its entirety, it is clear that the Bosniak Community of Culture “Preporod” not only shared the historical destiny of the Bosniaks as a people, but the Bosniak collective historical destiny, especially in terms of cultural identity, was realized, both

symbolically and concretely, through the fate of today's Bosniak Community of Culture "Preporod" as well, starting with the founding of the societies "Gajret" and "Narodna uzdanica" and their later institutional path, through their unification and the establishment of the Cultural Society of Muslims "Preporod" and the prohibition of its work, as well as through the years of formal interruption in its activity, until its restoration and growth into what the Bosniak Community of Culture "Preporod" is today. Despite all the challenges, difficulties and problems, which are not lacking even in the present time, just as they were not lacking in the past, the Bosniak Community of Culture "Preporod" has and must have a future because it is a necessity, an indispensable need primarily of Bosniaks as a people, the home of their culture and identity, but also the necessity of Bosnia and Herzegovina's cultural and identity multiplicity in their individuality and mutual connections and relationships. All this always and inevitably for the common good, "for the well-being of the home and people".

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ARTICLES

BOSNIA  N
S STUDIES
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ŠAĆIR FILANDRA

Challenges Facing Bosniak
Politics at the Beginning of the
XXI Century

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Summary

This political essay assesses the key challenges faced by Bosniak political actors at the beginning of the XXI century. These problems include both the fragmentation and moral crisis of Bosniak political elites and the radicalization of their own political position; their attitudes towards Belgrade and Zagreb as the centers of the Serbian and Croatian nations; the “parochialization” of political consciousness; the lack of a proactive political attitude amidst the populace and finally the political primacy of identity at the expense of economic and development issues. These are some of the challenges which this paper analyzes and which, according to the author, will influence the character and profile of Bosniak politics in the coming decades. In facing each of these challenges, the author also offers possible solutions that encourage the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, enhancing its democratic and plural character.

Keywords: Bosniaks, politics, XXI century, political fragmentation, moral crisis, political challenges, political identity.

The independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a 20th century achievement. From Alibey Firdus at the beginning of the century, through the National Liberation Struggle in the Second World War, to Alija Izetbegović at its end, numerous generations of Bosniak politicians, public workers, intellectuals and artists have now finally ‘translated’ the idea of statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in all its uniqueness, into this most significant and sublime Bosniak and Bosnian-Herzegovinian political achievement. The achievement of firstly independence and then full statehood is not only the work of Bosniaks, although in its final political and military achievement (delivered by the RBiH Army), they made the most decisive contribution. This idea was also, always advocated, promoted and defended by numerous Bosnian Serbs and Croats, especially through the anti-fascist movement during the Second World War and the period of socialism. Their share in the building of Bosnian political will is still very significant, and has enabled Bosnia and Herzegovina to preserve its historic multi-religious and multi-ethnic character, even today.

Bosniaks never had exclusive designs on the state itself. The Bosniak political vision was, and still is today, a multi-ethnic, multi-religious Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state of equal peoples and citizens, an independent political community. Bosnia is only possible as such. Any other solution is anti-Bosnia.

What kind of challenges does Bosnia and Herzegovina face at the beginning of the 21st century? What kind of political situation do we have three decades after the end of the war and the signing of the peace agreement? The questionability of the Dayton Accords – which after two decades remains the only constitutional/

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political arrangement of Bosnia - has become unquestionable. This is the only fact on which all existing political parties agree. There are serious differences between the leading political actors of the different nations present within Bosnia, regarding the understanding of the character of its statehood and how it should be organized. These political actors directly prevent the establishment of political cohesion and political identification with the state. Their favoring of group ethno-national interests is to the detriment of Bosnia's citizens and their rights. This structure and institutional articulation of interests generates crises and conflicts, antagonizes ethnic communities, and hinders the country's political development. Dissatisfaction with the existing constitutional arrangement is present and developed amongst all Bosnia's citizens and peoples. This dissatisfaction, is felt for different reasons however. It is most often expressed by the attitude that nothing after Dayton, and based on it, is new and different which would legitimize this novelty as something different from the pre-Dayton status, and thus that post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina essentially does not exist. In such a pessimistic vision, which is, in fact, not realistic, the absence of social and political reforms (as a prerequisite for the development of the political system) is strongly underlined. It is true that the political system of the country has not evolved in a positive sense. Numerous attempts at significant constitutional reforms have failed. The political goals of the key ethno-national actors are still quite divergent. However, numerous structural changes have been made in Bosnian society that have made the system stable and self-sustaining. The control over the armed forces by those implementing the peace treaty and the accompanying reforms in the security and financial sectors have created a favorable and stable environment for citizens to work on their prosperity. Euro-Atlantic integrations however, especially with NATO, do not yet have the consent of key political actors. Whilst domestic positive will towards EU integration is nominally better, Euro-Atlantic institutions themselves do not show too much of a rush to award us with membership.

The situation in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is not ideal. The legacy of the war is still alive. The total energy of the war did not disappear with the achievement of peace, rather it was transformed and legitimized by the first post-war political elections in 1996. Every actor from the war, the national elites (and their war goals), the national parties (as the main actors of war conflicts) remained almost unchanged, and were democratically legitimized for the first time in the first post-war elections, and this is where a key mistake was made in the implementation of the peace agreement. Immediately after the war, the international community had enough military forces and political will to bring a radical departure from the war's ideologies and its actors, but it did not have the courage, interest, or vision to act appropriately. In the first year of peace, a situation was created through elections wherein the war was simply continued with democratic instruments. It was transformed into a so called 'reality', which only "froze" the

war and did not resolve it. In this way, the entire legacy of the war has now acquired a civilian, so-called democratic form. The same, or almost the same, degree of ethnic distance, inter-ethnic distrust, division of society and disbelief of citizens was peacefully kept in place. Behind the fact of a divided society, which today has become an analytical platitude, ethnic distrust, insufficient appreciation of the other and the different are very much present on a social and anthropological level. In this, our Bosnian society, love and truth are not binding values. Lies have often become the source, form and framework of these emerging identitarian ideological narratives. Truth and facts do not seem to bind. Epistemological relativism produces moral relativism; war criminals are often celebrated as heroes! People in such a social environment are deformed and even dehumanized over time. Despite all of this, the interpersonal and inter-ethnic relations that take place outside the domain of high politics, in everyday life, are getting better every day, producing a considerable degree of social cohesion.

In order for this picture not to be too bleak, it should also be pointed out that significant steps forward have been recently made in the institutional development of the state. The harmonization of political will at the level of state institutions, where the polarization of political actors is most pronounced, was nevertheless achieved by the adoption of key legal solutions necessary for the functioning of the state. At the entity levels, where institutions' capacities are far more extensive, significant results were achieved in all political domains. The government is at its most functional at the local, municipal level, where significant economic achievements and inter-municipal/inter-ethnic communication values are expressed. Here, Bosnia's citizens are building their future together through democratic principles and institutional mechanisms. The interests of citizens, regardless of their ethno-religious affiliation, in security and peace, economic prosperity, social security, increasing the quality of life and services, are unique. These shared interests serve as a form of pledge to maintain their community. It is up to politics to translate such a determination into a new reality.

What is the situation of Bosniaks at the beginning of the 21st century? What challenges do they face and what are their possible solutions?

The position of Bosniaks has never been better. Today, they are **free people**. A free nation is one that makes its own laws and can govern by them, and Bosniaks are in such a position today. Never before in their history have they had a better political status. They are free and recognized by others as a nation that realizes its political subjectivity in a free, sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all previous historical epochs, their identity and their political rights had been denied, contested, diminished or ignored. Their political aspirations, from the era of the European Spring of Nations in the middle of the 19th century, to the very end of the 20th, envisaged an autonomous Bosnia within the extant empires and complex political systems. Of greatest importance was the preservation of Bosniaks'

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spiritual existence (before their physical), so that at the end of the twentieth century they would reach and realize the idea of the independence of their country. The Ottomans treated them as “Krajišniks”(rebels) and full members of their empire, suppressing in blood their first state-building movement under the leadership of Husein-Captain Gradašević. During the Austro-Hungarian administration, Bosnia was a province of the Viennese Empire, in which they fought for years for religious and educational autonomy in order to preserve their identity. The Yugoslav idea, essentially an attempt at resolving the Serb-Croat issue, was essentially anti-Bosnian because in the Kingdom/First Yugoslavia they were treated as merely a religious group in the deconstructed Bosnia that was eventually divided between Belgrade and Zagreb. In the Second/Socialist Yugoslavia, only with its democratization, would Bosniaks achieve formal, but never substantial, recognition as a nation, although their immediate homeland did have the political status of an equal federal republic.

All these different regimes and forms of government each with their own ideologies, treated Bosniaks, to a greater or lesser extent, with mistrust or discrimination. The freedom they have achieved today is the result of the transgenerational effort of Bosniaks for self-determination, the efforts of numerous generations and prominent individuals are woven into it, and current and future social elites should treat it with the greatest responsibility.

At the same time, one should never lose sight of the fact that a free nation is made up of free individuals. Individual freedom is a basic value and a prerequisite for the development of every society, including that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only free people think, explore and build the world, and therefore appreciation and protection of liberal values is of the highest priority.

In spite of the fact that they won and acquired a state, Bosniaks still do not have a sufficiently developed state-building consciousness. This kind of remark or even self-accusation, since it can often be heard in public, is not an essential deficiency of Bosniak political consciousness, but a historically determined condition that can and should be analyzed and then changed. State-building consciousness is not something metaphysical that you simply have or don't have, but on the contrary, it is a process of continuous learning and training in state-management, guided by the principles of the common good and high moral and legal standards. To be a statesman, basically, means to be loyal to the laws of your own country (which you participated in making), to give priority to the general, common interest and moral good of all people, over particular, egoistic aspirations.

The solution to this problem is simple. We just need to respect the laws of the country we live and to be honest, which we all think we are, but obviously aren't.

When we say that Bosniak political actors are not yet at the level of the historical moment and the political needs of their country, we do not disqualify those

politicians as such. Rather, we would like to emphasize that in their actions, there is to a considerable extent, a subjectivism and lack of knowledge, as well as insufficient respect for the principles and laws of institutional actions and behavior. The politics of many Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats also suffer from the same “diseases”. Many of the Bosniak and Bosnian political actors still do not manage well the country that the pro-Bosnian patriotic forces fought for in the last war. At the same time, but not as a mitigating circumstance, we should be aware of the fact that the conditions for building a state-building-will are unfavorable. Many political subjects still express different interests and the divergence of ethno-national interests is still at work. This is increasingly, aggravatingly reflected in Bosniak political elites. The desire of Belgrade and Zagreb to paternalize Bosnia and Herzegovina and instrumentalize their compatriots in the country, further complicates the constitution and development of a common political will.

Bosniak politics, just like all national politics in the region, is still caught in ideological mists and historical and romantic reminiscences. There needs to be more pragmatism, contextualization and orientation towards the future. Politics is viewed as merely power and an opportunity to attribute material gains to the holder of that power. Space is then opened for corrupt acts as laws are insufficiently respected, and the principles of a just and law-regulated society in which all citizens are equal before the law, are violated. In this way, the state subsequently becomes a means of enriching a small number of individuals, while its management is confined to the framework of party oligarchies. A moral crisis becomes the mother of all crises.

Prevention of the permutation of politics into the desire for power and authority is possible. It is a prerequisite that political actors publicly acknowledge and accept their mistakes and flaws, that they do not treat critical opinion as hostile, and that they are forced by the same public to permanent self-reflection. A critical public, free media and the rule of law are based on the values of a free society, and through these tools it is possible (in the long term) to shape a new political culture.

In order for Bosniaks to avoid possible poverty and reduce economic exploitation in this age of globalization, neoliberalism and various other forms of contemporary neocolonialism, their politics should be more productive. The quality of a country’s politics is measured by the living standards of its citizens. The economic migration of the Bosniak labor force towards the West testifies that the state, led by the post-war elites, cannot meet the existential needs of its citizens. All the post-Yugoslav states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been deindustrialized. Huge social differences, the disappearance of the middle class, the impoverishment of the population and the exploitation of the workforce are destroying the reproductive matrix of society and opening the way for populism and totalitarianism.

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What follows for the Bosniak politics is a stronger confrontation with the material challenges of Bosniak and Bosnian citizens, and a turning away from the now dominant ideological, identity and worldview issues, towards economic issues and problems. Bosniaks should be concerned with development, not identity issues. Today, these issues are resolved on a collective level and their variation in public space is an expression of ignorance, powerlessness or manipulative intentions of such actors. The growth of the economy and social standards is a prerequisite for the wealth of peoples and individuals. At the same time, the liberalization of politics and mutual relations is a prerequisite for economic strengthening. Capital and politics, freedom and democracy are in an organic unity. Rich societies and rich communities, which Bosniaks should have as their goal, are open and inclusive societies, based on the rule of law, meritocracy and respect for human rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks, need to replace worldview topics and the focus on the past, with development perspectives.

Bosniak politics lacks a proactive attitude, a recognizable subjectivity, a solid, independently structured framework and program, i.e., a clear goal and vision. When politics is reduced to the disposal of existing resources of wealth and power, then the political vision is lost, and space is opened for clientelism, corruption and oligarchic interests, which are prevalent today. Such a policy lacks a utopian dimension, ideals, hopes, conceptions, strategic actions and orientation towards the new and the future. In such a state, politics, instead of being proactive, becomes reactive. This is still very much the case for Bosniaks. Their political practice in recent times is predominantly reduced to being reactive, responding to the political moves of the competing nationalist policies of their neighbors' leaders, who as a rule, are usually one step ahead of Bosniak leaders in their demands. Such a reactive, defensive position develops into deep political conservatism and reduces Bosniaks to defenders of the existing situation, to being passive, to extras in politics, and gives birth to a losing mentality. This results in preoccupation with political moves made by others. In this way, these others determine the content of political discussions and determine the direction of political topics and events. The lack of an independent political initiative leads to the shortcomings of one's own political agenda, ultimately to the loss of one's own politics.

It is both necessary and possible to build a special strategy for Bosniak national development, in a form that is clear and binding for political actors as holders of executive power. It would trace the long-term goals of development and the constitutional principles of every Bosniak political activity, that is, determine the smallest common content of national interests and values. The future of the people cannot be left in the hands of politicians alone. On a meritocratic basis, rather than ideological or party principles, it is possible to institutionally gather Bosniak intellectual forces to develop such a program. The Bosniak non-governmental sector is invited to be the bearer of such an initiative.

Bosniak politics suffers from party fragmentation. This fragmentation is primarily generated by the existing political system. The cantonal organization of the Federation of BiH, where Bosniaks predominantly live today, contributes to the ‘cantonization’ of Bosniak political consciousness. This new political consciousness is expressed in the narrow interests of the cantonal political elites in the areas of their rule. Cantons function as mini-states, having all the attributes of semi-statehood, from parliamentary, legislative, executive power, as well as their own judicial and police authorities. They have their own assemblies, governments, their own revenues, budgets, their own police, health and school systems, their own official newspapers, flags and coats of arms.

When the collective political consciousness of the national subject is insufficiently developed, as is Bosniak political consciousness today, when national interests and goals and the principles of political action are not clearly profiled, when such a situation lasts for a long time (as in this case), when the population is not in a physically compact area, then divergent forces in the national corps can easily emerge. The fragmentation of Bosniak consciousness favors the emergence of isolationism, parochialism, provincialism and conservatism, to the detriment of the cohesive properties of the national identity. The country, the whole, has lost focus. When one adds to this the fact of the lack of national authorities, institutional or personal, then such a situation becomes more complicated. There is no clear and modern ideological profiling of political parties. All this results in the absence of creative forces and creative ideas in Bosniak politics.

Bosniaks today have a large number of “smaller” political parties. Political and party pluralization within Bosniaks has been very pronounced in the post-war period, in relation to other peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this is their democratic qualitative achievement. However, one gets the impression that party pluralization is not always an expression of different ideologies and competing policies of social development, but rather a conflict of the material and oligarchic interests of political parties. Thus, it could happen within the Bosniak party scene, that a whole series of political subjects at the local or cantonal level develop, which do not yet have, and will have difficulty acquiring, the capacities to rise to the national, state level.

The low electoral threshold favors this “crowding” of the party scene and creates a false impression of its competitiveness. At the same time, large, so-called the traditional parties of the left and the center are not sufficiently democratized. Transformed into oligarchic structures, they are left without either the ability or the interest to share their political capital with a larger number of participants through the principle of inclusion. This leads to their constant splitting and the emergence of new, small parties. A large number of political subjects, created in such circumstances i.e., on the basis of individual’s unsatisfied leadership ambitions, and the undemocratic nature of these large parties, obscures the political

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scene. Such fragmentation, on the one hand, exhausts the scene, since the constantly emerging new parties do not have enough strength or capacity to make significant and necessary political strides with their activity; while on the other hand, it creates a false impression of the development of the political scene.

By adopting a new or amending the existing Election Law, it is possible to qualitatively overcome such a situation. This law should respect our plurality and the character of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Primacy in this relationship should be given to the individual in relation to the collective, ethnic principle, which is the European practice and a condition of European integration.

Bosniaks, just like other nations, are not immune to various forms of nationalism, whether they perceive it as a form of national self-awareness or an aggressive attitude towards those who are different to them. On that side of pandering to one's own nationalism, which as a rule is the practice of all nations, we rightly claim that Bosniak nationalism is, in principle, defensive. It was shaped thus in the fight against the attacks on the Bosniak people and Bosnian land over the last two centuries. Responsibility that this does not become aggressive lies with Bosniak politicians, current and future. National and religious extremism amidst Bosniaks would be disastrous for them and their country in the long run.

In order to avoid this flow of consciousness, it is necessary to ask the question about the possible sources of Bosniak nationalism, or what possible processes in the country and its surrounding environment can generate such an aggressive consciousness?

The possible sources of such a deformation of Bosniak politics are primarily external, found in the behavior of the surrounding nations - Serbian and Croatian above all - and the international community and its actors. We are witnessing that today, encouraged by external elements, within a good part of Bosniaks, reasonable or not, a narrative is developing about the dislike of the European environment towards them as an autochthonous European Muslim people. According to that narrative, they are not allowed, in a variety of different ways, to be decisive political actors in their country. That certain political forces in Europe do not like having a new state with a Muslim majority in their backyard, nor in the European Union (their club), to which Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a Bosniak demographic majority) could potentially belong, is a valid assumption, although difficult to prove. According to this narrative, in order to prevent this from happening, Bosnia would in future be paternalized by Zagreb and Belgrade and key international political institutions, under the pretext of guaranteeing the collective democratic rights of members of non-Bosniak communities in Bosnia. The capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina's state institutions would also be reduced in such a scenario, which would certainly frustrate the Bosniaks. On the other side of this narrative, which has its supporters among conspiracy theorists, it is necessary to

point out that any deliberate and artificial reduction of the political capacity of Bosniaks, disregarding the equality of their individual and collective rights with other citizens and peoples of Europe, would lead to their de-Westernization and necessary extremism.

Another, internal, possible source of Bosniak nationalism would be their acceptance of living outside Bosnian integrity. The key challenge of contemporary Bosniak politics is the possibility of self-separation of Bosniaks from Bosnia, as a homeland, a country and a complete state, and agreeing to some kind of “Bosnia country” or an area that we can “prosperously control”, which would be a euphemism for an ethnic Bosniak state. Until recent times, all Bosniak political elites refused and avoided such thinking. Bosniaks have never imagined themselves outside of Bosnian integrity. Today, Serbian and Croatian nationalisms (both in Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia respectively), having already ethnically nationalized parts of Bosnia by expelling Bosniaks, are heading toward the definitive ethnic territorialization of the country. When some Western power centers give them tacit support in this, psychological and political pressures are exerted on the Bosniaks to “accept” this disastrous course of events for Bosnia as their salvation. Acceptance of such an “offer” would be the end of both Bosnia and Bosniaks. Bosniak separation from Bosnia would not lead them to nationalism but to Islamism - to a people without a state. And that, given the geopolitical context of their lives, would be extremely dangerous for them.

Bosniaks must not respond to the outpourings of the surrounding Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, which still exist and which will certainly continue to exist in different modalities, with their own nationalism. An aggressive and unethical attitude towards the Other and the different is not characteristic of the traditional Bosniak political culture. Historical traumas, genocide and ethnic cleansing, to which they were exposed far more than their fellow citizens of other nationalities in the last war, cannot be a reason for Bosniaks to start behaving as their challengers.

Considering all the ethnic, cultural and religious markers of their collective identity, Bosniaks should find a way out of the “scissors” of surrounding nationalism, responding with dynamic and qualitative policies for general social, economic, cultural and scientific development. In this, education plays an important role, which must be treated as the most important development force of society, a medium for building an open identity and an instrument for accepting civilizational values. Since they define themselves as an integrative agent for the state, their actions and activities should in all domains of life and public policies, be an inclusive factor in the development of the common political will of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also its’ shared social wealth.

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Today, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats are equal and respected European nations, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is an equal country with Serbia and Croatia. This must be the platform of all future Bosniak actors in discussions on improving mutual relations, both between peoples and between countries. The phrase about the supposed 'agreement of the people', which we had before the state independence of the country, is today being replaced by the phrase 'regulating interstate relations'. Serbs and Croats, Belgrade and Zagreb, should be discussed from the aspect of the state, not the nation. The two-century process of Serbian and Croatian appropriation, non-recognition and assimilation of Bosnia and Bosniaks is over. Those nationalisms were historically defeated, they neither predicted nor wanted such a development in history, and the equality of Bosnia and Bosniaks is still difficult for them to accept. Therefore, it is up to every Bosniak policy to prioritize building good-neighborly relations with those neighboring and surrounding national and state centers, based on the principles of equality and mutual respect.

The relationship towards Belgrade and Zagreb, as the real and symbolic centers of the Serbian and Croatian nations and states, is of the greatest importance for Bosniak politics. Croats and Serbs are Bosniaks' greatest enemies, but also friends. They are the closest to them, but also the most distant. For Bosniaks, peace and a harmonious environment is a condition for survival and development.

Harmonization of relations with neighboring countries is an axiomatic precondition for the prosperity of Bosniaks. And only prosperous, materially, culturally and spiritually strong Bosniaks can be a deterrent and defense against future nationalist attacks from their neighbors. These attacks will not stop, in one form or another. Therefore, without waiting for an apology from their neighbors for crimes in the last war, Bosniaks should be the first to extend open arms to their neighbors, and to confess and condemn their crimes against them in the last war, if there were any. In this way, the Bosniak actors themselves would transcend the position and status of victims of the past war - self-victimization already burdens and pacifies them - and take over the leadership of civil peace initiatives.

The pre-war multinational and multi-confessional Sarajevo became mono-ethnized in the post-war period, against its will. As a result of the past aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the multi-year siege of its capital and the change in the ethnic structure of its population, Sarajevo has become a predominantly Bosniak city. This in itself is not and should not be a problem if the terms "Bosniak" (as a designation for the most populous nation of the capital of a multinational state), and the term "city" (as a civilizational and politically open structure of equal citizens/inhabitants), are not in collision. Regardless of the fact that in post-war Sarajevo, its public administration was never ethnically discriminatory, it is perceived by the majority of the non-Bosniak citizens of the state as a Bosniak city, a city of one nation, and not as a common, capital city of the state and all of its nations. Exclusionary and ethno-marking perceptions of the capital

in a multinational state, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, are not favorable for its integration. Such a situation represents a challenge for all future city, cantonal and Bosniak politics, given that Bosniak political actors are the decisive shapers of public politics in this area.

In the digital communication space, Sarajevo has the same, if not greater, symbolic capacity than Bosnia itself. Despite that, in the last three decades, Sarajevo has not developed the capacities of an integrating center for the country. The provincialization of Sarajevo, which we are witnessing today, reflects negatively on the state organization of Bosnia. In the perception of Bosnia's citizens, Sarajevo does not have the emotional status of the center of the country. Recently, nothing has changed qualitatively, either formally or essentially, in its extremely negative constitutional-legal status, and in terms of the extent of its competence and responsibility. The reason for this is the self-interested calculations of its political subjects. Deprived, impoverished and status-reduced Sarajevo today lacks many facilities. For example, it lacks a City Library, a building for the Museum of Contemporary Art, a new concert hall or Music Hall, a new gallery of Fine Arts or the buildings of new theaters in new parts of the city. It lacks a Museum of the Siege of Sarajevo, a monument to the defenders of the city, a separate building for the Government of FBiH, a properly developed campus for the University of Sarajevo, a sports arena and not to mention more. Without such infrastructural facilities, the City can hardly have a converging emotional energy or the necessary quality worthy of a state capital. Elitism and high culture should belong to the capital, making it a desirable and valued center, compared to the periphery.

A more intensive overall development of Sarajevo is a prerequisite for making it more attractive, but also gaining it respect. There is no development without openness, inclusive culture and liberal views. Today, the City does not communicate with its environment to the extent it should. This is as a consequence of the last war, but not enough, actually nothing, has been done to overcome this isolationist, almost concentration-camp-like syndrome. The demographic sources of the City's growth from its surroundings are decreasing. Today, it has one hundred thousand fewer inhabitants compared to pre-war times, while the upcoming trends are even more unfavorable. Sarajevo lacks a metropolitan vision of itself as a million-strong, open, rich, technologically and financially developed city that bases its growth on the internationalization of sources of people and capital, and a significant reliance on the wider environment.

We witness the different nature of the 'territorialization of nationality' in the case of the Bosnian entity, Republika Srpska. While the political forces of Sarajevo never did anything programmatically to make that city predominantly mono-national, the political forces of Republika Srpska did everything during the war, from mass crimes, expulsion of the population, murders, concentration camps and genocide, to make what is now called Republika Srpska (RS), mono-ethnic.

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According to the research on the survival policies of non-Bosniak communities in the RS entity, which I conducted with my colleagues two years ago, it is evident that the state, and especially the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has invested considerable material resources in the past decades to help minority non-Serb communities in RS. Despite this, the policy of return and survival has experienced a total failure. Despite all efforts, the mono-ethnic nature of the demographics, and political character of the entity, has only increased over time.

The demographic characteristics of the Bosniak community of that entity, which was the focus of the research, are very unfavorable. Of the 173,000 registered Bosniaks in RS in the 2013 population census, today there are approximately only 50,000, or 5% of the entity's population, who have the status of permanent residents, i.e. those who sleep there on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. The largest number of inhabitants are in two-member families and their average age in many places is over 60 years old. Also, the disparity between newborns and deaths is constantly increasing. The education level of the Bosniak population is also extremely unfavorable. Highly educated Bosniaks in the RS do not have employment, so new university graduates are employed in the Federation or go abroad. Further, social care is disorganized, medical care is minimal and poverty is widespread.

Despite all these negative socio-demographic indicators, we came to a realistically optimistic conclusion that it is still possible to stabilize the biological presence of Bosniaks in Republika Srpska. A prerequisite for achieving this goal is a possible and necessary radical reconceptualization of their current survival policy. This primarily means the construction of a new institutional framework, the establishment of new institutions specified and intended only for that area of life, such as the Bosniak Municipal Councils, the Association of Bosniak Businessmen, the Legal Aid Office, the Bosniak Land Fund, new national cultural events, etc. The construction of this new institutional framework would mean the Bosniaks of RS taking responsibility for their future, the end of federal paternalism over that population and the cessation of treating these citizens primarily as "voters" who are politically needed to delegitimize the RS. The Bosniak community of the RS is so small, weak, disorganized and disqualified by status, that it does not represent any political force, and especially cannot be material for pre-election displays of patriotism by Sarajevo parties. Biological survival and economic recovery are its priority issues.

While from the perspective of Bosniak political actors, Republika Srpska, unfortunately, is often treated as a "foreign country", and from the perspective of dominant Serb policies, this same entity is too often referred to as a "state", research so far shows that this daily-political matrix of high politics has little, or almost no, effect on the daily life of local communities. At the local, municipal level, the insights are quite positive: good inter-ethnic relations are stable, inter-ethnic and

in general human solidarity is maximally expressed. Security issues, along with individual excesses that capture the public's attention, have basically been resolved, while economic issues become a priority. These positive insights represent the basis for a possible stabilization of the multi-ethnic nature of that entity, which otherwise poses a great challenge to the internal and then external sovereignty of the state.

Conclusion

The political, identitarian and socioeconomic challenges that Bosniak politics is facing at the threshold of the 21st century, will essentially determine the character and direction of development of that political community. The clear pro-European political, geopolitical and value orientation of Bosniak political actors, declared in the program, needs clear readings in practice in the coming time. In particular, this refers to the need for strict application of meritocratic principles in politics, the eradication of corruption and the gray economy, consistent rule of law, and proactive conceptualization of one's own policy in accordance with the principles of Bosnia and Herzegovina's ethnic, religious and political plurality.

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SARAJEVO

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Bosnian Language and Education
in the Bosnian Vilayet –
a Sociolinguistic Approach

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Summary

Based on archival material and the processing of the indicated literature on language and education, this paper historiographically, analytically, and critically deals with the sociolinguistic aspects, and key issues regarding the status of the mother tongue and domestic schooling in the social order built during the Bosnian Vilayet. Education in the period of the Bosnian Vilayet is particularly important to study in the domain of the entire history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the context of the opening of the Vilayet Printing House and the intensification of the Bosnian writing in general, and especially considering that at that time the Systemic Education Reform was carried out within Ottoman administration.

Also, in the middle of the 19th century, during the Bosnian Vilayet, live processes of Serbian and Croatian nationalization appeared on Bosnian soil, which gave additional importance to the study of language and education from a sociolinguistic point of view.

Keywords: *Bosnian Vilayet, education, Bosnian language, Croatian language, Serbian language, ethnonational relations*

Introduction

The opening of the Vilayet printing house in the early years of the Bosnian vilayet¹, gave Bosnian (as a mother tongue) a more intensive role in the process of organizing the social system. However, the printing of books by the Vilayet printing house was preceded by the intensification of the Bosnian written word within the manuscripts from the earlier period, but also within editions printed outside of Bosnia, which in terms of the importance of the written word in the vernacular language is equally important for our overall cultural memory. Ottoman educational reforms that correspond with the existence of the Bosnian Vilayet Administration, contributed to the organization and development of the complete educational system in Bosnia as well, especially in the context of the opening of different types of schools, especially higher-ranking schools (such as 'ruždi' and other higher-level schools, such as clerical or administrative schools). Based on this, it is possible to directly monitor the status of Bosnian language issues in the school system at that time, specifically based on available data on school documentation and records and existing valid normative acts on individual schools, but also based on existing available textbooks and other school contents, and above all on valid legal regulations and school rules for this time.

Also, regarding the issues vis-à-vis the status of the Bosnian language in the Vilayet's school system should be viewed here in the broader context of

1 The title a major administrative district or province with its own governor in the Ottoman Empire

questioning social relations and the issue of the relationship to Bosnian as the official language of the Bosnian Vilayet, especially in connection with the extended national Serbian and Croatian ideas in Bosnia in the mid-nineteenth century (and later). Here, the activities of individual foreign consulates played a particularly important role, which would additionally support Catholic and/or Orthodox education in Bosnia, but first of all, attention should be focused on the direct connection of national-political programs and movements with concrete issues of social relations, which often broke down precisely through education, where social relations are often the most visible. This led to the Bosnian Vilayet authorities having to directly interfere in individual issues of school programs and textbook policy. Archive documentation will be available for a more complete insight into all indicated issues.

Bosnian language and education 1865—1878.

There are numerous recent studies on the history of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we should refer to the author's research of Hajrudin Čurić,² Đorđe Pejanović,³ Mitar Papić,⁴ Vojislav Bogičević,⁵ Ismet Kasumović,⁶ Salko Špago⁷ Vlado Pandžić,⁸ and others, and one of the first researches to offer us an insight into the status of the mother tongue in Bosnian Vilayet education is the text "Education and Teaching. History of our initial religious teaching" by Hamdija Mulić, published in the magazine *Biser* from 1918, (issues 11 and 12). After talking about Bosnian authors who wrote in Arabic in the old days, Mulić⁹ stated

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- 2 Hajrudin Čurić, (1986). *Muslimansko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918*. "Veselin Masleša", Sarajevo
 - 3 Đorđe Pejanović, (1953). *Srednje i stručne škole u Bosni i Hercegovini od početka do 1941 godine*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo,
 - 4 Mitar Papić, (1982). *Hrvatsko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. godine* "Veselin Masleša", Sarajevo, and: Mitar Papić, (1978). *Istorija srpskih škola u Bosni i Hercegovini*, "Veselin Masleša", Sarajevo
 - 5 Vojislav Bogičević, (1965). *Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola u Bosni i Hercegovini u doba turske i austrougarske uprave (1463-1818)*, Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika BiH, Sarajevo
 - 6 Ismet Kasumović, "Ruždije – prve niže gimnazije u Bosni i Hercegovini" *Kabes*, časopis za duhovnu i nacionalnu afirmaciju, no. 6, yr. II, Mostar, 1996, pp. 70—71. Also: Ismet Kasumović, *Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave*, (1999). Islamski kulturni centar, Mostar
 - 7 Salko Špago, *Ideje vodilje bosanskohercegovačkog školstva od XV do XIX stoljeća*, (2004). [Nastavnički fakultet Univerziteta 'Džemal Bijedić' u Mostaru, Mostar,
 - 8 Vlado Pandžić, (2006). *Pouke i muke po hrvatskome jeziku u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Hrvatski leksikografski institute Bosne i Hercegovine, Mostar.
 - 9 Hamdija Mulić appeared often and for a long time in our periodical, writing about upbringing and education, and he also wrote several author's special editions within this topic. His book written in Arabic alphabet, printed in the Islamic joint-stock printing house in 1914, under the title: *Za reformu naše nastave*, is particularly recognizable. Also, the same author in the study *Metodika vjerske nastave (nauka o predavanju pojedinih nastavnih predmeta u mektebu)*,

the following: “Just after and ‘ex katedra’ (in lectures) the principle began to be preached, that “we should study in our Bosnian language, and write in Arabic alphabet.”¹⁰ after which the same text goes on to tell about the folk educators Imam, Omer Humo and Imam Mustafa Rakim.¹¹

Hamdija Mulić states that Omer Humo “publicly preached that we should learn in our mother tongue and write books in Arabic letters” (pointed out by J. H.),¹² because the children he taught until then had mostly learned Turkish words by heart, without understanding.

Then it is said about Mustafa Rakim: “There was a contemporary of Omer Humo in Krajina also an Imam, Mustafa Rakim. He also preached that one should learn in his mother tongue and wrote a very nice book for children ‘Muminluci’ in Bosnian language and Arabic letters” (pointed out by J. H.).¹³ It is interesting that ‘Muminluci’ has so far appeared under the title “This is a book written in the Bosnian language.”¹⁴ It is especially important to say that Omer Humo printed his *ilmihal* (book of religious rules) in Constantinople in 1865 and that Mustafa Rakim (as a resident of the Valide Sultanija madrasa in Constantinople), as confirmed by Srđan Janković, three years later (more precisely, in 1868) actually copied (not wrote) a work whose author was “Hadži Ali-Riza, Mehmed Zaim, Bosna—Brodli (Agić?).”¹⁵

(1941), Sarajevo, states that the first religious books in our language were written by Hadži Muhamed Razi Turković (1140—1 191. H.G. / 1722—1786), namely the books “Šuruti Islam” and “Namazluk”, stating that the same author is known for the song of didactic content for children “Čujte, djeco, svikoli” — so it was alhamijado poet Muhamed Velihodžić Razi (apart from the name and these songs, the mentioned years of life of Velihodžić and Turković also match). Velihodžić and , Huković, in the text *Napori za uvođenje narodnog jezika u početne vjerske škole muslimana* states that Razi “was the first of the Muslim intellectuals to request that religious education in schools be taught exclusively in the vernacular, instead of partly in Turkish and the Arabic language” (cf. M. Huković, *Efforts to introduce...*,242). Here, of course, the writings of Abdulvehab Ilhamija, Ahmed Kamboja and others should also be considered, regardless of the fact that, for example, Ilhamija’s *Ilmihal* manuscript, which are similar to Karahodža’s ‘*Namazluci*’, etc. For us, manuscript books are equally important in terms of their place and importance in our overall historiography.

10 Hamdija Mulić, *Odgoj i nastava. Povijest naše početne vjerske nastave* (1918), Časopis Biser, no. 11-12, Mostar, 179.

11 For Mustafa ef. Rakim, the fact that the authorship of the works of Mehmed Zaim Agić is attributed to him is valid, even though Mustafa Rakim only copied them. The coincidence of the name with the famous Turkish calligrapher M. Rakim (1757-1826) is puzzling. It might be that this is also a pseudonym.

12 H. Mulić, “*Odgoj i nastava...*”, 179.

13 H. Mulić, “*Odgoj i nastava*”, p. 179.

14 Srđan Janković, (1988), “Ko je autor prvog našeg štampanog alhamijado teksta?” *Književni jezik*, 17/4, Sarajevo, p. 194. (More precisely, with a somewhat different order of words.)

15 S. Janković “Ko je autor...”, p. 194.

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Photo 1. Beginning of *Sehletul-vusul* by Omer Humo.¹⁶

E. Solak states: “Imam Mehmed Zaim Agić from Bosanski Brod, in 1868, in Istanbul printed a book ‘*Od virovanja kitab*’ (A book of belief) in the Arabic alphabet but in the Bosnian language.”¹⁷

Likewise, Hajrudin Čurić confirms that the first textbook of religious studies in our language was written by Imam Mehmed Zaim Agić (published/written in Bosnia, and duplicated in Constantinople), also states that: “Towards the end of the Turkish rule, scholars began to ensure that the secular and religious books of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were written and printed in the national language, the Bosnian language, as they called it because it was also the official name.”¹⁸

16 In three lines in the title stands *Haza kitabi sehletul—vusul bi lisani bosnevi* (This is a book *Sehletul-vusul* in Bosnian language). More details about Humo’s ilmihal can be found in Munir Drkić, Alen, Kalajđžija, *Sehletul-vusul. Grafika i leksika Sehletul-vusula*, (2010). Muzej Hercegovina, Mostar, We took the source of this page from Fatima, Žutic’, “Books printed on Bosnian language in Arabic script”, 39th Annual Conference MELCom International, Cambridge, 2017. Available online: https://www.melcominternational.org/wpcontent/content/past_conf/2017/2017_papers/Zutic_MI_2017.pdf (accessed April 2022), and for this occasion minimally cleaned the photo visually.

17 Edina Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1850. do 1914. godine*, (2014). Univerzitet u Sarajevu — Institut za jezik, Special editions, vol. 20, Sarajevo, , p. 89.

18 H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo* p. 42.



Photo 2. Summary of Zaim Agić's work 'Ovo (je) od virovanja na bosanski jezik kitab'.¹⁹

A dilemma could arise as to whether “Muminluci” as one of the first printed Muslim books in the Bosnian language (1868) is the original or popular name for “Od virovanja kitab” [A book of belief], or whether it is the other way around, although a direct insight into the manuscript eliminates this dilemma. Also, it is very important to state here that in the middle of the nineteenth century (which corresponds to the beginning of the establishment of the Bosnian Vilayet), some of our important authors appeared who, through their publications in the native language, directly and indirectly, indicated the significance and importance of the Bosnian language in the religious and secular education of that time (which does not contradict the fact that there were such activities much earlier, already from the beginning of the 19th century).

Interestingly, Topal Osman-pasha himself addressed the issue of education at the first session of the Vilayet assembly: Bosnia received a constitutional law in 1865 by imperial decree, according to which, Bosnia and Herzegovina (which until then had been administratively separated),²⁰ was united into one administrative

¹⁹ Here the title is ‘Ovo od virovanja na bosanski jezik kitab’. The last word in the title, in the first line (left): Bosnian; the first word in the second line (right): language. Therefore, the term Muminluci will still be used as an alternative name. A facsimile of the first page is available from Fatima Žutić, “Books printed in the Bosnian language in Arabic script”, 39th Annual Conference MELCom International, Cambridge, (2017). Available online: https://www.melco-international.org/wpcontent/content/past_conf_/2017/2017_papers/Zutic_MI_2017.pdf (access: April 2022)

²⁰ Of course, we are also talking about the earlier short-term separation of the Herzegovinian Sandžak from the framework of the Bosnian Pashaluk.

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area under the name vilayet, headed by a governor – a Valija. At the first vilayet assembly, Valija Topal Osman-pasha also said there was a need for the people to learn to read and write and thus chase away the ignorance that has gripped them (pointed out by J. H.)²¹

Primary education in the Ottoman education system from 1824, started with ‘siby-an-mektebs’ attended by Muslim children,²² and later on, teaching reforms were introduced or new types of schools were opened, so “since 1857, the opening of primary schools was officially approved for all confessions in Bosnia.”²³ Soon, other types of schools were opened, such as the first official secular secondary schools.

One document from the Istanbul Ottoman Archives, under the code “BOA. TSRBNM. 12-13”, talks about the facts concerning the Ottoman administration, Bosnian was the mother tongue in schools in Bosnia, and the document mentions all three of our confessions. Thus, based on this document (“BOA. TSRBNM. 12-13”), it can be seen that as early as January 1864 (25th of Redžeb 1280 year according to the Muslim calendar) as the document is dated, there is talk of monitoring the work of the ‘mekteb’, and especially the Muslim schools in Sarajevo, where there were up to 100 students. It can be seen that it was felt that there was a need to invest more in this school, than for those in Herzegovina. Also, it is stated that there was an ‘Idaija’ school in Sarajevo with as many as 120 students, where the students were in class until noon, and afternoon they dispersed to their shops. It is interesting that, in addition to Muslims, there were also “Christian” and “Latin” children who attended schools. As the document states, the situation with Christian schools was similar to that of Muslim schools, as far as exams and the number of students are concerned, only that Christians managed to open one school for girls aged 6 and 7 to 10 and 11. Although “Latins” were willing to attend Muslim schools, given that they mostly lived outside the city, their number was around 20 to 30 students. It was also mentioned that non-Muslim girls’ schools were successful to the extent that Muslim girls also attended those schools, 3 of them had been enrolled so far, and this circumstance caused various reactions in society. Therefore, it was requested to open a school for Muslim female children which will be in accordance with Islamic values and ideals.²⁴

Golen²⁵ exegetes the document “B.O.A., A.MKT.MHM., 292/64” which, speaking similarly, thematically complements our document, and which was already

21 According to H. Kreševljaković and reports of the Provincial Assembly, in: V. Bogićević, *Istorija razvitka*, p 13.

22 E. Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku* [Discussions on language], p. 63.

23 Ibid

24 İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, BOA. TSRBNM. 12-13. Document and abstract. The translation was given to me by Amina Lila (MA), PhD student at the University of Istanbul, Arabist and a Turkologist, to whom I send my heartfelt thanks.

25 Zafer Golen, “Tanzimat Donerninde Bosna Hersekte Egitim”,(2004). Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, pp. 52—53/2002—2003, Sarajevo,.

transmitted and described in our language by Solak: “When Ahmed Dževdet Pasha completed the control of education in Herzegovina at the beginning of 1864, at the entrance to Sarajevo, as he noted in his letters to the Government, was greeted by Muslim and Christian children, while a “Christian girl” began a speech praising Sultan Abdulaziz.”²⁶

More directly, in the document ‘BOA TSRBNM. 12-13’ for this case, the following is stated:

“Both Christian schools for girls adhere to the teaching of ‘nutuk’ (speech and address of the sultan) and various prayers for the glory of the sultan, which have been translated into Bosnian. When I arrived in Sarajevo, I (Ahmed Dževdet pasha, op. a.) listened to an eleven-year-old student named Branka Bogić,²⁷ who quoted the ‘nutuk’ and wrote it in both languages. I am sending a translation of these prayers in Bosnian together with this report. Along with this, I am also sending a photo of one of the five students who were photographed.”(pointed out by J. H.).²⁸

From the above, it is understood that the mentioned eleven-year-old girl read and wrote and recited in Turkish and Bosnian, and, interestingly, a photograph of one of the girls is also mentioned. Unfortunately, the original handwriting of the girl and the photograph are not available in the archival material.

As far as the ‘mekteb’ as a school is concerned, in the beginning, the following subjects were studied in these schools: “alphabet (elifba), Qur’an, ilmihal (religious studies), writing and mathematics of the four basic operations,”²⁹ and from 1868 the following subjects were added: “spelling (for the teaching of spelling, alphabet books by Bosnian authors were mainly used, which over time underwent various changes, i.e., typographical reforms), useful sciences (ma’limat-i nafi’a), geography and arithmetic”.³⁰ The first secular high schools in the Ottoman administration of the Bosnian Vilayet were the so-called ruždije. “The first ruždijas in Bosnia and Herzegovina were founded in the early sixties of the nineteenth century, more precisely in 1862,”³¹ when they were founded in Sarajevo, Travnik and Banja Luka. The classes lasted four years.

According to the 1869 Ottoman Education Law, the Law on General Education, the native language of the environment was also be used in elementary schools,

26 E. Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku*, p. 64.

27 It can also be read as Ivanka Durgica, Jovanka Kogica, or some third variation. In the BOA document. TSRBNM. pp. 12-13, next to Branka (that is, Ivanka or Jovaka) the name is mentioned and last name and other girls as students, last name Rajković and unclear first name, first perhaps as Zlatka Rajković, and possibly in the reading as Javanka or Jelenka in addition to Zlatka). (I thank E. Solak, A. Kadrić and A. Lili for consultations.)

28 BOA. TSRBNM. pp. 12-13.

29 E. Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku*, p. 63.

30 Ibid.

31 I. Kasumović, “Ruždije...”, p. 71.

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especially concerning the rule that “non-Muslim youth (will) attend religious classes according to their confession, and according to the provisions of their religious institution,”³² i.e. that religious education and “Writing in the notebooks” will be taught to non-Muslim children “in their mother tongue,”³³ i.e. that in lower secondary schools (ruždija), in addition to other subjects, “the language most spoken in the area where the ruždija is located” will be taught.³⁴ Also, some subjects (especially religious) in (ruždija) “will be taught in the language spoken by the population in that place,”³⁵ while there was also a rule that “in non-Muslim ruždijas, instead of Arabic and Persian grammar, the grammar of the mother tongue is taught.”³⁶ It is important to point out that these are general rules, and that for example, in Bosnia, non-Muslims completed the ruždija together with Muslims: “Among the students, there were also members of other religions: Catholics, Orthodox and Jews.”³⁷ Thus, it is known that among those who completed the ruždija in Sarajevo were Orthodox Christians Aleksa Popović Sarajlija and Todo Kreštalica, or Jews Isak Salom, Javer Baruch, and others.³⁸

Also, for the Mostar ruždija, it is stated that Imams Omer and Jusuf attended and were valuable students, and some students of the Catholic faith also graduated: “Among the first to enroll in this school were: Šćepo Zadro, Marko Bokšić, Marko Butigan, Pero Smoljan, Ivan Vlaho, etc. Some were accepted into the civil service, while others continued their education in Constantinople.”³⁹ It is important to point out that according to the available list of subjects in ruždija, H. Čurić (1986) does not provide data on mother tongue (except for a certain Izet who taught “writing”⁴⁰ at the Sarajevo ‘ruždija’, while he confirms that, in addition to Muslims, Jews, Catholics and Orthodox also attended the ‘ruždija’, and some stood out in particular: Javier Baruch, as a graduate of the Sarajevo ‘ruždija’, was later “sent as a Bosnian representative to the Constantinople parliament,” and Ziver Salom after the completion of ruždija “took the post of district commissioner in Damascus”.⁴¹

It is important to point out that according to the several sources available for reviewing the school certificates issued for ‘ruždija’ schools, we still could not find

32 S. Špago, *Ideje vodilje*, p. 150.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid, p. 154.

35 Ibid, p. 155.

36 Ibid.

37 I. Kasumović, “Ruždije..”, p. 71.

38 Ibid.

39 According to S. Traljić, in: H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo*, 148. Čurić also points out that the Sarajevo ruždija was also attended by Catholics, and in Mostar also by Orthodox, but he did not find a list of names.

40 Compare with: H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo*, p. 143.

41 Ibid, p. 144.

‘mother tongue’ listed among the graded subjects,⁴² which cannot be said for other types of secondary schools where we find the Bosnian language listed in the subjects on the final exam and school certificates. Even at very beginnings of the Vilayet government, we can find the official Bosnian language, especially as the official language of official gazettes and newspapers, but also the official mother tongue in education, wider state administration, etc.⁴³

There are sources on how in the Ottoman archival documentation officially, in the administrative sense, the Bosnian language is used for Bosnia and Bosniaks, e.g. when appointing official translators or about the costs of translation from Bosnian or into Bosnian, then when appointing officials who know the Bosnian language. For the newspaper *Bosna*, as an official government gazette, right from the start (1866), it was known it would be published “in Turkish and Bosnian,”⁴⁴ and the same applies to *Sarajevski cvjetnik*, *Neretva*, etc. In the daily news section of some magazines (in domestic periodicals), we also find information about language and schooling.

In the middle of April 1866, the newspaper *Bosanski Vjestnik* published:

“Yesterday, in the presence of His Eminence the Vizier and other vilayet high-ranking officials and some members of the Grand Majlis, there was an examination of some young men, who not long ago voluntarily established themselves to listen to those sciences, which are necessary for them, namely: French, Arabic, Persian and Bosnian as well as reading and writing on the same (pointed out by J. H.); Turkish cursive, geography, and mathematics. They showed great success considering the shortness of time.”⁴⁵

Similarly, data shows that on December 14, 1868 (28 Šaban 1285 according to the lunar calendar) the first final exam was completed in a Sarajevo state administrative and legal school for the education of clerical staff, that is, for the training of civil officials in the Bosnian province.⁴⁶ In the official provincial gazette “*Bosna*” on December 21 1868, a form of school certificate from this school was published, and printed in the Vilayet printing house. In the final school exam, students took the following subjects: Persian language, history, stylistics, geography,

42 Compare: Fatma Issa, *Tanzimat! Döneminde Osmanlı Borsası'nda Rüstiye Mektepleri (1851-1878)*, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Tarih Anabilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul, 2021. URL: <https://hdl.handle.net/11352/3298> (Accessed: 20/04/2022)

43 Compare with E. Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku*, p. 60. Also, about the Bosnian language in the Ottoman era see also in: Alen Kalajdžija, *Počeci službene upotrebe bosanskoga jezika* (2016) *Književni jezik*, 27/1-2, Sarajevo, , pp. 33-55, i.e. in: Jasmin Hodžić, *Bosanski jezik: Statusna pitanja bosanskog jezika kroz historiju nauke o bosanskom jeziku* Simurg media i Internacionalni Univerzitet u Sarajevu, Sarajevo

44 E. Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku*, p. 80.

45 *Bosanski vjestnik* 14. 4. 1866. (available in Gazi Husrev-bey's library in Sarajevo)

46 Compare with H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo*, p. 157.

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and arithmetic, and at the “examination of teacher Rašid” as an assistant to the Bosnian valiija, the aforementioned students took an exam in the Bosnian language (pointed out by J. H.).⁴⁷



Photo 3: Form of school certificate with written Bosnian language in 1868⁴⁸

Detailed information about said certificate is reported in the magazine *Bosna* by Hajrudin Čurić,⁴⁹ and another previous bibliography also recognized this fact about the official Bosnian language in Bosnian civil service schools:

“Clerical schools (Sabah mektebi or morning schools) were formed for the needs of the administration. According to their rank, they were above the ‘ruždija’ schools. The first such school was founded by Sherif Osman-pasha in 1865 in Sarajevo. The subjects taught were stylistics, the Bosnian language, the Persian language, geography, history, arithmetic, and the French language.”⁵⁰ Hajrudin Čurić states that after 1865 this school was closed for a short time, and provides detailed information about its establishment and approval for work. Recognizing the need that in the central place of the Bosnian Vilayet, as well as in the towns of Sandžak, “all literate people could read and write Bosnian, (J.H. pointed out) as well as the other sciences necessary for clerks, the Vilayet government asked the Sultan to open a school for clerks in Sarajevo named “Sabah mektebi, (Morning school)”. From the Grand Vizier’s order dated 11 Muharrem 1283 (May 26, 1866), the Sultan approved the opening of this school.⁵¹

47 *Bosna*, December 21, 1868 (available in Gazi Husrev—bey’s library in Sarajevo)

48 *Bosna*, December 21, 1868 (available in Gazi Husrev—bey’s library in Sarajevo).

49 H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo*, p. 157.

50 S. Špago, *Ideje vodilje*, p. 88.

51 H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo*, p. 155.

It is particularly important that, as Čurić states, this school also had its own official regulation, according to which some basic data from school norms and standards are given, so: “The regulation emphasizes the duty of students to learn Bosnian, the language as “regularly prescribed by the subject.”⁵² As S. Špago later stated, it was planned to also teach French in the school, but H. Čurić states that it was not until the spring of 1869 that he found news about the appointment of a French teacher (May 1, 1869), and that French may have been an optional subject. It is important to point out that according to the data from the school certificate, it can be seen that “examiner Rašid” was in charge of the school’s final exam for the Bosnian language (as we have already stated), although Čurić states that the Bosnian language teacher at the beginning of the school’s operation was “Miloš”, who he thinks might be the famous journalist, Miloš Mandić.⁵³ So, even before the legal provisions on the use of other (non-Oriental) mother tongues in Ottoman education, here we have data demonstrating that the Bosnian language was officially present in primary and secondary schools during Ottoman administration.

Education and the language of Orthodox and Catholics in Bosnian Vilayet

The status of the Bosnian language in the times before the official establishment of the Bosnian Vilayet, is recognizable in the sources on Bosnian linguistic identity, by both Catholics and Orthodox in Bosnia. Ivan Frano Jukić, in his famous book from 1851 entitled “Geography and History of Bosnia” and printed by Ljudevit Gaj in Zagreb, under the pseudonym Slavoljub Bošnjak, states that “there is one nation in Bosnia”, which he views as “Slavic.” He says that “Bosniaks are a branch of this great tree,”⁵⁴ and that they belong to a southern Slavic tribe of that great Slavic European nation. Immediately afterwards, in the same place, he directly mentions the language, that is, the “dialect spoken in Bosnia”, which he claims is “the purest” and that its excellence has been recognized by other scholars.⁵⁵ It is especially important that the Bosnian language Jukić states that : “Bosnia is the only Turkish state, which has remained completely free of the Turkish language, both in villages and towns, other languages than Bosnian are not spoken” (pointed out by J. H.).⁵⁶ In addition to several other available domestic textbooks in Catholic and similarly in Orthodox schools,

⁵² Ibid, p. 156.

⁵³ Ibid. Also, he was the official editor of the Vilayet newspapers in the Bosnian language (compare with E. Solak, *Rasprave o jeziku*).

⁵⁴ Slavoljub Bošnjak (Ivan Frano Jukić), *Zemljopis i poviestnica Bosne*, Brzotisak narodne tiskarnice Ljudevita Gaja, Zagreb, (1851), p. 13.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 16.

textbooks and books that were supplied from Croatia or Serbia were used in practice. It is more interesting to point out the fact that Catholic schools, in contrast to the example of Orthodox schools, had a greater or more open awareness of the local language and national identity, so the harmonization of Croatian textbooks with the local language expression was officially advocated. Bosniak national and Bosnian linguistic identity was not foreign to Bosnian Catholics even in their official statements. The activity of the Bosnian Franciscans, i.e. the official support of the church (and the Croatian linguistic identity appears only sporadically), certainly contributed to this, while the Bosnian Orthodox had to seek rights for their own cultural and linguistic identity within the Orthodox Church, which was in the conflict with Phanariot priests. The cause of the early non-commitment of the Orthodox population to the native-language identity could also be as a result of the Phanariot avoiding worshipping in the local language, which was also manifested in the suppression of the national interest in Orthodox schools in Bosnia.

“The Phanariots (...) were a bigger nuisance for the schools than Turkish regime was⁵⁷... I still remember a Greek teacher named Jejina, who taught children Greek at school and would have expelled the Serbian language (pointed out by J.H.) and who taught in Sarajevo from 1836 to 1838.”⁵⁸

Interestingly, the Ottoman government of the Bosnian vilayet is represented as tolerant towards religious freedom, but also ruthless towards the propagation of national (nationalist) ideas. Mitar Papić states:

”Turks do not and would not mind a school where Orthodox prayers are taught, psalters and hymn writers, but they were merciless when national ideas appeared there, especially when it came to teaching contents (pointed out by J.H.) or any other forms of work in which the issue of national liberation was hinted at. And since Serbian schools at that time were dealing with this, they were very often under attack from the regime.”⁵⁹

On the other hand, during the national awakening, the Bosnian Orthodox did reach for the distinct propagation of national ideas that came from Serbia, which was naturally met with condemnation by the local Ottoman and later Austro-Hungarian authorities. However, in the example of tying the Bosnian Orthodox school system to the Serbian school system and textbooks, we also have a recorded reference to the Bosniak/Bosnian identity of our Orthodox. Vuk Karadžić highlights the Bosniak identity (however we understood it or explain it) of the Orthodox from Bosnia who, according to the practice of that time, procure textbooks in Serbia for their schools in Bosnia.

57 M. Papić, *Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 17.

58 Ibid. p. 16.

59 Ibid.

A note was preserved in Vuk's correspondence, from which it can be seen that books were sometimes bought from Belgrade for Bosnia: "Many times, it happens that Bosniaks come here and ask for school books, so they don't know what kind of books they need, but when they come to the store they want school books, how do you know they are for us because we don't know, and neither do our teachers, which ones are good and which should be bought for the children".⁶⁰

Also, a reference to the Bosnian (Bosniak) identity of our Orthodox in the Bosnian Vilayet (or earlier), directly appears the subject Bosnian language in Orthodox Bosnian schools or the subject Grammar of the Bosnian language, which can be verified by established official sources, and which is not unknown even to Serbian researchers, such as Papić and Bogićević.

Another similar example of the turmoil surrounding the identity of non-Muslims in Bosnia and the open defense of Bosniakism among Bosnian non-Muslims is the example of Antun Knežević (1834—1889), who interestingly reviews Bosniakism and the Bosnian language among Serbs, but also shows how this identity practically changed, according to one of his long stories:

"About thirty years ago, my friend Teofil came from Zadar Petranovic to Sarajevo to organize the Sarajevo Christian Classroom, and for reasons that we all know well, he began to teach in the Classroom how "Cyrillic" is the Serb alphabet and supposedly, we speak Serbian; how all the church books used by Bosnian Christians in the church were written with that Serb alphabet, just as Serbs in Serbia use the same books, and so that Bosnian Christians must be called Serbs according to the church. — A little later, the infamous Pelagić flew to Banja Luka, and following the same instructions, he also made a similar teaching echo throughout Krajina. All Bosniaks were amazed at this previously unheard-of teaching; in fact, the Turkish Government itself began to appeal to, and even disgusted, by this new teaching, especially Vezir Asim - Pasha; but it was refused that Christians are called that only in the ecclesiastical sense, and not by the people. Russian Consul in Sarajevo Hilferding himself had to write whole articles about this matter in newspapers and in his history to defend the Christians. But when Austria-Hungary invaded Bosnia, even more subjugated, our Christians pointed out that they were Serbs by nationality, displayed Serbian flags, and called the Bosnian language Serbian. In this way, a part of the Bosniaks betrayed and destroyed their beloved people and their glorious nationality for the sake of their Serb brothers, from whom they received little or no benefit!"⁶¹

⁶⁰ Papić M., *Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 73.

⁶¹ Varica (electronic version) registration number of the file in the archives of the Franciscan monastery "St. Luke" in Jajce: Monastery Jajce. 277/8—10. (Quotation given according to excerpt, without corrections...)

Knežević also pointed out that: “For nearly fourteen centuries, I have known this country was called Bosnia, its inhabitants Bosniaks, and their language is Bosnian.”⁶²

As we have seen, some propaganda activities were previously highlighted within the spreading of national ideas through education. This was a common occurrence in both Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian times.

Thus, during the Ottoman era, the Serbian national propaganda activities led by Petranović did not go unnoticed. “The teacher at the Serbian school in Sarajevo, Bogoljub (Teofilo) Petranović, who has been working at that school since 1863, was particularly notorious among the Turkish authorities.”⁶³ Also, on a similar occasion, the following is stated: “When the organization “United Serbian Youth” was founded in Novi Sad in 1866, Petranovic joined it together with a larger number of Bosnian youths. In 1867, Topal Osman-paša had a list of suspicious persons, considering the organization of Bosnian youths as “Bosnian heteria” (according to Čorović). In this era, Serbian school teachers Nikola Kašiković, Vaso Pelagić, Savo Kosanović stand out for their similar national work.”⁶⁴

In one of the encyclopedia entries about Topal Osman-pasha⁶⁵ it is stated that: “With various measures, he prevented the spread of the Great Serbian ideology among Bosnian Serbs (expulsion of Pelagic from Bosnia) and fortified the Ottoman-Serbian border on the Drina.”

On the other hand, the following was also noted:

“Since the arrival of Topal Osman-pasha at the head of the Bosnian Vilayet, something really started to be accomplished in the field of education. In April 1866, the Vilayet printing house was opened in Sarajevo, where several textbooks intended for Orthodox and Catholic elementary schools were printed. The textbooks are

62 Ibid.

63 V. Bogićević, *Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola*, p. 15.

64 Ibid.

As reported by Julijan Jelinić, the Sarajevo Society for the Expansion of the Serbian Name and Serbian Thought was also active in our country: “Serbian agitations in Bosnia in 1862 reached such a point that a society was founded in Sarajevo under the chairmanship of priest Teotila Petranović, a native of Drniš official Greek-Eastern names: ‘hrkać’, ‘vlah’, ‘riščanin’, ‘rumi’ and extended Serbian names. Gjuro Rajković from Dubrovnik, Nikola Pavlović, Anton Jehanović, Vaso Hadži-Ristić and Risto-Hadži Ristić joined this company. Society quickly showed itself in its true light. It began to propagate the idea of the imminent collapse of the Ottoman government, of the Serbian future in Bosnia, as well as of the restoration of Dušan’s empire, for which Osman-pasha dismissed him and banished Petranovic, Pavlović and Vasa Hadži-Ristić from Bosnia.” (Julijan Jelinić, *Kultura i bosanski franjevci*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, (1915), pp. 186-187)

65 Topal, Osman-pasha. *Hrvatska enciklopedija, mrežno izdanje*. (2021). Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, Accessed on October 11, 2021 (<http://www.enciklopedija.hr/Natuknica.aspx?ID=61769>).

devoid of articles of a national character and adjusted according to the interests of the regime (pointed out by J. H.).”⁶⁶

Papić also highlights distinct tendency of problematic content in Serbian textbooks, which was also the practice in the Austro-Hungarian era, : “When it comes to banning textbooks, it should be said that there were provocative texts with pronounced nationalist pretensions in reading books and in certain textbooks, especially history and geography textbooks” (pointed out by J.H.). And Serbian newspapers, which stood up to defend these textbooks, often went beyond the framework of national defense positions and sometimes moved to open chauvinistic positions.⁶⁷

At the time, Staka Skenderova stood out from these tendencies as a great Orthodox and women’s educator and founder of the school⁶⁸ to which Sherif Topal Osman Pasha himself sent his children.⁶⁹ Regarding Staka Skenderova (who, as an exception, confirms the previously mentioned rule), it is stated: “Apparently, Staka was not influenced by the ideas preached by Vaso Pelagić at that time, just as she was not overwhelmed by national ideas, which in her time, were strongly penetrating from Serbia.”⁷⁰

It is especially important to refer to the following: “One report has been preserved and from which it can be seen that the Serbian schools sent the curriculum for approval to the Turkish authorities, and because it shows the plan for all four grades of the school in the year 1858.”⁷¹ Risto Šušnjuč left in the both the National and University Libraries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, several of his notebooks in the manuscript under the title “Materials for the history of Serbian schools in the Turkish era,”⁷² and in volume IV, on pages 5 and 6, he provides information about the teaching plan and program from 1858 in a Serbian elementary school in Sarajevo, in which, among other things, the Bosnian language is provided for the third grade, and Bosnian grammar for the fourth grade. Papić singles out a special comment on the Bosnian language in Serbian schools: “Here we find the term “Bosnian language” for the first time, which will sometimes appear

66 V. Bogičević, *Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola*, p. 13.

67 Papić, *Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 152. It should be said that the Austro-Hungarian authorities also assessed contents of Serbian textbooks as extremely harmful, so textbooks were confiscated and banned in the Austro-Hungarian era as a result. Similarly, textbooks from abroad were evaluated as undesirable and domestic textbooks approved by local authorities were sought.

68 Staka founded the Women’s School in Sarajevo in 1858.

69 He materially helped this school and sent his female children to it (see M. Papić, “*Istorija srpskih škola...*”, p. 89). The program of Staka Skenderova Girls’ School is read from one of the official exam from 1870: calculus, chaslovac, psalter, štiea, drawing, Old Slavonic language and handwriting work (highlighted by J. H.) (see M. Papić, “*Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 90).

70 Compare with M. Papić, *Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 92.

71 Ibid, p. 16.

72 Ibid, p. 17.

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later. The national language is called by this name only in those cases when the school appears before the Turkish authorities, by which it could be assumed that the name Serbian language was undesirable (pointed out by J. H.). This can be predicted more because this is precisely the time when the Turkish regime keeps a watchful eye on everything that would have any national overtones".⁷³

Bogićević also, before the others, communicates information about how the Serbian schools' curriculum aligned with the requirements of the then (Ottoman) authorities, citing a direct quote from Vaso Pelagić and Dorđe Karanović from 1872: "The Ottoman administration in Bosnia itself chooses and appoints teachers and determines the teaching plan in schools" (pointed out by J. H.),⁷⁴ highlighting the role of Topal Osman Pasha in particular: "Since Topal Osman Pasha came to power, strict care had to be taken to align the Serbian elementary school curriculum with the requirements of the Turkish administration. ...) From the report that the Church and School Board in Sarajevo sent to the Ottoman authorities, the curriculum had to be sent to the Turkish authorities for approval. To avoid various difficulties with the Turkish authorities, the boards made various changes in the plans."⁷⁵ Bogićević then cites a case from 1858, when on January 30, the Bosnian language was shown in the official curriculum, and then, when the previous plan was approved, already on March 3, it again read "Serbian grammar", "Serbian history", etc.⁷⁶ The same example is with Papić.⁷⁷

| Разред | ПРЕДМЕТИ |
|--------|--|
| I | Буквар, познавање писмена, рачуница и молитве од закона |
| II | Катихизис, читанка, часловац и рачуница |
| III | Земљопис, босански језик и молитва од закона хришћанског |
| IV | Граматика босанског језика, граматика њемачког језика, граматика талијанског језика, рачуница, земљопис, историја, зоологија и катихизис ⁷⁸ |

Photo 4. Bosnian language in an Orthodox school in Sarajevo in 1858.⁷⁸

73 Ibid, p. 20.

74 V. Bogićević, *Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola*, p. 56

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid, pp. 57-58.

77 M. Papić, *Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 21.

78 Ibid, 20.

Topal Osman-pasha took office in 1861 (from 1865 as the ruler of the Bosnian Vilayet), and the Bosnian language was in the official curriculum in the Sarajevo Orthodox school even before Topal Osman -pasha, and not thanks to him, as Bogićević stated.

However, it is not a rare that historians do not agree on the data regarding the name of the mother tongue in older Bosnian schools. Sometimes terminology is used, where precision is not taken into account, so, for example, the author, intends to point out that he was learning his mother tongue and not some oriental language, will say that at some school, for example he was learning Serbo-Croatian or Serbian (where we are talking about Bosnian, etc.). However, sometimes such “mistakes” are more evident than possible mere accidental mistakes, as in the example of the Civil School from 1864, which states that grammar with syntax is taught, and the nominated languages are Italian and Turkish.⁷⁹ Stevo Kaluđerčić gave the previous data under the title First Annual Report of Serbian Primary Schools and Higher Girls’ School in Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 1899 on page 22⁸⁰ and Papić comments on the language: “Serbian language is not listed here because it is self-evident that it was a compulsory subject.”⁸¹ At the same school, Dorđe Pejanović, instead of “grammar with syntax” lists the subject “Serbian grammar with syntax.”⁸² He also refers to Kaluđerčić (1899), Papić’s and Pejanović’s data, which evidently does not agree, and the “underlying” information that the Serbian language was compulsory for the subject is not correct either.

However, numerous other available sources also confirm the proclaimed nomination of the Serbian language in Orthodox schools and in the Bosnian Vilayet, which was defended by later Ottoman school regulations (from 1869) and by the officially cherished principles of tolerance in the educational system.⁸³ Similarly, it is possible to confirm the identity of the Croatian language in the Bosnian province, based on available sources and archival material.

As was the case with the procurement of textbook literature from Serbia for Orthodox schools in Bosnia, Bosnian Catholics also officially prescribed that for textbook school literature, in the absence of domestic textbooks, foreign books should be used instead, of course primarily Croatian: “Scientific books, until our regiment does not see itself as special, let them be the same as those prescribed for the Croatian national schools in the Austrian Empire. (pointed out by J. H.) If the government finds these books for inspection, they should be handed over

79 M. Papić, *Istorija srpskih škola*, p. 85. (According to S. Kaluđerčić, (1899))

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Đ. Pejanović, *Srednje i stručne škole*, p. 34.

83 The problem, however, arises from the fact that the linguistic Serbian and Croatian movements were identities framed within wider national-political propaganda and ideas for joining Bosnia, to Serbia or Croatia.

to it.”⁸⁴ That is why it was not unusual that in addition to the German, French and Italian languages, Croatian⁸⁵ is also mentioned in Martić’s statute (previously it refers to the Sarajevo school founded in 1865, for which Fr. Grga Martić wrote the statute, the aforementioned document of the Institution). Similarly, as in the previously mentioned Sabah-Mektebi clerical school in Sarajevo, founded in the same year (1865), had its official regulations with the Bosnian language as a compulsory subject.⁸⁶ It is more interesting to see what was the official attitude of the Bosnian Franciscans towards the textbooks from Croatia, so here we highlight the recommendation of *Bosna Srebrena* from 1854: “If it were possible, some more scholarly monks should be chosen who would adapt the elementary Croatian folk books to our vernacular language, or from whom they translated. (pointed out by J.H.) Then let the high government be asked to print those books for us at a cheap price in Sarajevo.”⁸⁷

If we look directly at the already existing Franciscan textbooks in Bosnia, we can demonstrate their Bosnian language and Bosniak folk identity.

In 1824, Augustin Miletić edited the book *‘Istomagegne stvari potribitii nauka karstjanskoga za uvz’xbagne diczé, i cegliadi priprastité u darxavi bosankoj’* in Fojnica (printed only in 1828 in Rome), where on page 6, he defines his people with the phrase “A mi nevoglni Boscgnaczi”, referring directly to the education system, also saying: “Neither do we have a school, nor teachers nor printing office, nor a way to print, for anyone to learn to speak our Bosnian...” (pointed out by J. H.)⁸⁸

It is interesting that just one year before the printing of Miletić’s textbook, Ambroža Matić (a grammar schoolteacher and a Bosnian Franciscan priest) in 1827 prepared a mathematics textbook *‘Racsun for the first and second school years’*, “brought from Latin to the Bosnian language” (pointed out by J. H., Matić 1973).. The book was printed in Osijek (Cr) and written in Tolisa near Orašje, at the time of the opening of the first modern-type Bosnian school, approved by Husein-captain Gradašćević and started by Fr. Ilija Starčević in 1823.⁸⁹ Stanko Mijić states: “What was taught in this school was written down by Fr. Martin Nedić in the Book of Church Expenses” on page 205. He writes: “In the same school (he is talking about the school in Tolisa) they teach, protect, write, do math, sing

84 G. Martić, “*Ustanove*”; according to: Mitar Papić, *Stazama prosvjete i kulture*, Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, Sarajevo, p. 45.

85 In a report from the final exam at this school (c. Bosanski Vjestnik, 7 April 1866), after the stated Croatian language, the Bosnian language was also listed as the mother tongue in the exam.

86 Compare with H. Čurić, *Muslimansko školstvo*, p. 155.

87 M. Papić, *Hrvatsko školstvo*, p. 36.

88 Augustin Miletić, *‘Istomagegne stvari potribitii nauka karstjanskoga za uvixbagne dicze i cegliadi priprostite u darxavi bosankoj*, Rome, (1828), p. 6.

89 Ambroža Matić, *Racsun za prvu i drugu godinu shkulsku*, Slovima Divaldovima, Knjigotisca, Osijek, (1827).

the holy mass in the Bosnian language (pointed out by J. H).⁹⁰ Matić also writes about the Bosnian language in the preface of his textbook. The Bosnian identity of Bosnian Franciscans was well-known and it was also manifested in the specific language nomination, regardless of the later Illyrian ideas of certain Bosnian Franciscans. However, considering the previously existing Franciscan textbooks and the open display of Bosnian identity and Bosnian-language-consciousness, the middle of the century there is a kind of middle course. Later it would be that the nomination ‘Croatian language’ also appeared in official textbooks, first among the Franciscans of Herzegovina, as is the case with the textbook “Spelling for Lower Schools in Herzegovina”, printed in Mostar in 1873, written by Franjo Milićević, who would later go on to openly spread right-wing political ideas and propagate an open Croatian national (and linguistic) orientation.

Conclusion

Based on the results presented, we can see the direct sources on the Bosnian language in the school system of the Bosnian Vilayet are available to us, where it is shown that the Bosnian language can be spoken of in two ways, from two different angles: from the so-called “inside” view, based on the available material on school documentation and records, but also with a view “from the outside”, based on how the official representatives (again domestic but also “external”) of the Ottoman administration looked at the issues of regulating language and schooling. In both cases, we are talking about the Bosnian language as an official language, but also about the legal arrangements of educational issues and the ever-increasing space for cultivating other linguistic, religious, and cultural specificities. However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, at the establishment of the Bosnian Vilayet, we certainly have confirmation of an official Bosnian language in our schools, both among Muslims and among Orthodox Christians. However, the awakening of national consciousness and living processes of the Serbian and then the partial Croat nationalizations in Bosnia, led to the fact that already in the time of the Bosnian Vilayet, the extant three-component school system was later supported by a linguistic three-component system, which again corresponds to the protection of different cultural-religious social patterns, of which even the teaching content and school programs were not separated.

If we are talking about components, it should be noted that, according to the available data, members of different religions also attended the schools of other religious groups, = Muslim children attended non-Muslim schools, or vice versa. In this regard, there was a clear, integral Bosnian position on language issues, as was the case with the publication of domestic official gazettes.

⁹⁰ Stanko Mijić, *Razvojni put osnovne škole u Tolisi do prerastanja u osmogodisnju školu* in: Josip Baotić and others, *150 godina Osnovne škole u Tolisi (1823-1973)*, Tolisa, (1973), p. 23.

However, it was established that the authorities of the Bosnian Vilayet had a direct influence on the organization and systematization of individual issues of the school system, e.g. in the official approval of school programs or the management of domestic textbook policy. Everything led to the breaking of spears through the school system concerning broader social relations, which resulted in the banning of certain textbooks or sensitive nationalist attitudes in the school system at the time. This also contributed to the opening of the Vilayet printing house, through which the whole process of textbook policy could be followed concerning the then national-political currents and sensitive ideological orientations and activities of certain educational circles.

Nevertheless, the legal provisions also supported a more tolerant attitude towards other confessions and the use of the language in narrow circles, within the local environment. So at the end of the century, corresponding to the end of the Ottoman administration, we will officially have a more diverse linguistic image of Bosnia at that time and parallel, successful, accepted processes of Serb and Croat nationalization in Bosnia.

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BOSNIA  N
S STUDIES
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MIRZA EMIRHAFIZOVIĆ

The Course of Demographic
Transition in Bosnia and
Herzegovina – an Overview

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Summary

The aim of the paper is to present the course of the demographic transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) within the context of social changes driven by modernization, and the key events that conditioned its dynamics. The focus of the analysis is on the components of the natural movement of BH's population (birth rate and mortality), in accordance with the original assumptions of the theory of demographic transition. Industrialization accompanied by urbanization during socialism, structurally transformed BH's population, which implies that there was a set of socio-economic factors that strongly influenced reproduction. Changes in the structure of households according to the population censuses conducted after the Second World War, including the last one from 2013, are especially considered. The forced entry into the post-transition stage in population development, which can largely be attributed to the consequences of the 1992-1995 war, but also to the post-war crisis, also marks the beginning of a "new" demographic reality, characterized primarily by total depopulation and the progressive aging of the population. Extremely low fertility since 2002, indicates the existence of unfavorable socio-economic conditions for starting a family, i.e. the realization of fertility intentions.

Introduction

BH's contemporary demographic development faces multiple problems and challenges, which are primarily manifested in the country's total depopulation (decrease in the number of inhabitants as a result of years of the dominance of negative components of population dynamics) and progressive aging of the population (increase in the proportion of people in the 'third age' of life while at the same time, there is a decrease in the share of children and youth in the total population). Negative demographic trends should be considered in the light of a group of factors: socio-economic, biological, psychological and others. When analyzing population trends over a wider period of time, the following must be taken into account: the accelerated nature of the birth/fertility transition until the 1980s; the consequences of the war (1992-1995) which are most evident on the demographic level; and finally, BH's post-Dayton permanent political and economic crisis. All these factors have inevitably led to biological regression, which properly took hold during the second decade of the 21st century. The contradictions of BH's demographic development during this multi-decade crisis cannot be fully understood without a deeper and more serious consideration of the specifics that determined these population processes. Therefore, there is a justified need to emphasize the close connection between population reproduction and the (changing) socio-economic context, through the theory of demographic transition.

***MIRZA EMIRHAFIZOVIĆ**

The Course of Demographic Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina – an Overview

Demographic transition - from rural to industrial society

The beginning of BH's demographic transition goes back to the period between the two world wars, in the early 1930s, and is characterized by a drop in mortality, followed by a gradual decrease in the birth rate, with certain oscillations.¹ Unlike the countries of autochthonous demographic transition, changes in the level of birth rate/fertility and mortality in BH were not driven by industrialization and its accompanying processes, but they occurred in the conditions arising from a predominantly agrarian-oriented economy, albeit within the framework of capitalist relations.²

The overcoming of high stationarity was preceded by an increase in the difference between the positive and negative components of natural population movement, and as a result, the rate of natural growth from 1931 to 1939 was stable and significantly higher at that time (approx. 20 per thousand).³ Comparatively, BH had the highest birth rate in the 1930s as part of the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but its value was still significantly below the biological maximum.⁴ Despite the decline in mortality, the level of fertility, due to its long stability, remained unchanged, which determined the growth of the population. Nor did the consequences of the world economic crisis, which occurred at the end of the twenties, significantly provoke a decline in fertility in BH, due to the fact that "a large number of inhabitants (...) lived in agriculturally underdeveloped areas, with strong social norms in the area of reproduction and were significantly isolated from the influence of the social processes of that time."⁵ The high frequency of births is immanent in the rural way of life before modernization; a pro-natal mentality guaranteed the survival and sustainability of the community relying on its own capacities.

Rural BH, with a low degree of urbanization and an underdeveloped social division of labor, at that time still predominantly belonged to the "mechanical solidarity" of pre-modern society (Durkheim), that is, according to Tönnies' dichotomy, it was more a Community (Gemeinschaft) than a Society (Gesellschaft).⁶

1 See more in: Breznik, Dušan (Ed.) (1974). *The Population of Yugoslavia*, C.I.C.R.E.D. Series, (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, Demographic Research Center).

2 See more in: Bošnjović, Ilijas (1990). *Demografska crna jama: nova zamka industrijskog društva*, Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša

3 Grebo, Zlata (1975). *Čovjek, radanje i društvo: socijalna uslovljenost nataliteta i demografska politika u BiH*, Sarajevo: Svjetlost

4 The value of the general birth rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1930s fell from 40.3‰ (1931) to 35.1‰ (1939), see: Rašević, Miroslav (1971). *Determinante fertiliteta stanovništva u Jugoslaviji*, Belgrade: Demographic Research Centre, Institute of Social Sciences

5 Rašević, Miroslav (1971). *Determinante fertiliteta stanovništva u Jugoslaviji*, Belgrade: Demographic Research Centre, Institute of Social Sciences, p. 98

6 The idea of a city that represents the antithesis of traditional rurality is perhaps most closely related to the dichotomy between Community-Society by sociologist F. Tönnies. In essence, he described two basic organizational principles of human cooperation. The first was *gemeinschaft*

The predominantly agrarian character of BH's economy is visible from the employment-structure, according to main occupation data taken from the 1931 census. As much as 84.1 percent of BH's employed population was concentrated in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector, while only 6 to 7 percent were employed in industry and crafts. The almost stagnant economic development during that period was not able to redirect surplus labor from rural areas to non-agricultural activities and thus relieve agrarian overcrowding, which increased with the influx of new generations as a result of high birth rates.⁷

Rurality in the full sense of the word remained the primary feature of BH's society after the end of the Second World War, due to the fact that the majority of the population existed exclusively within the framework of a peasant autarkic society.⁸ According to all the relevant criteria synthesized in the measures of vital statistics, immediately after the Second World War BH, like other less developed countries of the Balkans, was still at the beginning of the demographic transition.⁹ During the period of post-war birth compensation, which lasted until the mid-1950s, the difference between the number of live births and the number of deaths resulted in a very high type of natural increase whose value, regardless of the decline in the birth rate, remained above 20 per thousand until 1966. This type of increase was caused by a decrease in the death rate, especially of infants and children under five years of age, which was facilitated by improvements in health care and other social circumstances.

Thanks to the fact that a different age-specific mortality pattern was achieved, the share in the number of deaths was more and more prevalent in the elderly population,¹⁰ and due to the relatively young age structure, the level of mortality decreased until the 1980s. Therefore, the effects of the fertility transition did not immediately manifest themselves in a decline in the rate of natural increase. The general birth rate registered a constant decline, so that already in the second half of the 1960s, the number of live births per 1,000 inhabitants was less than 30. This trend of a rapidly decreasing birth rate continued into the 1970s, when the birth rate dropped below 20 per thousand, while the death rate has stabilized.

- community, characterized by the cooperation of people for the common good, united by family ties (kinship) and neighborhood and connected by a common language and folklore tradition. At the other end of the spectrum, Tönnies positions a *gesellschaft* - a society characterized by marked individualism and a lack of ties, such as existed in a rural community, Hubbard, (2006).

7 Grebo, Zlata (1975). *Čovjek, rađanje i društvo: socijalna uslovljenost nataliteta i demografska politika u BiH*, ibid.

8 Kamberović, Husnija, (1998) *Osnovna obilježja razvoja društva u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1945. do 1953. godine*, "Časopis za suvremenu povijest", Vol. 30 (359-376)

9 Frejka, Tomas., and Sardon, Jean-Paul (2004). *Childbearing Trends and Prospects in Low-Fertility Countries: A Cohort Analysis. European Studies of Population*, Vol. 13., Dordrecht/ Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic Publishers

10 See more in: Wilmoth, John R. (2000). *Demography of longevity: past, present and future trends. Experimental Gerontology*, 35, pp. 1111-1129.

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The more precise measure of births (the total fertility rate), averaged for most of the 1970s slightly above two children per woman, satisfying simple population reproduction. Despite achieving this model of rational human reproduction, the trend of declining fertility continued with a slightly weaker intensity, so that during the 1980s and until the war (1992-1995), the value of the total fertility rate was between 1.8 and 1.9. Since then, BH has definitely joined the countries facing the problem of insufficient births. In order to fully understand the dynamics behind BH's demographic transition, especially the birth rate transition (from excessive to insufficient births), it is necessary to look at the transformation of the population's socio-economic structures, through which the influence of development factors on population reproduction is realized.¹¹ In this regard, comparing the data of the population census conducted after the Second World War, several prominent trends can be observed, which were stimulated by modernization:

- Continuous decline in the share of the active agricultural population, by more than 55 percentage points from 1953 to 1991 (from 67.5 to 11 percent) as a result of industrial development, i.e. de-agrarianization, urbanization (in a broader sense), intensive migration from rural to urban areas (transfer of excess labor from the countryside) and the strengthening of the tertiary sector.^{12, 13}
- Consequently, the ratio of urban and rural population changed; in the course of thirty years (1961-1991), the share of the urban population almost doubled (from 22.3 to 40 percent).¹⁴
- A dynamic transformation (improvement) of the educational structure of the population also took place, although the situation in 1953 was extremely unfavorable,¹⁵ illiteracy was reduced by the introduction of compulsory primary education, while the share of people aged 15 and over who completed primary and secondary school grew noticeably.

11 This is one of the postulates of the original theoretical model of the demographic transition, which was developed by the American demographer Warren Thompson at the end of the 1920s, Wertheimer-Baletić, (1999).

12 Jugoslovenski leksikografski zavod (1982). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In I. Cecić (ed.), *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, p. 140

13 Federalni zavod za statistiku (1998). Census of population, households, apartments and agricultural holdings in 1991. Comparative data in 1971, 1981 and 1991, Sarajevo: Federalni zavod za statistiku.

14 World Bank, World Bank Open Data. (2021). Urban population (% of total population) - Bosnia and Herzegovina [Data file]. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=BA>

15 See more in: Katz, Vera (2011). *Društveni i ekonomski razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine 1948.-1953.*, Sarajevo: Institut za historiju.

- The share of active women increased significantly; their massive employment introduced unprecedented intergenerational social mobility, which was subsequently reflected in the lowering of reproductive standards (according to the demand of the time, they were primarily recruited in the industrial sector to work in factories).¹⁶

- In addition to migration, the effects of the demographic transition were mostly manifested in the declining natural reduction of the average household size.

The aforementioned structural changes clearly indicate that modernization deeply affected all domains of life, which will be elaborated below.

The existence of a cause-and-effect relationship between the decrease in infant mortality and the drop in fertility is empirically observable in BH. In 1931, the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births was as high as 160.1, which means that 16% of infants in that period died before reaching 364 days of age. In the interval from 1934 to 1937, the infant mortality rate was reduced on average by slightly more than 20 per thousand. In the early 1950s, the value of the infant mortality rate did not decrease significantly, and at 135.5 per thousand, it was higher than the Yugoslav average. However, from the mid-1950s, a more noticeable decrease in infant mortality rate began, continuing over the following decades.

Very high effective fertility, with an average of 5.13 children per woman in 1950, corresponds with the birth rate in the initial stage of the demographic transition. The slower transformation of reproductive patterns can be attributed to the interaction of the historical context (wartime) and the effects of socio-economic factors of the time. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the control of conception and birth was only sporadic, so that even the older fertile cohorts contributed significantly to the population's high fertility. It was only the increase in social awareness about family planning that led to the wider use of contraceptives and other methods of birth control, which made the mastery of natural reproduction more widespread. By accepting new patterns in the field of procreative behavior¹⁷ prerequisites were created for modifying reproductive norms and reducing the number of children in the family. Greater certainty of children's survival, especially in the first year of life, is of crucial importance for changing the reproductive model of cohorts that were entering or were at the beginning of their reproductive age, starting from the mid-1950s. Consequently, in line with different fertility aspirations, the average number of children per woman after the age of 50 is lower than in previous generations, which is evident if one compares cumulative fertility rates based on census results over several decades.

¹⁶ Read more about the numerous problems and challenges women faced during socialism in: Kožul, Franjo. (1973). "*Samoupravni i radni status žene u Bosni i Hercegovini*", Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu: Sarajevo.

¹⁷ Bobić, Mirjana (2007). *Demografija i sociologija – veza ili sinteza*, Belgrade: Official Gazette

The development of industry stimulated the transformation of the family, which gradually adapted to the principles of urban-industrial society. This basically meant the collapse of the patriarchal type of family organization, which had been based on extremely rigid relationships.¹⁸ The radical change in the socio-economic status of women and the multiplication of their roles is one of the most significant phenomena of overall social development. The duality of roles both in the family and outside it, came as a result of the engagement of women in the labor market, which was primarily by enabled socio-economic development, using their potential.^{19, 20} Industrialization also gave a strong impulse to internal migrations, which powerfully impacted the population's structural characteristics, and its territorial distribution. It was industrial-type migration (directed towards urban centers) that caused the creation of areas of concentration and deconcentration of population. Social changes did not bypass rural areas however, primarily those in the immediate vicinity of cities. Demographic behavior precisely serves as one of the relevant criteria for typifying the rural population, according to the traditional-modern ideal-type characteristics.²¹

This quote from Musabegović highlighted that: "The (rural) family is experiencing a significant transformation due to urban influences, first of all by reducing family functions. The biological-reproductive function of the family transforms through the decline in the birth rate of the rural population (...)." ²²

Therefore, apart from the exodus of the rural population, the effects of demographic transition are also reflected in the depopulation of rural areas.²³ The decline in fertility in BH took place according to a model that is typical for late industrialization countries. The fertility transition in the early phase was moderate, and then, as a reaction to the long-term decline in mortality and overall modernization processes, it was extremely dynamic (fertility level decreased in short periods of time), only to slow down again in the mature stage. Comparing the rate of birth/fertility decline and the pace of economic growth, due to their mismatch, the author Bošnjović advocates a thesis about the anticipatory character of the

18 Ackerman, Nathan W. (Kosović, Dušan) (1987), *Psihodinamika porodičnog života: dijagnoza i liječenje porodičnih odnosa*, Titograd: Pobjeda

19 Fočo, Salih (1998). *Sociologija*, Sarajevo: Svjetlost

20 Stojčić (2009: p. 112) notes from a critical perspective that "despite advanced legal solutions and the proclaimed equality of men and women, the reality of everyday life was different. The idea of a woman's dual role as worker and mother, as the one who is primarily responsible for reproduction and the family, was actually never questioned, which resulted in a double burden for women, at the workplace and with responsibilities at home."

21 Šuvar, Stipe (1988). *Sociologija sela 1*, Zagreb: Školska knjiga

22 Musabegović, Nijaz (1997) *Ruralno-urbani antagonizmi i moderni svijet*, Sarajevo: FEB

23 Macura, Miloš (1997). *Stanovništvo i razvoj*, Selected papers (book II), Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.

demographic transition in BH, since it preceded technological development and the dynamics of economic growth. In the 1980s, the country was in the late sub stage of the demographic transition, but still with significant bio-reproductive capacity.²⁴

Analyzing demographic trends in the 1980s, the author Grebo warned already about the repercussions of maintaining the resulting disorder in the reproduction of the population due to the drop in fertility below the level necessary for generational renewal.²⁵ Despite the lowering of the birth rate, demographic inertia is responsible for population growth until the beginning of the war, although the pace of growth was slower than in the previous decade.²⁶

Structural changes of households according to population censuses after the Second World War

Formerly numerically large households in BH, often made up of several families, under the influence of modernization trends (industrialization, urbanization, deagrarianization, rural exodus, increase in the level of education, changes in lifestyle, adoption of different reproductive norms, etc.) were gradually been reduced to single-family communities of the nuclear type.²⁷ In other words, in modern societies, such as BH, the two-generation structure of family households consisting of married couple/parents with children prevails.

The tendency in decreasing household size during the period of intense demographic transition is supported by the data presented in the following table.

24 Bošnović, Ilijas. (1990). *Demografska crna jama: nova zamka industrijskog društva*, ibid.

25 Grebo, Zlata (1985). *Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine 1980-ih godina*, Pregled 11-12, pp. 1263-1295

26 The natural increase in 1980 was 44,813 with a rate of 10.9 per thousand, while ten years later, in 1990, its value was 37,859 with a rate of 8.7 per thousand (RIS FRBiH, 1991).

27 Regarding the transformation of the rural family, the sociologist Musabegović (1997: p.328) writes: "While in the not-so-distant past, family cooperatives dominated, which in recent times appear as exotic and attractive rare remnants of some ancient times, the modern village is characterized by two-generational and three-generation families with a permanent increase in the number of married and single families. Here, it should be pointed out that the decline in the number of household members also conditions the weakening of family, the breaking and transformation of family ties, as well as the ending of the material interdependence of family members, since the growth of employment opportunities results in the individualization of rural family members."

Table 1: Numerical structure of households in BH according to censuses

| The size of the household | 1948 | 1953 | 1961 | 1971 | 1981 | 1991 | 2013 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| In total (=100,00) | 498 116 | 565 212 | 706 107 | 848 545 | 1,030,689 | 1,207,098 | 1,155,736 |
| Single | 8,6 | 9,0 | 10,6 | 9,7 | 9,5 | 10,8 | 19 |
| Two members | 10,1 | 10,0 | 10,8 | 11,5 | 13,9 | 16,7 | 24 |
| Three members | 12,7 | 13,3 | 13,8 | 14,8 | 17,6 | 19,0 | 20 |
| Four members | 14,0 | 15,0 | 17,0 | 20,6 | 25,6 | 28,8 | 20,6 |
| Five members | 14,0 | 14,1 | 15,1 | 15,9 | 14,7 | 13,0 | 9,3 |
| Six members | 12,5 | 12,0 | 11,9 | 11,1 | 8,8 | 6,5 | 4,3 |
| 7 members | 10,0 | 9,4 | 8,4 | 7,1 | 4,7 | 2,8 | 1,6 |
| Eight members | 18,2 | 17,2 | 12,4 | 9,3 | 5,2 | 2,5 | 1,2 |
| The average number of household members | 5,2 | 5,0 | 4,6 | 4,4 | 4,0 | 3,6 | 3,0 |

Source: BHAS, 2022.

The shares of the most numerous households with six, seven, eight and more members were constantly decreasing; the larger the household, the more intense the decline. On the other hand, the opposite tendency - an increase in the share - is observed in households with a smaller number of members, including those with five members, whose share was increasing slightly until 1981. The largest increase (double) in the share was recorded in households with four members, while households with three and two members had an approximately equal relative increase. The share of single households, i.e. households with only one member, increased slightly until 1991.

The decrease in the number of large households and the increase in their total number resulted in a constant decrease in the average number of members in the household. In the time interval from 1953 to 1981, households decreased on average by one person, counting an average of four members. The downward trend in the average number of members per household continued in the following decade, so in 1991 the average number was 3.6 persons.

The demographic consequences of the war (1992-1995) are visible in the reduction of the total number of households as well as their size compared to 1991. In this regard, it should be noted that many families experienced a traumatic exile experience and did not return to their pre-war place of residence after the war's end. The latest available data on household size (from 2013) shows that the share of single-person households increased by 8 percentage points, compared to the

1991 census. Only by means of the socio-demographic characteristics of the persons living alone could it be established which subtype of single household is involved, where age, marital status and parentage are key characteristics. The increase in the share of single households somewhat signals the increasing representation of the “non-family sector,”²⁸ which consists of adults and couples without children.²⁹ Two-member households with a share of almost a quarter (24%) are in the first place by frequency, followed by three-member and four-member households with an equal share (20%), while numerically large households with five or more members in total are less represented than single households.

Post-transition stage in the development of the population - entering the demographic winter

The long-term decline in BH's birth rate, the external migration and the constant increase in the average life expectancy are reflected in the transformation of the population's age structure; the number of children is decreased whilst the number of people aged 60 and over increased, so that the population of BH, according to analytical indicators, was on the threshold of demographic aging in the early 1990s.³⁰

As a result of the war (1992-1995) and the crises posed by post-war multiple transitions, , judging by the level of birth and mortality, the society in BH was forced to enter the post-transition stage in population development, which does not correspond to the level of the standard achieved by the once developed countries of the West, where the course of the demographic transition, unlike BH (but also other countries in the surrounding area), was relatively aligned with the overall socio-economic development. Precisely because of the changed demographic reality with emphasized contradictions, especially in the post-conflict period (from the second half of the 1990s), one can rather speak of “(quasi) post-transition” or “induced transition”.³¹ The phrase ‘demographic winter’³² is used as a metaphor for that stage in the development of the population, because in the age structure,

28 Keilman, Nico (2003). *Demographic and social implications of low fertility for family structures in Europe*. Population Studies N. 43. Council of Europe Publishing.

29 According to the 2013 Census, more than 13% of women aged 40 to 44 have not given birth to a single child (BHAS, 2019).

30 The transition in the domain of birth/fertility and mortality is accompanied by a transition in the age structure of the population (Pool, 2010).

31 Wetheimer-Baletić, Alica (2005). *Razmatranja o posttranzicijskoj etapi razvoja stanovništva*, Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest, 37(1): pp. 377-388.

32 The American documentary film *Demographic Winter* (2008) deals with the causes and consequences of the decline of fertility in industrialized countries, the rate of which is below the level necessary to ensure the simple reproduction of the population in terms of generation renewal. In the film, experts present their observations on demographic challenges, including Gary Becker, former professor at the University of Chicago and winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1981.

due to the continuous decline in fertility and the increase in average life expectancy, there is an increasingly pronounced disparity between the number of children (and younger generations in general) and people in the third age of life. In addition to low fertility, the selectivity of (em)migrants according to age, where people in their 20s and 30s predominate, largely contributes to BH's depopulation processes. All the mentioned negative trends accelerated the aging of the population, which, according to the average age, the proportion of children and young people on one hand, and people over 65 years of age (post-retirement contingent), on the other (as well as other indicators), has already entered the stage of old age.³³




Figure 1: Population trends according to censuses (1953-2013)

Source: BHAS, 2022.

The extent of the destructive consequences of the war (and partly the post-war situation) in terms of population development is illustrated by the data of experts from the Institute of Demography in Vienna, which shows that BH suffered the largest demographic decline of (22 percent³⁴) of all European countries in the period from 1990 to 2017.

A drastic drop in the birth rate is evident when comparing the vital statistics data from 1990 and 2020: the number of live births is almost two and a half times lower than 30 years earlier (66,952 and 27,143 respectively).^{35, 36}

33 Emirhafizović, Mirza, & Zolic, Hasan (2017). *Dobna struktura i reprodukcija stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine*, in: Cvitković, Ivan (ed.), *Demografske i etničke promjene u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Special editions, book CLXXII, Odsjek za društvene nauke, book 9. Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 11–26. DOI: 10.5644/PI2017.172.01.

34 Sobotka, Tomáš., Zeman, Kryštof., Di Lego, Vanessa., Goujon, Anne., Hammer, Bernhard., Loichinger, Elke., Sauerberg, Markus., and Luy, Marc (2018). *European demographic data sheet 2018*. Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/OEAW, WU). http://edds2018.populationeurope.org/download/files/eds2018_key_findings.pdf

35 Data source: Republic Institute of Statistics of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina (RZS SRBiH) (1991). *Statistical yearbook of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: Republički zavod za statistiku).

36 Data source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHAS) (2022). *Demography 2021*. Sarajevo: Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine




Figure 2: Trends in general birth and death rates, and natural increases 1953 - 2020 (in %) Author's construction based on vital statistics data (RSI SRBIH, 1991; BHAS, 2022)

In the immediate post-war years, the low birth rate (below 13 per thousand) was significantly higher than the mortality rate, which resulted in a natural increase rate of more than five per thousand (1996 and 1997). This collapsed in 1998 however. The death rate gained in intensity especially, after entering the new millennium, while the mortality rate increased at the same time. Such tendencies inevitably led to natural depopulation (also known as the “white plague”), so that in 2007, the number of deaths was greater than the number of live births.³⁷ In addition to all other disadvantages, we should take into account the fact that in that period, even the youngest members of the large Baby Boom generation were coming out of their fertile age, so the shift of the center of gravity of biological reproduction to the smaller generations (X, Y, etc.) further narrows the physiological framework.

From 1996 to 2020, the general birth rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina decreased by five per thousand (from 12.8 to 7.8‰), while the general mortality rate in the same period increased by six per thousand (from 6.9 to 12.8‰), which is reflected in the divergence of the respective curves on the graph, starting from 2010 (See Figure 2).³⁸ The tendency toward the growth of the negative value of yearly natural increase does not subside, making biological regression the dominant

37 Emirhafizović, Mirza (2018). *Kad demografska zima zakuca na vrata: Denatalitet i prirodna depopulacija*: Context: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 5(1), pp. 7–24. <https://doi.org/10.55425/23036966.2018.5.1.7>

38 Data source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2022), *ibid.*

determinant of the recent demographic development of BH. On that basis alone, the country lost almost 99,000 inhabitants over the course of ten years, from 2011 to 2021. The reasons for the extremely low fertility rate (below 1.3 children per woman since 2002) in a family-oriented society lie (apart from the war's far-reaching demographic consequences) in a post-conflict reality permeated by political instability; "transitional (new) poverty" (Papić, 2009); structural unemployment;³⁹ precarization of work, institutional corruption, lack of adequate and systemic pro-natal policy measures; plus other numerous other socio-economic problems.⁴⁰ All of these not only cause the delay in transition to parenthood (for which the increase in the average age of first-time mothers is an indicator), and ultimately the failure to realize fertility aspirations, but also repulsive factors that have a strong effect on emigration from BH. Those leaving are mostly people in the optimal fertile and working age. In short, negative natural change (more deaths than live births) and negative migration balance (more emigration than immigration) simultaneously generate a depopulation spiral, which through quantitative-qualitative changes in the population (primarily in its age structure) is reflected in all key aspects of society.

BH's constant reduction of the infant mortality rate (infant mortality) stands out as the only positive demographic trend in the post-war period. From 1996 to 2007, the value of that indicator was halved (from 14 to 6.8 per thousand), only to drop below 5 per thousand for the first time in 2021, or more precisely, 4.6 infant deaths per 1,000 live births were registered.⁴¹

Some authors agree that the differences in demographic trends between the former socialist countries and the rest of the developed world, as well as the rapid population changes of a structural and quantitative nature in Central and Eastern Europe, could be attributed to the extremely different environments in which people have made and are making behavioral choices.^{42, 43}

39 High unemployment in the post-conflict period and insufficient income for those who do have a job make the housing problem unsolvable in the long term for a significant part of the youth population. The unsolved housing issue imposes itself on people in their twenties and even thirties as one of the factors that have a demotivating effect on the formation of a marriage union. See more details about this in: Akrap, Anđelko, Čipin, Ivan (2008) *Stambeni problem, produženi život s roditeljima i odgoda ulaska u brak u Hrvatskoj*. Revija za socijalnu politiku. 15 (3): pp. 415-434.

40 Lutz et al (2006) formulated hypotheses about the low fertility trap containing three independent mechanisms, classified as demographic, social and economic.

41 Data source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHAS) (2022), *ibid*.

42 Katus, Kalev and Zakharov, Sergei V. (1998). *Demographic Adaptation to Socioeconomic Changes in the USSR Successor States*. Paper presented at the IUSSP XXIIIrd General Population Conference, Beijing, October 11-17, 1997 (RU, Series B, No.40. Tallinn: Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre).

43 Philipov, Dimiter and Kohler, Hans-Peter (2001). *Tempo effects in the fertility decline in Eastern Europe: evidence from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia*. European

The traditional, neoclassical view of fertility overlooks, or at least does not explicitly address, the impact of economic uncertainty on the decision to have children, which should not be neglected when trying to explain long-term changes in fertility rates. Uncertainty, which became a characteristic of the transition from the socialist system to capitalism, certainly had a significant impact on the quantum of births. It is well known that workers in socialist countries did not enjoy a particularly high standard of living, but they had secure jobs and incomes, guaranteed pensions, a universal health care system and free education without exception. With the transition to a market economy, this social contract was invalidated, and workers were left without guarantees, facing individual uncertainty in the face of macroeconomic turbulence.^{44, 45}

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the valid normative framework, which is largely based on the traditional value system, and which is confirmed by the empirical findings of research conducted⁴⁶ on the attitudes of the population towards religion, family, marriage, childbirth,⁴⁷ etc., Bosnian society, as well as most other societies of the European south, has not yet embraced the second demographic transition,⁴⁸ although some forms of westernization of the family are noticeable, not only in the structural sense but also in terms of roles and relationships within it.

However, one should consider the fact that the lifestyle of more educated people in urban areas deviates to a certain extent from the standardized paradigm, which

Journal of Population 17(1): pp 37-60.

44 Puljiz (2008: p. 158) underlines some social aspects of the former system: "In addition to social security, derived from employment, certain universal rights were also introduced (e.g. mass education, health care, pension rights for a relatively wide range of citizens, etc.). In larger and more powerful social enterprises, a system of additional social benefits for employees was developed, which affected the standard of living of citizens. Furthermore, a respectable social infrastructure was developed in the socialist period".

45 Brainerd, Elizabeth (2010). *The Demographic Transformation of Post-Socialist Countries: Causes, Consequences, and Questions*. Working Paper No. 2010/15.

46 See in: Kolenović Đapo, Jadranka, and Brkić Šmigoc, Jelena (2020). *Values in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overview of the main findings of the 2019 European values study*, Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

47 Even today, getting married usually precedes the expansion of the family, which is confirmed by the statistical fact that about 90% of all births take place within the framework of marriage. Another important feature of the traditional marriage regime was the "principle of unchanging lifelong partnership" (Lestheaghe, 2010); the durability of a marriage is most often broken by the death of a spouse.

48 University professors van de Kaa and Leasthege, with their theoretical proposition about the second demographic transition, which dates back to the 1980s, tried to emphasize the demographic contrast in relation to the classic demographic transition. See more about this in: Van de Kaa, Dirk J. (2002). "The Idea of a Second Demographic Transition in Industrialized Countries". Paper presented at the Sixth Welfare Policy Seminar of the National Institute of Population and Social Security, Tokyo, Japan, January 29, 2002.

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often results in more liberal views on divorce,⁴⁹ cohabitation, fluidity of living arrangements, illegitimate birth and (permanent) non-participation in reproduction, etc.⁵⁰

Concluding considerations

Birth compensation after the Second World War enabled the continuation of demographic growth, despite the long-term decrease in fertility and the negative migration balance, (which has been a constant factor in BH). The wave of structural changes induced by industrialization and urbanization affected all spheres of society, which ultimately reflected on the reproductive behavior of the population. One of the markers of lifestyle adaptation to the principles of industrial society, is the reduced need for numerous offspring,⁵¹ especially given urbanization, de-agrarianization and mass engagement of women in the labor market. It is important to emphasize that the lowering of reproductive standards was preceded by the suppression of infant mortality, as a result of significant strides made in the domain of public health and the improvement of general hygienic and sanitary conditions. These changes in the structure of households clearly point to the atomization of the Bosnian family.

Population growth was maintained until the 1990s, albeit at a slower pace, precisely thanks to the “echo effect” of the numerous ‘Baby Boom’ generation. Although disruption in population reproduction was already noticeable in the 1980s, the relatively favorable age structure of the population and the birth rate provided an optimistic perspective for demographic development. However, the war of 1992-1995, along with a series of accompanying destructive factors, caused a true demographic catastrophe. High mortality, displacement of people (most often through forced migrations) and unrealized birth rate significantly reduced the population’s reproductive potential. The unsatisfactory levels of refugee-return from abroad in the post-war period, meant the definitive loss of a respectable percentage of the vital population. The mild demographic recovery in the first post-war years, which was manifested in the value of the birth/fertility rate and natural increase, occurred as a reaction of the population to the normalization of life and the return of optimism after experiencing traumatic events. However, entering the new millennium, the number of live births is permanently decreasing, while at the

49 The divorce rate, along with nuptiality and celibacy, signals, depending on its level, which of the two behavioral models the population follows: modern or traditional, Bobić, (2007)

50 Emirhafizović, Mirza and Puhalić, Andrea (2022). *Socio-Economic Challenges to Family Formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Major Issues*. In: Mirza Emirhafizovic, Tali Heiman, Marton Medgyesi, Catarina Pinheiro Mota, Smiljka Tomanovic & Sue Vella (Eds.). *Family Formation Among Youth in Europe: Coping With Socio-Economic Disadvantages* (pp. 1-16). (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing)

51 See more in: Becker, Gary S. (1981) *A treatise on the family*, London: Harvard University Press

same time the number of deaths is increasing due to the increase in the proportion of people in the third age (negative demographic momentum). The depopulation spiral is additionally fueled by the continuous outflow of residents in their optimal working and fertile age, promoting the dynamics of the aging population.

The findings of the research showed that the value orientations and attitudes towards marriage, family and childbirth among the relative majority of respondents in BH belong to the conservative spectrum. Leaving the established normative framework of family foundation in modern Bosnian society, which, among other things, includes the ideal age of marriage and transition to parenthood, desired number of children, etc., these attitudes are often as a result of people's lifestyle, family biography, social background, economic circumstances, level of opportunity costs, migration experience (socialization in a different culture) and other circumstances.

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BOSNIA  STUDIES
SARAJEVO
1

ADNAN DŽAFIĆ

NEZIR KRČALO**

Imposed Trauma of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Society

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Review article

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Summary

Experiencing trauma is a process wherein a painful injury to the community is determined, the victim is determined, responsibility is assigned and appropriate and material consequences are distributed. Collective identity will be changed in an important sense. To the extent that traumas are experienced in this way, they are therefore imagined and represented, as a social fact. It is shared and widely distributed among members of a particular group. It takes on a facticity or externality in relation to each of them and is perceived as imposing and constraining their actions.

A key variable in the analysis of trauma is the management of various resources, social and cultural capital. The trauma that originates from the cultural conflict is overcome by the tolerant attitudes of the educated elite. Better educated groups have better skills for actively dealing with cultural traumas. Another variable can be called social embeddedness, because those who have rich social networks of acquaintances, numerous friends and strong family support are much better prepared to cope with the traumatic reorientation to capitalist enterprise, the free market and individualistic responsibility.

Keywords: *trauma, transition, elites, modernization changes, power.*

Introductory context

The non-consolidation of political democracy and the building of new political institutions was the focus of the earliest reforms that began immediately after the first parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. But it took time for the formal, legal facade to turn into an effective, operational framework for political life. When new institutions start working and become rooted in civil society, they exert a strong educational pressure on trust. However, the democratic transition was interrupted after the recognition of the independence of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on March 1, 1992, by a war that would stop the young democracy's legal and political development. After the re-consolidation of the capitalist market and private property with the adoption of the Constitution in 1995 and a series of special laws dealing with the economic sphere, they built the legal foundation of the new capitalist economy. The principle of private ownership was reaffirmed, state companies were privatized, and the unfinished process of returning property seized during the communist period was completed. At the same time, a new capitalist infrastructure quickly emerged, such as: banks, stock exchanges, brokers, insurance companies, credit unions, mutual funds, and so on. All this was supposed to provide a suitable framework for a true explosion of entrepreneurship, which had evolved over several years from street trading and illicit financial speculation. The democratic reform of Bosnian society was

postponed, and a new legal-political framework and the name of the state were established as part of the peace agreement, which was supposed to provide the basis for the continuation of the already-started democratic transition, but in completely changed social circumstances and with completely wrongly-chosen political leaders. The stability and security of trading conditions, as well as the favorable and safe business environment were interrupted to a significant extent. The realistic chance of inclusion in the Western military, political and economic alliances has disappeared. The growing availability of voluntary associations, clubs, organizations, as well as the increase in the importance of spontaneous social participation, as well as the expansion of personal networks over the last ten years, cannot replace the functioning of institutions that would provide citizens with a sense of security and support.

The process of building the institutions of democratic social organization alone is not enough. It is necessary to reaffirm the functional practices of the previous political experience within the living, but damaged cultural specificity and tradition of Bosnian society. The process of breaking the community and functional society started before the war was continued by the imposition of artificial patterns of socio-political life inappropriate to Bosnia and Herzegovina's historical legacy of individual and collective Bosnian identity.

Changes and cultural trauma

For Sztompka, the concept of cultural trauma is best defined as a culturally defined and interpreted shock to the cultural fabric of society, a model of a traumatic sequence. "Cultural trauma is treated as a link in an ongoing chain of social change; depending on the number of specific circumstances, cultural trauma can be a stage in the constructive morphogenesis of culture or in the destructive cycle of cultural decay."¹

The experience of the 20th century, which embodies social change on an unparalleled scale, leaves us in a different mood - neither too optimistic, nor too progressive. And we feel more skeptical - because we have seen the dark side of change: the costs, pain and suffering it can bring. If we look at the ways in which sociological theories perceive and conceptualize historical change, we can distinguish three types of dominant discourses. First, throughout the 19th century, the discourse of progress prevailed, accompanying the birth and spread of a triumphant modernity. Then, somewhere in the middle of the 20th century, we witnessed the decline of the idea of progress and the rise of the discourse of crisis. "And now, at the end of the twentieth century, we suddenly hear more and more often - in the media, in political and in everyday speech - the strange word trauma, which is

¹ Sztompka, P. (2000). *Cultural trauma: The other face of social change*. *European Journal of Social Theory* 3(4), p. 449

no longer limited to hospitals and psychiatric wards.”² In medical language, this term refers precisely to the impact of a sudden event, which leaves long-term, destructive effects on the body, disabling it in some important aspects. Extended to psychiatric discourse, it is akin to a long-term - destructive effect on the personality, resulting in some form of mental or emotional incapacity. The term trauma applied to the social domain, would mean negative effects on the social body. It would indicate a specific pathology of social action. For social change to be potentially traumatizing, it must have four characteristics, all of which must be present in conjunction. Such a change is characterized by a special temporal quality - it is sudden and fast. It has a special essence and scope - it is radical, deep, comprehensive and touches the core. It has a special origin – it is perceived as imposed, exogenous, coming from outside, as something we did not contribute to, or if we did, then only unconsciously (we ‘suffer traumas’, traumas ‘happen to us’, we ‘encounter traumas’). It meets a certain mental framework - it is perceived as unexpected, unforeseen, surprising, shocking and repulsive. Sztompka³ includes the following social changes that would correspond to the aforementioned characteristics of cultural trauma: revolutions (whether victorious or unsuccessful), coups d’état, racial riots; market collapses, stock market crashes; radical economic reforms (e.g. nationalization or privatization); forced migration or deportation, ethnic cleansing; genocide, extermination, mass murder and acts of terrorism or violence. He also includes events like the assassination of a political leader, the resignation of a high official; the opening secret archives and revelation of the truth about the past; revisionist interpretations of national heroic traditions; the collapse of the empire and finally, lost wars⁴.

Sztompka goes on to explain firstly however, that not all such events cause trauma (although under some conditions they all can, and some actually do). Secondly, the resulting traumas can be radically unequal in strength, duration and significance; and thirdly, cultural trauma does not always have to occur (the effects of potentially traumatizing events can be different, crossing or not reaching the level of cultural trauma). Trauma is not a stable condition, but a dynamic, evolving process.

The starting point of this kind of analysis is the occurrence of some sudden, radical, comprehensive social change (revolutions, sudden social upheavals are prime examples). Such a change is reflected in the domain of culture: there is a tension between old cultural regulations (rules, values, meanings, symbols, discourses, etc.) and an emerging culture adequate to new social conditions. Due to the cultural inertia of the earlier legacies of now outdated cultures, the system for which it was functionally adequate survives, and for some time coexists with

² Ibid, p. 449

³ Ibid, p. 451

⁴ Ibid, p. 452

the new culture, thus becoming functionally inadequate for the new system. This state of cultural rupture or ambivalence provides a convenient background that can give birth to a full-blown cultural trauma: a culturally defined wound in the same culture. Social change also tends to disrupt the lifeworld, leading to several potentially traumatizing events or situations. People use the available collection of cultural resources to interpret those events or situations. Some interpretations consider them traumas and then, a traumatic state appears. In response, people resort to various coping strategies. Meanwhile, social changes take place independently according to their specific pace and concrete causality. When parametric changes exacerbate traumatizing situations, people resort to ineffective (or even counter-effective) coping strategies and an outdated culture is supported and perpetuated by the obsessive cultivation of memories. The second is a benign parametric change that improves traumatizing situations, along with effective trauma coping mechanisms, and the fading of outdated cultural heritage through generational change. Together, these three forces result in the mitigation or elimination of trauma and lead to the final consolidation of a new culture. Here, cultural trauma, despite its immediate negative, painful consequences, shows its positive, functional potential as a force of social emergence. Despite the disruption and disintegration of the cultural order it brings, in different time frames it can be seen as the seed of a new cultural system, an incentive for cultural consolidation or construction. A traumatic state, caused by traumatizing events or situations, culturally interpreted as trauma, in the most general terms is an unusual state, an unusual state of affairs: some disorder, dislocation or disorder, provided that it is experienced or perceived negatively - as painful, harmful, unpleasant, repulsive.⁵ But does cultural trauma always result from some failure or adverse event (in other words, are traumatizing events always negative)? Can cultural trauma also result from success if it is unexpected, unaccustomed, crosses a certain level, undermines the normal routines of collective life? In other words, can traumatizing events be - objectively - positive, useful? A hint of such a possibility is given by Emile Durkheim in his treatise on anomie (1951). A good example on a macro scale is the collapse of communism and the deep, radical transformation of Eastern European societies. It is an event that most people welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm and for some time and for some groups it resulted in traumatic experiences known as transition pains (e.g. unemployment, degradation of status, impoverishment, increase in crime). Trauma is a “social fact” in the Durkheimian sense of the term: it is shared and widely distributed among members of a particular group. It takes on a facticity or externality in relation to each of them and is perceived as imposing and constraining their actions. It is also a collective phenomenon, a condition experienced by a group, community or society, as a result of devastating events that are culturally interpreted as

5 Ibid, pp. 453-454

traumatizing. Trauma affects a collectivity and therefore cannot be treated as an individual psychological problem (as is treated in the rich psychoanalytic literature). A key variable in the analysis of trauma may be the management of various resources, social and cultural capital. Such a variable helps in perceiving, defining and actively dealing with traumas. A central factor in cultural trauma research appears to be education. The higher the level of education, the more perceptive and sensitive people become to cultural traumas. And at the same time, they are better equipped to express trauma. It is no wonder that some of the more subtle and hidden traumas were first noticed and diagnosed by intellectuals, philosophers and social scientists, who provided ready-made definitions and symbolic frameworks for other people to use. More educated groups also tend to have better skills for actively dealing with cultural traumas. But other factors besides education can also play an important role. For those types of trauma that stem from cultural conflict or multiculturalism, tolerant, relativistic attitudes—as opposed to ethnocentrism or dogmatism—will enable people to better cope with the trauma. Another variable can be called social embeddedness. For example, studies of post-communist societies have found that those with rich social networks of acquaintances, numerous friends, and strong family support will be much better prepared to cope with the traumatic reorientation toward capitalist enterprise, free markets, and individualistic responsibility. Giddens rounds out his account of late modernity (1990) with a discussion of the typical responses people take to adapt to pervasive uncertainty or risk. The first is pragmatic acceptance or a business attitude, which manifests itself in focusing on daily tasks and suppressing anxiety from consciousness; the second is sustainable optimism, the belief that somehow things will turn out better and dangers will be averted, as a result of providence, or science, or technology, or ultimate human rationality; the third is cynical pessimism, with a shortened time perspective and a hedonistic desire to enjoy life here and now, before dangers befall us; fourth, there is a radical challenge to the perceived sources of danger, which mostly takes place within social movements. The flow of social change is pervasive and continuous; it knows neither beginnings nor ends. Each episode of change occurs for different reasons, often contingent and different from other episodes. “Within the flow of social changes, a traumatic sequence can appear in a double capacity: as a consequence of some other changes (precipitating events in a suitable context), but also as an initiator of a specific type of change (actions to confront and reshape structures or culture).”⁶

Modernization changes

The general modernization process, according to Kalanj (2007), includes four interconnected dimensions: political modernization, that is, the development of key

⁶ Ibid, pp. 459

institutions (political parties, parliaments, etc.) plus free and secret voting, which enables participation in decision-making. Economic modernization, which includes the growing division of labor, the use of management techniques, the improvement of technology, and the increase of trade facilities; social modernization, leading to increasing literacy, urbanization, the decline of traditional authority and growing social and structural differentiation and finally; cultural modernization, marked by the process of secularization in which religious opinion, the practice of institutions lose their crucial social meaning. “It would therefore be more correct to speak of modernizations that always combine the general idea of modernity with different cultural and social experiences and intertwine with different types of identity patterns and constructions.”⁷ Bosnia and Herzegovina’s society, as well as neighboring societies, went through similar stages in the age of modernization. Namely, in the 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian administration was the bearer of the initial stages of modernization, especially (partly) in the economic and social modernization in the countries of Southeastern Europe. Rimac (2016) states in the three-dimensional process of modernization in the Republic of Croatia, in addition to this first phase, which he calls industrial, there are two more phases - the phase of socialist modernization and the modernization after 1990. “The basic idea of the socialist transition was based on the idea that by changing the way of production, other modernization processes will be initiated that will rapidly modernize the socialist states. But as modernization is carried out by the political pressure of the ruling elites, the whole series of modernization processes, especially in the ‘spiritual’ sphere, is imposed and controlled by the ruling elites.”⁸ In countries that spontaneously entered the modernization process, the development of new economic elites arose from the industrial revolution, and thus defined the need for changes in other spheres. The reforms of the political system reflected in the process of introducing democracy were a consequence of the need for labor in industrial centers. The acquisition of political power in the first phase of the democratic consolidation of societies becomes then, first of all, the need to accelerate the process of industrial growth by freeing the serfs. “Defining the freedom of the individual is the foundation of the establishment of the labor market and enhances the possibilities of economic development. Other political goals, such as demonarchization and the establishment of the national state are perhaps incidental stages in the dismantling of the previous way of establishing political power. The establishment of the rule of law, and within the legal system the establishment of personal legal responsibility is a sequence of changes in the normative sphere that follow the basic idea of freeing

7 Kalanj, R. (2007). *Dimenzije modernizacije i mjesto identiteta. Socijalna ekologija, časopis za ekološku misao i sociološki istraživanja okoline.* (16) 2–3, p. 114

8 Rimac, I. (2016). *Vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu i mogućnosti političkoga konsenzusa*, p. 122, In: Sekulić, D. (ed.) *Vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu.* Zagreb, Centar za demokraciju i pravo ‘Mirko Tripalo’.

the workforce from the previous restrictions of the old system. Only later does the law become the arbiter of the free market.”⁹ Education and science are given the function growing industrial production. Rational administration represents the first goal of modernization, rationality meaning the getting rid of obstacles to accelerating industrial production and economic growth. Economic and management (political) elites have matching goals in the long-term development of society towards the accumulation of wealth through greater production. In this way, social consensus is established on the basis of symbolic unification with a common goal - the growth of the economic power of national economic elites. The social consensus based on the establishment of a goal in the form of economic growth had to be justified by a partial redistribution of economic income, which becomes the main task of political elites. The redistribution of national wealth was measured within the framework of rational maintenance of the balance of capital concentration and consumption of the population, which as a labor force contributes to the growth of capital. “Therefore, political programs in the most developed countries primarily develop models of social redistribution within the balance of capital maintenance and production growth, and management of the symbolic elements of national state cohesion.”¹⁰

The development of the welfare-state model showed over time the expansion of the model of redistribution of social wealth into other spheres of everyday life in accordance with material and technical development, including the possibility of shaping free time, and the expression of higher motivational and value goals of larger groups of the population. This provided the basis for the growth of the tertiary sector. Political models which, in their initial phases, focused on the development of the economic sector and the satisfaction of material resources, changes the view of politics from an activity focused on fulfilling national goals to the activity of ensuring a better life of the population and realizing the right to individual freedoms and the development of individual self-actualization patterns nowadays.

The socialist model of modernization was primarily aimed at economic modernization, which was to be achieved through the accumulation of original capital through agriculture, instead of through industrial development.¹¹

Another very significant mistake of this modernization model was reflected in the imposition of the transition to modernization by political elites through the conquest of political power and the use of the repressive apparatus of the state.

⁹ Ibid, p. 122.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 123.

¹¹ “From the foregoing it is evident that agriculture and the countryside in the first post-war period served as the most important accumulation base for the development of industry, and then overall social development” Musabegović, N. (1997). *Ruralno-urbani antagonizmi i moderni svijet*. Sarajevo, FEB p. 202

Transitional changes in the spheres of spirituality, law, religion and science, instead of being driven by economic reasons and motives of economic growth, were forced (in socialist countries) in this regard and shaped according to the motives of socialist political elites to stay in power.

In the period after the socio-political transition that began at the beginning of the nineties of the 20th century, Bosnia's independence and its transition was stopped by the war. Economic reform continues in the period of post-war reconstruction of the country's destroyed and devastated capacities, but there is also deindustrialization through the decline of economic entities that failed to transform and modernize in the sudden aftermath of developed systems accustomed to the competition of the global economy. Weak economic elites accustomed to economic operations based on socialist principles became part of political elites, who in turn did not have the knowledge for rational economic management. The majority of the previous "economic elites" have retreated into the sphere of politics, from which they were delegated to the economy, creating political programs which, as far as the economy is concerned, are mainly related to inadequate taxation, similar to the socialist model of taxation of tradesmen, and political programs in which redistribution of the national product is planned and social transfers significantly beyond the possibilities of the economy.¹² On the other hand, the economic sphere remains without elites and only in a small number of cases, it survives due to the interest of foreign investors in natural resources, and not in the knowledge and organizational structure of previous production capacities. The political sphere, although taking assuming a democratic structure, is burdened by a form of governance that was taken over from the old political structures. Political programs are without reference to the needs of economic growth, the management of social transfers takes place through social rewards for belonging to a particular political option.¹³ The only change is that now, due to the greater number of political options, relationships are based on the logic of belonging to one political option and therefore can be unproductive when the political option is not in power (Kalanj). Rational management of society requires the use of all available human resources. The policy of inclusion is based on the

12 "(...) demonstrates a system left over from previous socialist times, financially and organizationally weak, deeply damaged by the consequences of war and fragmented along ethnic lines. This is why the social protection policy is not fulfilling its purpose in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving many people outside the system...", in Stambolieva, M., Dehnert, S. (ed.) (2011). *"Welfare States in Transition 20 Years after the Yugoslav Welfare Model"* Sofia, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Office Bulgaria, p. 10

13 "...governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be characterized as neopatrimonialism, defined by patronage and clientelistic power relations within the institutions of the formal legal state", p. 671. According to Shank, neopatrimonialism represents a process in which formal rules function, but in the reality of the same regime informal rules and norms take precedence over formal institutions. In Puljek-Shank, R. (2017). *Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive governance in neopatrimonialism*, Democratization, Routledge, (24)4, pp. 670–688.

idea of increasing the capacity of society to use all its human potential. The use of knowledge and science, as an engine for accelerating economic growth, is used and conditioned by political-ideological divisions.

When analyzing the post-transition state of Southeastern European societies, it would be useful to apply the societal-success model proposed by Bolčić. The conditions for a successful society are, first of all, reflected in the distinct identification of the majority of members with the institutionally-defined society. The observation of the system of property relations and the analysis of the system of social promotion, which essentially determines the social processes that lead to the success or failure of public policies, would be of particular importance in observing the aforementioned companies' success. In addition to the success factors mentioned, the highlighted "ethno-nationalizing" trends in these societies are important. The ignoring of the scientific knowledge offered by social sciences by those in power is a factor in persistent failure (institutional and non-institutional) in shaping and implementing their public policies.¹⁴

In Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding area, except for the countries that became part of the European Union and more or less overcame their transitional difficulties, the model of social participation of free individuals is still blocked by the political control of economic resources and the model of exclusion from social distribution, based on ideological affiliation to one of the political option. In the interpretation of modernization patterns, the situation in BiH is characterized by a series of anomalies that society and certain elites inherit from the previous period of modernization. The occupation of positions of political power by political actors creates political elites, which can function without the need to refer to economic efficiency as a key element of checking the expediency of political governance.

Former socialist countries, instead of focusing on building a welfare state and social consensus, are focusing on the political establishment of national states, as democratic / national states did at the end of the 18th century.¹⁵

14 Bolčić, S. (2019b). *Uspešno društvo i primenjena sociologija*. *Sociologija*, Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije, Belgrade, (Vol. LXI, N° 5), p. 758 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1903323B>.

15 Pusić, E. (2002). *Upravljanje u savremenoj državi*. Zagreb, Suvremena javna uprava, p. 68 "The modern state was created in the 15th and 16th centuries in Europe by expanding the reach of effective and stable political power from a single feudal domain to the wider area that it would become the territory of a nation state. The monopolization of force, as well as the guarantee of peace and security that rests on it was made possible by a triple organizational innovation in the modern state: by creating a professional army, different from the armed retinue of feudal lords; by introducing taxes, different from giving subjects to a feudal lord; and organizing state administration, different from a gathering of courtiers at the court of a ruler. Only the state administration gave the army and its financing the stability without which the guarantee of peace and security in the entire area would be just an empty promise."

For this reason, those countries had a traumatic economic transition from a planned socialist economy to a market that is no longer defined by national borders, but through integration and globalization, has expanded beyond the reach of national political elites. While the normatively desirable variant of capitalism is based on entrepreneurship, political capitalism is based on clientelism and corruption (Dolonec 2016: 94). On the other hand, according to Kalanj (1998), “the symbolic rationality of the transition period is essentially aimed at taking over, imitating and elevating the Western cultural pattern” (Kalanj 1998: 39). Developing this approach, analysts have for some time been trying to determine the variants of capitalism that arose from the collapse of the socialist economies of Eastern Europe, highlighting as their common characteristics such as deindustrialization and high unemployment; high exposure to investment strategies of multinational companies and investment decisions of foreign banks; a decline in the overall level of public investment in social protection; falling expenditure on pensions and education and finally; growing income inequality and the growing risk of poverty. Determining the impact of these variants of capitalism in these countries would mean analyzing the effects of different variants of capitalism with regard to international competitiveness, efficiency and productivity on the one hand, and on the other, the effects in achieving social prosperity (Sztompka). Due to the socio-historical specificities of the countries that abandoned the socialist/communist model of social organization in Europe, Dolonec points to problematic views on the socio-economic development of the countries of the former SFRY. She claims: “...taking a sociological perspective means starting from the assumption that the economic activity of various social actors is a reflection of their position in society and their related economic interest.” From such a perspective, it is quite clear that economic liberalization is in the interests of the elite, while economic paternalism understandably reflects the interests of the majority.¹⁶ In addition, the author also believes that there is no ideal model of the socio-economic path that is the same for all countries of the former socialist system, but that, in addition to the general basic assumptions of the development of a democratic society and the dimensions of modernization (which we stated at the beginning of the text), one should also take into account certain cultural and historical specificities of individual societies, in order not to fall again into the ideological matrices of the “correct” and “wrong” modernization model.

Factors of Societal Success

The failure of post-Yugoslav societies is also reflected in the relationship to trends, both in their geopolitical environment and in the relationship to the widespread

¹⁶ Dolonec, D. (2016). *Nakon devijantne modernizacije, divlji kapitalizam? Genealogija teze i neke kritičke opaske*. In: Sekulić, D. (ed.), *Vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu i mogućnosti političkoga konsenzusa*. Zagreb, Centar za demokraciju i pravo „Mirko Tripalo“, p. 105

expectations of the citizens of those societies during and after the “breakup” of the former Yugoslav society. “Most of these societies do not succeed, even after almost three decades (since 1990), in achieving the social product per inhabitant as it was in 1989, just as they fail to continuously achieve other indicators of positive economic development and a higher quality of life for people in these new societies. These societies have a significant and continuous, temporary and permanent, emigration of the population and, in particular, emigration of the highest quality segments of the workforce. They are dominated by unsuccessful political, economic and cultural elites who fail to implement public policies aimed at bringing these societies closer to modern successful societies.”¹⁷

Society is the individual man’s existential support. Man as an individual can be temporarily “excluded from society”, but permanent exclusion from society calls into question the very existence of socially excluded individuals. A society with which no one identifies does not exist as a real society. A successful society is neither successful nor necessarily a society just because it has large material (money) resources (Bolčić 2019b: 762). Peace, the absence of civil war, the absence of corruption, the rule of law and the existence of institutions that prevent the use of coercive force by the state, are conditions for the success of society and the functionality of institutions.¹⁸ In every society, what is done in that society to activate and skillfully use the available resources, and not just the wealth or scarcity of those resources, is of crucial importance. In addition to the disposal and engagement of all available resources, it is important to point out that property (ownership) relations were inadequately regulated during the years of “socialist construction” in Yugoslavia, in the “social property” regime. The state of inadequately regulated property relations continues in most post-Yugoslav societies. There are only generally, constitutionally, certain basic properties of property relations, partial laws on “privatization” and some other legal norms that regulate property relations, but there are no comprehensive systemic laws on property relations. Reducing “ownership reforms” exclusively to the “story of privatization” of social and state firms was not a valid strategic direction in settling ownership

17 Bolčić, S. (2019b). cited work, p. 761

18 Bolčić (2019b), cited work, p. 763. In the sociological understanding of social success, Bolčić cites the following properties as important: - developed social-systemic ability to activate and use, the effective use of the available material and human resources of a given society; - achieved quality of everyday life, and that of the widest circle of people in a given society; - positive balance in the exchange of goods and services with other companies; - institutionally developed ability to develop and apply innovations and all types of socially useful creativity; - institutional ability to overcome internal social conflicts in a timely and non-destructive manner; - institutional capacity to maintain stable social integration and functional social solidarity; - social-systemic establishment and realization of a social climate for peaceful everyday life, where people’s feelings to live a life that is humanly appropriate and worth living prevail. Each of the mentioned criteria of social success has more concrete indicators that, apparently, in everyday life, sometimes easier, sometimes harder to recognize and define.

relations in post-Yugoslav societies. “Ownership relations regulate important private and social interests, regulate ways to avoid conflicts of interest, as well as the illegitimate use of power (force) in appropriating benefits from the use of certain goods.”¹⁹

The identification of the majority of members of a given society with “their own society” implies stable social integration and functional social solidarity. A successful society must be organized according to the will of its members,²⁰ and enable the realization of their individual interests, but it must also have mechanisms to ensure necessary functional solidarity in order to meet the needs of those parts of society that, under the given circumstances, are unable to ensure the elementary satisfaction of human needs through their own activities. It is about solidarity, which results in systemically arranged solidarity, by which society ensures the elementary humanity of all its members. It is a legacy of modernity based on the experience that functional solidarity and good social integration are a condition for any lasting social progress, that they are, in the last resort, an important factor in the economic efficiency of modern societies. Furthermore, the period in which we have been living for several decades is also a period of mass, persistent long-term unemployment, despite various economic and other policies of the current authorities. Such mass and long-term unemployment is certainly a feature, and one of the important generators, of social failure and social collapse. “Long-term unemployment leads to the fundamental destruction of society. Because people, who are left without a working and existential role in society, essentially remain without social status, ‘remain without society’. But then they also ‘turn their backs on society’ and stop thinking about society, about ‘others’. ‘Official society’, the state and its institutions, can enable and encourage the civil action of its members, but that ‘official society’ can also make it difficult and even prevent such action.”²¹ A mere change of politicians in government institutions does not produce the expected results. Modern, democratically organized societies should generate the creation and survival of successful and respectable elites, especially respectable political elites. If the system of social promotion is

19 Bolčić (2019b), cited work, p. 764.

20 Pusić (2002), cited work, p. 175, “In an institution, the motives, interests, and needs of people in a certain social community are transformed into permanent institutional purposes, and the norms that make up the structure of the institution have become, over time, the normative expectations of the entire social environment.” By converting the motives, interests and needs of people into the purposes of the institution, the motivational effect of those motives ceases. Their permanent satisfaction is now ensured through the institution, so they are no longer the subject of constant attention from interested parties. The organization, as a widespread form of social structure, appears only with the affirmation of a rational orientation in the minds of people. The founders set the organization’s goals with a formal act of its establishment, and in the same formal way the mutual relations between the members of the organization as well as the intended work methods are determined.”

21 Bolčić, S. (2019b). Cited work. p. 767

built on the rise of wrong, low-quality people, as soon as those who do not deserve awards are rewarded, it has a kind of “cancerous” effect on other spheres of society.²² Expertise, competent knowledge of a given area in which one should act, which includes appropriate, often multi-year experience of daily work in a given area is no longer decisive in the selection of people for important positions. This establishes a peculiar paradox - that modern societies that want to establish themselves as “knowledge societies” are collapsing one of the foundations of their success, which is the true professionalization of all spheres of social activity. In social circumstances where society is reduced to a special theological, ethno-national or ideological “community”, a kind of value bias is established, where different standards of valid behavior are applied for those “ours” and those who are “not ours”. Modern societies are more or less heterogeneous communities, they are essentially political communities of equal citizens, despite their many social differences, and any type of subordination of society to a narrower social group generates a series of unfavorable social consequences, which then adversely affect the overall success of the given society. All other social divisions, divisions based on economic, professional, educational, gender, age, narrowly territorial (local, regional) basis are secondary to generating social divisions along ethnic lines, which are difficult to overcome rationally. Society wants to be seen as a community of unique interests, although in reality it is not. “In social reality, ‘citizens’ are not homogenous in terms of interest. Their social problems are usually different, because their interests are different. The role of sociologists is to point out this real social heterogeneity, to the divisions that actually exist in society. Public policies that ignore real social divisions, and public policies are sometimes such that they lead to deep social divisions, cannot be successful public policies. Public policies can also be the direct cause of such splits in society, when they institutionally make the interests of one part of society the central state and social interest.”²³

The effects of ideologized political dissidence after socialism are much easier to trace in the sphere of trust in the organization of governance, such as social institutions.²⁴ Therefore, in such situations, one usually talks about the lack of po-

22 Bolčić S. (2019a). ‘Etnonacionalizacija’ postjugoslovenskih društava: svojstva, akteri, posledice i mogućnosti ‘deetnonacionalizacije’, *Sociologija*, Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije, Belgrade, Vol. LXI, N° 3, pp. 323–346 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1903323B>. See further: “Ethno-nationalization” of society can be advocated, supported and carried out with the support of diverse ideologies – until recently “socialist”, as well as anti-communist, liberal, social democratic, conservative, royalist, and nationalism is only one of the more or less emphasized “layers” of given ideologies and program of political action. p. 336

23 Bolčić, S. (2019b). Cited work. p. 776

24 Pusić (2002): cited work, p. 175: “Formal” means: determined by a positive regulation, statute, contract that is appropriately sanctioned and valid until revoked, or until a different regulation is adopted. And that regardless of whether it is really known to the addressees (“ignorantia iuris neminem excusat”), whether it has been internalized in their consciousness, adopted as their own

litical culture, or more basically, the parochial model of political culture. And with great distrust in others and their management of institutions, trust in the political system generally falls. The lack of socio-cultural capital as an “unfavorable cultural matrix” causes “chronic economic, political and social lag. What runs through the various versions of this thesis is the understanding according to which political culture hinders further social development. While the normatively desirable variant of capitalism is based on entrepreneurship, political capitalism is based on clientelism and corruption”.²⁵ At the beginning of the nineties, economic reforms were introduced that opened up space for entrepreneurial capitalism, but political capitalism still dominates.

However, we do not want to disparage the modernization progress that has been made in the cultural and industrial sphere, and we do not want to sidestep negative ideological guidelines and mistakes in the area of economic, political and social modernization of the Yugoslav-type socialist system. The socio-political situation in which Bosnian society is currently found, is certainly partially the result of the transfer of socio-political socialization from the socialist period. Mistakes also appear due to the uncritical application of the model of social and political transition that took place in European countries over the past hundred years. Due to this, Dolonec warns about the approach in researching the modernization of the countries of the former Yugoslavia: “...the key difference that I would like to point out is in the approach to explaining the diversity and specificity of real capitalist orders. The most dynamic contemporary branch that tries to capture the empirical diversity of real capitalist orders is comparative political economy, whose findings resolutely dispel the myth of real capitalism and its deviations.”²⁶

Power structures as constants of social development

Regarding the analysis of the relationship between local and global societies and the ideas and values on which these societies rest, the theoretical direction of the

principle of action, and especially regardless of whether such a regulation has had time to turn into general expectations within the social community. Greater flexibility in changing and adapting the organization compared to the institution is bought with a lower degree of stabilization and acceptance.

25 Pusić (2002): cited work, p. 174 “By differentiating under the pressure of the complexity of its relevant environment and occasionally changing the integration framework that connects the differentiated parts of the organization into a meaningfully functioning whole, the state as an organization changes. The transformation of the state as a certain form of institution occurs when the existing stabilization consensus no longer corresponds to the real state of society. This exhaustion of the everyday “social contract” manifests itself as a conflict in society, a conflict that breaks through stabilization structures, leads to anomic conditions and requires the imperative creation of a new consensus, a new “social contract”, new foundations for the framework stabilization of society.”

26 Dolonec (2016), cited work, p. 104

authors who analyze society as a result of the action of three dimensions of power: cultural, political and economic is interesting. Sociologists with this view of society try to show how the old forces, throughout history, have never left the stage, but change their roles. The triple power structure consists of participants who deal with sacred matters, i.e. those “who pray”, then those “who fight”, i.e. control the use of means of physical violence, and those “who work”, i.e. manufacturers and traders. For Katunarić (2012), the reconstruction of societies and their myths, according to Dumézil’s sociological analysis, corresponds with the way a good part of sociology analyzes the structure of society. This analysis shows that every complex society has a cultural-ideological sphere whose bearers (in archaic societies the clergy, and in modern ones, experts, intellectuals and the media), justify the existing social order, giving it a higher meaning. The military-political sphere defends order by the threat or direct use of physical force. The economic sphere materially ensures the social order by concentrating wealth in the possession of the upper social class. At the same time, it holds a military-political monopoly, a concentration of physical force, as well as a cultural-ideological one, i.e. monopoly on knowledge-production and the interpretation of the meaning of common life. “Influential sociologists who have dealt with history - such as Weber, Parsons, Gellner, Mann - similarly point to the main sources of social power, which also serve as sources of social inequality and international relations. These are: knowledge, physical violence and economic wealth. Without them all together, the social order is unsustainable.²⁷ Different social epochs change the order of power and the importance of certain of its dimensions. The triadic basis of power firstly placed the clergy in the foreground, the second time it was the military leaders, the third time, the wealthy citizens, although they all remain interconnected and necessary to each other. “But, in order to maintain itself, the winning side must establish a tripartite system as soon as possible, which Dumézil calls a ‘three-functional’ and ‘whole society.’”²⁸ The lack of any of the vital resources - material goods, armies and knowledge (from religious ideas and ideological rhetoric to technology) - results in the disintegration of society. Throughout history, two fundamental systems of power have crystallized. The first is the one with military-political dominance. In it, violence is used frequently, directly and in a brutal way both against subordinates and in interstate relations. The power system with economic dominance is the second, and it refers to developed capitalist societies. Their main goal is the accumulation of profits, while other dimensions of social life and international relations are subordinate to it. Since the second half of the 20th century, both systems of power have stabilized and become less and less mutually exclusive, and more and more complementary. Where capitalism does not lead to general social well-being, political regimes often resort to physical violence. In developed capitalist societies,

²⁷ Katunarić, V. (2012). *Putovi modernih društava*, Zagreb, Antibarbarus. p. 119

²⁸ Ibid, p. 120

ruling groups rely on more comfortable ways of ruling. The main lever of government is the purchasing power of the population, which truly enjoys consumption. However, economic crises call into question such comfort, as well as the further maintenance of power by democratic means. In such a framework, there is no place to explain why the key values of the modern era in the West - freedom, equality and fraternity - cannot influence the further transformation of a power system that is able to meet the world of democracy without borders and violence. They are not there because they are sunk in their economic and political practices that put reckless interest in the foreground. In the past, capitalism and democracy fought together against feudalism and monarchy, and then against Bolshevik socialism. After the removal of socialism, the modern system practically no longer fights against the unmodern. In the West, interest in the spread of democracy in the world has declined. Not only is the West most interested in the expansion of its own markets and the economic exploitation of others, but it will gladly leave the bad consequences of economic failure in a large number of countries to the care of the local political elites, who hardly deal with anything other than corruption and violence against dissenters. Capitalism and its allied cultures that imitate it can do no harm as long as the majority of people are under their control, materially or spiritually.

Conclusion

Now we have to take a longer perspective and ask why, several years after the events stemming from the reforms aimed at building a of Western-type open, democratic, market society, the syndrome of mistrust is still so present. The state of uncertainty, insecurity, ambiguity and opacity in the “life world” of post-communist people is still evident. Trust is based on anticipation of the future. “Such predictions in return imply certain ideas about the future social structure, its scope and mechanisms of social mobility, and about the gains and losses resulting from the transformation process. Uncertainties manifest in many ways. First, there is a greatly expanded “risk environment that collectively affects large masses of individuals”.²⁹ Unemployment and its threat obviously give rise to anxiety, insecurity, frustration and general distrusts in the system and its future. Almost equally threatening, is the risk of inflation and financial instability actualized by the ongoing global financial, health and war-induced crises. A general sense of uncertainty is also a consequence of normative disorganization or anomie. The legal system is a fragmented mosaic of partial regulations, old and new. It is often inconsistent, repeatedly changed and arbitrarily interpreted. The overload of rules, regulations, administrative codes and their conflicting interpretations makes them incomprehensible. A new constitution is still missing, as dozens of projects are

²⁹ Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 35

being debated by divided parliaments. The rule of law is threatened by extra-legal decisions of the highest authorities, including the presidency, and by retroactive laws passed by parliaments from time to time. Confidence in the continuity, stability and orderliness of social life has been effectively undermined. The state of anomie also extends to the political domain. Among broad groups of the population, there is complete disorientation in the mechanisms of excessively pluralistic and “democratic” politics.

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BOSNIA  N
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
1992-1995: Historical Context

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Summary

This paper analyzes the historical context of the events that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) during the period of dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), as well as the preparation of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), the Serb and Serbian political leadership in B&H and in Belgrade for armed conflict. To achieve the "strategic goals of the Serb people", the crime of genocide was committed, as well as other crimes (crimes against the values protected by international law), against the non-Serb, predominantly Bosniak group, in areas that, according to the aforementioned goals, are defined as "strategically important" territory that should become part of the Greater Serbian state. The elimination of borders on the Drina meant the occupation of areas where, according to the 1991 census, the Bosniak population dominated. The establishment of the borders on the Una River also meant the occupation of a large part of the territory of Bosanska Krajina by Serb forces. Ratko Mladić himself, during his presentation at the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serb People in B&H, qualified the realization of the strategic goals as a crime of genocide.

The paper also aims to present a historical synthesis of events in B&H during 1992-1995, with special emphasis on the crimes committed during the occupation of a part of B&H's territory. However, due to the inability to include, mention and analyze all crimes, only certain segments of crimes, committed from the Drina to the Una, will be presented in the paper, with firstly an analysis of certain orders given by the military and political leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the newly created Bosnian-Serb para-state entity, Republika Srpska (RS), and secondly, an interpretation of these crimes in, for example, Ratko Mladić's notebooks, as well as in numerous other documents of different provenances.

Court verdicts and public discourse also dominate topics related to the Genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995, while the genocide committed in B&H in 1992 is only discussed in the context of the final verdicts in the Karadžić and Mladić cases. The paper will draw attention to the prosecution of genocide in other Bosnian and Herzegovinian cities for the period from April to December 1992, based on which one can determine a strong element of the continuity, goals and intentions of an unchanging policy, which reached its culmination during July 1995.

Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of the SFRY's dissolution

In the years after World War II, the Chetnik movement was characterized as a collaborative and quisling movement and its individual commanders were brought to trial.¹ But since many Chetniks, perpetrators of crimes, moved to partisans, i.e. they replaced cockades with five-pointed stars,² many of the crimes they committed against Bosniaks were mentioned within the a narrow circle of the family. Until the 1980s, World War II was written about from the position of a winner.³ With the cessation of communist pressure, in the 1980s, a turning point in historiography began and one could write more freely about hitherto taboo and “sensitive” topics. Thus, a distance of almost half a century was necessary before it became possible to investigate in more detail the number of victims in World War II,⁴ as well as the crimes committed by the Chetniks, but also by the Partisans. In this context, Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletić published a series of documents and testimonies about crimes committed against Bosniaks, calling these crimes genocide.⁵

In the second half of the 1980s, Slobodan Milošević's insistence on reorganizing the SFRY upon the basis of Greater Serbian aspirations, according to the principle of “all Serbs in one state”, i.e. that “Serbian land is where Serbian bones are.”⁶

- 1 On July 15, 1946, the Military Council of Supreme Court of the FPRY sentenced Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, Stevan Moljević and 22 other members of the Chetnik movement. See: Zečević, Miodrag (2001). *Dokumenta sa suđenja Ravnogorskom pokretu*, June 10 - July 15, 1946, 1st book, Belgrade: SUBNOR Jugoslavija.
- 2 “Recent Chetnik dukes, e.g. Strajo Kočović, Ranko Popadić, known to the Muslim population for their crimes, were appointed as commanding partisan staff after the arrival of the communists. After Zulfikarpašić's indignation because of their admission to the partisan ranks, Rodoljub Čolaković replied: “If we arrested the butchers among the local Serbs, then we would arrest half of our People's Committee and most of the soldiers.” Zulfikarpašić, Adil-beg. (2001). *Panorama Pogleda, Pojmova, Pojava i Mišljenja*, Belgrade p. 256.-260. Nataša Zimonjić-Čengić's confession, BH Dani, no. 263, 20 June 2002.
- 3 For example, in the early 1970s, research on the ‘Crisis in the National Liberation Movement’ was met with fierce criticism, such as Rasim Hurem's book, which was attacked by most historians. See: Hurem, Rasim, (1972). *Kriza Narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Bosni i Hercegovini krajem 1941. i početkom 1942. godine*, Sarajevo: Svjetlost; About the reactions to Rasim Hurem's book as well as the attacks on Pašaga Mandžić, who also pointed out mistakes due to Partisan-Chetnik cooperation during 1941-1942, see more in: Kamberović, Husnija. (2006). *Najnoviji pogledi na Drugi svjetski rat u Bosni i Hercegovini*, in: *60 godina od završetka Drugog svjetskog rata – kako se sjećati 1945. Godine*, Collection of works, Sarajevo: Institut za historiju u Sarajevu, pp. 25 – 35.
- 4 Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić independently determined the numbers of victims of the Second World War.
- 5 Dedijer, Vladimir and Miletić, Antun, (1990). *Genocid nad Muslimanima 1941 – 1945*, Collection of documents and testimonies, Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
- 6 This part of the work “B&H in the context of the dissolution of the SFRY” is partly based on a part of the author's book, in which, under the same title, she explains these extremely important questions for understanding the Greater Serbian aspirations and preparations for attacks on B&H. Karović-Babić, Merisa, (2014). *Masovna ubistva civila u Sarajevu u vrijeme opsade*

On this occasion, the organizers of the aforementioned rallies took the relics of Prince Lazar from the Orthodox Patriarchate in Belgrade and with them made a tour of Orthodox monasteries in Serbia, B&H, Croatia and Kosovo, thus setting the boundaries of Greater Serbia. At the same time, thousands of anonymous corpses (supposedly Serb killed in WWII) exhumed from pits in Herzegovina were re-buried in mass graves, although it was not clear whether they were Serbian victims at all.⁷ The goal was to create a sense of paranoia, by constantly insisting on the endangerment of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia,⁸ and for this purpose, the number of Serbian victims of the Jasenovac concentration camp increased up to fourteen times⁹ compared to the real ones established by Kočović and Žerjavić.¹⁰ Previously, Slobodan Milošević, as the newly elected president of the Central Committee of the Communists' Union Serbia, chose the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo as an occasion to hint at the possible need for armed battles, in order to defend Serbian unity.¹¹ Such aspirations about the open domination of Serbia in Yugoslavia and the strengthening of "Greater Serbia" rightly encouraged even more separatist movements of republics that did not want to live in such a Yugoslavia.¹² One of the ways of achieving this plan was an attempt to more fully transform the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia into a Greater Serbian ruling party, which would ensure the complete transformation of the former Yugoslavia into a greater Serbia via a one-party system, democratic centralism and dictatorship.¹³

In the second half of the 1980s, the YPA became a predominantly Serbian army,¹⁴ and in the early 1990s it defined it's the army with a clear goal as defending Greater Serbia. The Federal Secretary for National Defense of the SFRY, General

1992-1995, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, pp. 23-33.

7 Donia J. Robert, July 30, (2002). *Kreiranje Republike Srpske 1990-1992. Poreklo i opšti kontekst.*, ICTY Expert Report; in: *Bosna i Hercegovina – jezgro velikosrpskog projekta*, editor Biserko, Sonja (2006). Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava, Belgrade, p. 158.

8 For example, see *Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (nacrt)*, (1986), Cyrillic text, see especially: pp. 37 – 74.

9 Radomir Bulatović claimed that 1,110,929 Serbs were killed in Jasenovac. See: Bulatović, Radomir (1990). *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac s posebnim osvrtom na Donju Gradinu*, Svjetlost.

10 Žerjavić determined that around 83,000 victims were killed in the Jasenovac camp. Žerjavić, Vladimir, (1989), *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb: Jugoslovenski viktimološki institut. In connection with this, see also: Kočović, Bogoljub (1990). *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji*, Sarajevo: Svjetlost.

11 Silber, Laura and Little, Alan, (1996). *Smrt Jugoslavije*, Opatija, Otokar Keršovani, p. 62;

12 On the aspiration for Serbia's dominance in Yugoslavia or the aspiration to realize Greater Serbian interests through separatism, which, as such, fed other separatisms, see: Dizdarević, Raif, (1999). *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: Svjedočenja*, Sarajevo: OKO, p. 292.

13 Tomac, Zdravko, (1992). *Iza zatvorenih vrata. Tako se stvarala hrvastka država*, Zagreb; Organizator , p. 48.

14 Radaković, Ilija T., (2003). *Besmislena YU ratovanja 1990-1995*, Belgrade: Society for the truth about the anti-fascist national liberation struggle in Yugoslavia (1941-1945), p. 57 – 59.

Veljko Kadijević, in his memoirs, talks about the tasks of the YPA on several occasions as: “protecting and defending the Serbian people outside Serbia and collecting the YPA in the borders of the future Yugoslavia.” After the crimes and occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia, Kadijević notes that the YPA “fully achieved the goals of this phase of the conflict – protected the Serbian people in Croatia, it enabled and helped them prepare militarily and even politically for the events that will follow.”¹⁵

At a secret meeting in Karađorđevo (Serbia), Milošević and Tuđman (the Croatian President), modeled on the political leaders from the end of the first Yugoslavia, Cvetković and Maček,¹⁶ discussed the division of B&H between Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian appetites.¹⁷ In the exact opposite direction, the aspirations of Izetbegović and Gligorov (then Presidents of B&H and Macedonia respectively) went with the aim of preserving Yugoslavia on the principle of the so-called “asymmetric federation”, and for this purpose on June 3, 1991, they published a joint proposal entitled “Platform on the Future Yugoslav Community”.¹⁸ However, this idea did not meet with the understanding of the main actors of the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis, because Slovenia and Croatia, forced by Greater Serbian politics,¹⁹ had already moved well into the direction of building their own independence.²⁰ Parallel to the crimes of the YPA in Croatia, the siege of Zadar, Dubrovnik, the siege of Vukovar (which ended in the occupation and the commission of mass crimes in this city²¹) in B&H, in addition to occasional

15 Kadijević, Veljko, (1993). *Moje viđenje raspada: Vojska bez države*, Belgrade; Politika, p. 114. and 128.

16 Boban, Ljubo, (1965). *Sporazum Cvetković-Maček*, Belgrade: Institut za sociološke nauke – odsjek za historijske nauke.

17 About this, as well as later agreements, on the partition of Bosnia in Tikveš, Gratz and Njivice, see: Minić, Miloš (1998), *Dogovori u Karađorđevu o podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine*, Rabić, Sarajevo, pp. 21 – 104. See also: Bilandžić, Dušan, (2006). *Povijest izbliza: Memoarski zapisi 1945-2005*, Zagreb, Prometej, p. 372 – 374; Mesić, Stjepan, (2008). *Jas sam dogovorio sastanak u Karađorđevu*, Author of the interview: Omer Karabeg, *Svjedoci raspada* Radio Slobodna Evropa.

18 Silber, Laura and Little, Allan (1996), Gligorov Kiro, *Podjela živog mesa*, Interview author: Omer Karabeg, *Svjedoci raspada*, Radio Slobodna Evropa, February 2008.

19 The latest in a series of examples of this kind of policy was reflected in the obstruction of the election of Stjepan Mesić as the President of the SFRY Presidency. Mesić was supposed to take over from Borisav Jović on May 15, 1991, and was elected only at the end of June 1991. See: Mesić, Stjepan, (1994). *Kako je srušena Jugoslavija: politički memoari*, Mislavpress, Zagreb, 2nd edition, pp. 1–82 and Jović, Borisav, (1995). *Poslednji dani SFRJ: Dnevne zabeleške iz perioda 15.5. 1989 - 8.7. 1992*. Belgrade: Politika, pp. 325 – 348

20 For example, back in July 1990, the Assembly of Slovenia took a key step towards independence by adopting a resolution declaring the sovereignty of Slovenia (Donia R. J. (2002), in: S. Biserko (ed.), *BiH – jezgro...*, p. 159).

21 ICTY, IT-95-13/1-T, Before Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Judgment, 2007, para. 63 – 253

armed attacks,²² a real political struggle took place over whether it would exit or stay in the rump Yugoslavia.²³ In this context, as the main parliamentary issue, on October 14 and 15, 1991, the Platform on the position of BiH in solving the Yugoslav crisis was imposed, to which the deputies of the nationalist SDS (Serbian Democratic Movement) and SPO (Serbian Renewal Movement) present in the Assembly of the Republic of B&H, reacted very violently. This was followed by the previously well-designed and planned actions of SDS politicians, who, for several months, had aimed at breaking with the legitimate Assembly of the RBiH.²⁴ It was at this session that Karadžić “asked” his parliamentary colleagues to take seriously “the interpretation of the political will of the Serbian people”, otherwise he would “lead Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell, and the Muslim people perhaps to disappear”.²⁵ The following day, delegates from the SDA and HDZ continued the session of the Assembly, and in the absence of SDS deputies, adopted the Declaration on Sovereignty and platform of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁶ Contrary to the efforts of the Conference of the European Community on Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission, to find peaceful solutions to the issues between the states that emerged as a result of the dissolution of the SFRY,²⁷ members of the SDS, with the full support

22 Čekić, Smil, (2004). *Agresija na republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Plkaniranje, priprema, izvođenje*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, pp. 783–784; ICTY, IT-98/29/1, Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Expert Report: Donia R. J., December (2006), *Od izbora do mrtve tačke. Geneza opsade Sarajeva, 1990-1994* p. 10.

23 For the SDA, one of the winning parties in the 1990 elections, Croatia remaining in Yugoslavia was the minimum condition under which B&H would agree to such a solution. However, the Muslim-Bosniak Organization (MBO) went in the direction of Serb-Bosniak reconciliation, which, however, was never concluded, although during August 1991, in the organization of SDS and MBO, several events were held under the title Brotherhood - peace – agreement. See more: Kamberović, Husnija (2011). *Hod po trnju: Iz bosanskohercegovačke historije 20. stoljeća*, Institut za historiju, Sarajevo, pp. 268 – 272).

24 Patrick, Treanor J., (2002). *Lideri Srpske demokratske stranke. Rukovodstvo bosanskih Srba 1990-1992*, (Expert report for case no. IT-00-39 and 40 – Krajišnik and Plavšić), (2002), in: S. Biserko (ed.), *BiH - jezgro...*, p. 302.

25 ICTY, 02963907, Continuation of the 8th Council Session of the SRBiH Assembly, October 14, 1991, Radovan Karadžić, p. 89/2 AG.

26 ICTY, IT-98/29/1, Donia J. R., *Od izbora do mrtve tačke...* p. 6.

27 The Arbitration Commission in Opinion no. 1 of November 29, 1991 stated that SFRY is in the process of disintegration - dissolution. Also, more about the succession, as a legal consequence of the dissolution of the SFRY, and not the secession of the Yugoslav republics, see especially the Opinion of the Arbitration Commission no. 8, 9, 10 and 11, and their legal interpretation in: Begić, Kasim (1997). *Bosna I Hercegovina od Vancove misije do Daytonskog sporazuma (1991-1996)*, Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga, p. 35; Kazazić, Vesna (2006). *Promjena suvereniteta i sukcesija kao instituta međunarodnog javnog prava*, Ljudska prava, Časopis za sve legalne I političke probleme, year 7, no. 1-2, Sarajevo: Institut za ljudska prava, pp. 17 – 27.

of Slobodan Milošević and the YPA, formed parastatal authorities,²⁸ which was a violation of the constitutional legal order of the FRBiH.²⁹

Meanwhile, on January 15, the European Community, with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, decided that the condition for the recognition of B&H as an independent and sovereign state would be to call a referendum under international control, as an institutional form of citizens' decision-making, provided for in the Constitution of the FRBiH.³⁰ Ten days after the announcement of this condition of the European Community, the Assembly of FRBiH called a referendum for February 29 and March 1, 1992.³¹ Despite the incidents and boycotts recorded on the very days of the referendum,³² it was successfully held, and five days after the polling stations closed, the results of the vote were announced, according to which, out of the total number of voters who went to the referendum (64.31% of voters), 99.44% of these voted for a sovereign and independent BiH.³³

Previously, during intensive discussions regarding the vote of the current Platform on the position of BiH in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, Karadzic repeatedly stated his intention to destroy Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) as an ethnic, religious and national group. During a telephone conversation with the poet Gojko Đogo, he repeated several times that Muslims will disappear, that "there will be blood up to their knees", because "there are 20,000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo", and that this city will be "a 'karakazan' in which 300,000 Muslims will die", noting that "he (President the RBiH, Alija Izetbegović) can have power in half of Sarajevo, Zenica and half of Tuzla."³⁴ The day after the aforementioned par-

28 After stormy parliamentary events, SDS politicians declared a state of emergency, establish a separate "Serbian assembly", and aim to unify, also illegally, the newly formed Serbian autonomous regions. The next step in the constitutional and legal destruction of B&H was the "plebiscite of the Serbian people", held on November 8 and 9, 1991, while on January 9, 1992, with the proclamation of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", the process of institutional "rounding off the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina" entered into its advanced phase (see more: Treanor, P. *Lideri Srpske demokratske stranke*, in: Biserko, S. (ed.), *BiH - jezgro...*, pp. 301 – 312; Begić, K. (1997), pp. 55 – 69). In continuation of the paper: Republika Srpska. In September 1992, the "Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was renamed "Republika Srpska". See: Džananović, Muamer, Medić, Jasmin and Karčić, Hikmet, (2023). *Nastanak Republike srpske: Od regionalizacije do strateških ciljeva (1991-1992)*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava: Institut za historiju Univerziteta u Sarajevu, pp. 140-142.

29 Begić, (1997), pp. 61 – 62.

30 Ibid, 43.

31 Ibid, 72.

32 Begić, (1997), pp. 77 – 78; "The first day of the referendum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Response very good", *Oslobođenje*, March 1, 1992, pp. 1, 3.

33 The results of the referendum were announced by the Republican Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was published by the Hina news agency on March 9, 1992. Sarajevo. See: Tuđman, Miroslav and Bilić, Ivan (2005). *Planovi, sporazumi, izjave o ustavnom ustrojstvu Bosne i Hercegovine 1991-1995*, Zagreb, p. 73.

34 ICTY, Transcript of an intercepted telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Gojko Đogo, October 10, 1991.

liamentary session, on October 15, 1991, Karadžić repeated similar hints about the destruction of Bosnian Muslims, if they insisted on independence. In a telephone conversation with his brother Luka and Miodrag Davidović he stated: "... It would be a war to the extermination of theirs. (...) The Serbs would never forgive them, it would be, it would destroy them completely. First of all, none of their leadership would be alive, in three or four hours they would all be killed. They wouldn't have a chance to survive at all."³⁵ After the announcement of the referendum results and the international recognition of the RBiH,³⁶ the events that followed in the coming period, when the armed conflict took on international proportions, showed that Karadžić's threats were by no means idle.

Occupation of part of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992

Tuđman and Milošević ambitions (as leaders of Croatia and Serbia respectively) regarding the division of Bosnian territory between, agreed in Karadžić, were implemented in practice, which led to the commission of large-scale crimes against the third, but most numerous ethnic group in Bosnia – against Bosniaks.

During the referendum period in B&H, Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik and Nikola Koljević, in their capacity as the presidency of the self-proclaimed Serb Republic of B&H, attended a meeting of the truncated Presidency of SFRY in Belgrade. At this session, acting President of the Presidency of SFRY, Branko Kostić gave his support to the representatives of the SDS from Bosnia, with the words: "... we do not count on being able to share, nor to draw any borders between us; if they are drawn, then they will probably draw sooner – these borders - between individual ethnic groups in Bosnia."³⁷

Based on previous consultations in Belgrade,³⁸ at the Assembly of the Serb People in B&H, held on May 12, 1992 in Banja Luka, six "strategic goals of the Serb people" were adopted: 1. State demarcation from the other two national communities; 2. Corridor between Semberija and Krajina; 3. Establishment of a corridor in the Drina River valley, i.e. elimination of the Drina as a border between Serbian

35 Treanor P, *Lideri Srpske demokratske stranke.....*, in: S. Biserko, *BiH – jezgro...* p. 266.

36 On April 6, 1992, the Republic of B&H gained international recognition from all 12 member states of the European Community, and the next day from the USA (See more: Đelmo, Zenaid, (2003). "The legal nature of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina", in: *Ljudska prava, Human Rights Review*, Year 4, No. 1–2, Sarajevo: Institut za ljudska prava Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu, p. 58.

37 ICTY, 02942793, Presidency of the SFRY, Notes from the meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY with representatives of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on March 2, 1992, Belgrade, March 1992.

38 ICTY, Diary of Ratko Mladić, 14 February 1992 – 25 May 1992, p. 248 - 314; Šadinlija, Mesud, (2014). *Prsten za glavu aždaje: Sarajevo u strateškim ciljevima Republike Srpske 1992 – 1995*, in: Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Sarajevu, Book 3, p. 359.

states; 4. Establishing the border on the rivers Una and Neretva; 5. Division of the city of Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim parts and establishment in each of the parts of effective state power: 6. An exit of Republika Srpska to the sea.³⁹

Aware of the fact that, in order to achieve these strategic goals, it would be necessary to ‘clean’ the aforementioned territory of non-Serbs of its predominantly Bosniak population, the newly elected commander of the newly formed army of the Serb Republic of B&H, Ratko Mladić, warned the MPs that if the aforementioned strategic goals were to be realized, it would be genocide: “people and nations are not guns or keys in pockets, so we will move them back and forth (...) we cannot clean up nor can we have just Serbs to remain or perish and the rest to leave. (...) I don’t know how Mr. Krajišnik and Mr. Karadžić will explain this to the world. This, folks, is genocide.”⁴⁰ However, Mladić preferred to suggest to the Serbian military and political leadership to differently in public, compared to what will actually be done in practice: “What we will do should be our greatest secret (...) we will not say that we will demolish the power line or turn off the water, because it brings America to its feet, but gentlemen, we ask you all in order, well, one day there is no water in the whole of Sarajevo. We don’t know what it is, we don’t know, we’re going to fix it, slowly. And so, with electricity (...) we must wisely communicate to the world, we will say that the other side shot, hit the power line and went out of power, targeted the water supply, went out of power here and there, we make efforts and repairs, that’s the diplomacy...”⁴¹

Prior to this official presentation of the “strategic goals of the Serbian people”, the YPA and various paramilitary forces from Serbia and Montenegro, along with military and police forces of the SDS, occupied a significant part of B&H: Bijeljina (April 1),⁴² Zvornik (April 8),⁴³ Foča (April 7-18),⁴⁴ Bratunac (April 17),⁴⁵ Sanski

39 Notes from the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People...”, 12 May 1992, published in: *Ja sam za ratnu opciju*, Fondacija Istina, Pravda, Pomirenje, Tuzla, (2007); The decision on “Strategic objectives of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was originally published on November 26, 1993 in the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, number 22, p. 866.

40 “Notes from the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serb People...”, 12 May 1992, pp. 27-32; Ratko Mladić’s speech.

41 Ibid, 28, 32.

42 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, Before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 24 March 2016, VOLUME I, par. 618; see also: 2nd Military District Command, Operational Duty Team, conf. no. 10/36-1987; April 5, 1992, Delivered to: GS OS SFRY – Operations Center, Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Dobrašin Praščević; on the deployment of YPA forces in Bijeljina, see also: Command of the 2nd MD, conf. no. 09(997-20; 7/4/1992, Submit RKM 2. MD, GS OS SFRY - OC; During the takeover of Bijeljina, according to the data of the MIA of Bijeljina, 43 people died, of which 28 were Muslims, 8 Albanians, 5 Serbs and 2 Croats.

43 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, Karadžić, 24 March 2016, Volume II, paragraph 1592.

44 ICTY, IT-97-25-T, Before Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Judgment, 15 March 2002, paragraph 2. and 21.

45 ICTY, IT-02-61-S, Before Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, paragraph 67; Mašić, Nijaz, (1996), *Istina o Bratuncu – agresija, genocid i*

Most (April 19),⁴⁶ Vlasenica (April 21-23),⁴⁷ Bosanska Krupa (April 21-26),⁴⁸ Višegrad (April 14-May 19),⁴⁹ Čajniče (April 16, 1992),⁵⁰ Prijedor (April 30),⁵¹ Brčko (April 30)⁵² and many other Bosnian cities. Ultimately, a few months after the beginning of the war, between 60 and 70% of the territory of the internationally recognized Republic of B&H was occupied.⁵³

Previously, in accordance with the ‘Instruction on the organization and operation of the organs of the Serb people in extraordinary circumstances’, the SDS had in municipalities where the Serb population was in the minority, divided the existing municipalities and created new, exclusively Serb, institutions in settlements with the Serb majority. This type of municipality was called “Variant B” in the Instructions, while municipalities with a majority Serb population were called “Variant A”.⁵⁴ With this approach, therefore, a “solution” was found for municipalities where the Serb population constituted a minority.

The cities listed above were occupied at a time when the YPA was still officially present in the territory of the RBiH, which, after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 752 of May 15, 1992, was supposed to “immediately withdraw or submit to the jurisdiction of the Government of B&H”.⁵⁵ In order to show that they respected the aforementioned resolution, four days after its adoption, on May 19, 1992, members of the YPA ostensibly withdrew from the Republic of B&H, leaving behind all their heavy weapons and military equipment in the territory controlled recently formed VRS (Army of Republika Srpska). But as the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Duško Tadić case found, “the renamed Bosnian Serb

oslobodilačka borba 1992 – 1995, Municipality of Bratunac with temporary seat in Tuzla, Tuzla. 46 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, Karadžić, 24 March 2016, Volume II, para. 1939.

47 ICTY, IT-00-39-T, Before Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Judgment, 27 September 2006, para. 349.

48 ICTY, IT-00-39-T, Before Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Judgment, 27 September 2006, para. 396 – 398.

49 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. X-KR/06/202, Željko Lelek, Sarajevo, 23 May 2008, First Instance Verdict, p. 18; X-KRŽ-06/202, Željko Lelek, Second-instance verdict, Sarajevo, 12 January 2009.

50 Court of BiH, Case no. S 1 1 K 003541 10 Kri., Case of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH v. Milun Kornjača, First Instance Verdict, 21.5.2014. p. 5-6; Second-instance verdict, August 6, 2015.

51 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, Karadžić, 24 March 2016, para. 1592.

52 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, Karadžić, 24 March 2016, para. 798; 2807.

53 Slobodan Milošević himself often used to brag about 70% of the territory in B&H. E.g., see: ICTY, 02943704, Stenographic Notes of the Session of the Council for Harmonization of Views on State Policy, held on 18 August 1992.

54 Čekić, S. (2004). pp. 527-529; The SDS municipal committees were responsible for establishing two institutions: the “Crisis Headquarters of the Serb People” and the “Assembly of the Serb People.” – i.e. Serb Municipality (AIIZ, inv. no. 3-1172, SDS BiH, Main Committee, Strictly Confidential, Copy No. 100, “Instructions on the Organization and Action of the Organs of the Serbian People in BiH in Extraordinary Circumstances”, Sarajevo, December 19, 1991).

55 UN, Security Council, Resolution 752 (1992), May 15, 1992.

army still constituted an army under the command of the Army of Yugoslavia General Staff in Belgrade.”⁵⁶ Also, the Secretary of the Federal Secretariat of National Defense, General Veljko Kadijević, noted that the commands and units of the YPA “formed the backbone of the Army of Republika Srpska with complete armaments and equipment.”⁵⁷ In September 1991, the UN Security Council adopted resolution No. 1. 713, by which all states undertook to establish a general and complete suspension and ban (embargo) on all shipments of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ Only Bosniaks in B&H were truly affected.

Previously, the weapons of the Territorial Defense of the FRBiH units were drastically reduced, in such a way that they were moved to the YPA’s warehouses,⁵⁹ which is why the possibility of defending the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of B&H was questioned, and the defense of Bosniaks in the Republic was reduced to a minimum. Therefore, in the first days of aggression against the then internationally recognized Republic, one could often hear the phrase “miracle of Bosnian resistance”, which is a phenomenon worthy of all attention. However, as a result of the occupation of a large percentage of Bosnian territory and the siege of cities, there were numerous crimes against humanity and international law committed by the YPA / YA / VRS, which marked the last decade of the 20th century.

The path to achieving the strategic goals of the Serb people

The elimination of the border on the Drina River, as well as the establishment of borders on the Una and Neretva rivers, are two of the Six Strategic Goals of the Serb people,⁶⁰ a policy that was formulated and explained at the Assembly of the Serb People from May 12, 1992, and which had previously been discussed and defined in the circle of the inner political leadership in Belgrade, then subsequently by the SDS leadership circle during a meeting in Nevesinje.⁶¹

56 ICTY, IT-94-1-A, Before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor vs. Duško Tadić, Judgment, July 15, 1999, para. 152. also, in connection with this, see paragraphs: 131, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 162. In connection with the officers of the Army of Yugoslavia, the 30th and 40th personnel centers of the Army of Yugoslavia, who were attached to individual corps in BiH, see: *Zločini nad djecom...*

57 Kadijević, Veljko, (1993). p. 147.

58 Security Council, S/RES/713, Resolution 713, 25 September 1991.

59 Šadinlija, Mesud (2013). *Teritorijalna odbrana Bosne i Hercegovine: 1986 – 1992*, Sarajevo: Institute for Research on Crimes Against Humanity and International Law.

60 The Decision on the Strategic Goals of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina was published in the Official Gazette of the RS on November 26, 1993. (ICTY, 01146063, Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, Number 22, p. 866, Friday, November 26, 1993).

61 ICTY, Diary of Ratko Mladić, 14 February 1992 – 25 May 1992, p. 248 - 314.; Šadinlija, Mesud. (2014) *Prsten za glavu aždaje: Sarajevo u strateškim ciljevima Republike Srpske 1992 – 199*, in: Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Sarajevu, Book 3, p. 359.

Many Serb political officials also declared their ambitions regarding the creation of “ethnically pure” areas in Podrinje. For example, in early April 1992, Foča SDS President Miroslav Stanić said that “the Drina will never be a border but nitrogen between two lungs”, alluding to the unification of Bosnian Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro. Also, in this statement broadcast on Radio Foča, he stressed that coexistence between “Serbs and Muslims is unsustainable”, saying that Bosnian Serbs “can no longer be awakened by imam’s voice from the mosque” and that they are “threatened with circumcision.”⁶²

In addition to the weapons already owned by the now predominantly Serb YPA, there were also efforts to further distribute extra weapons to areas in B&H with a majority Serb population.⁶³ Since the spring of 1991, prominent members of the SDS in Belgrade arranged additional deliveries of weapons to the municipalities where they were in charge. Mihalj Kertes, a member of the Serbian parliament, was charged by Milošević to negotiate with representatives of the Bosnian Serbs, in order to contract their arming. During one of the meetings with the presidents of the Municipal Committee of the SDS from Srebrenica and Bratunac, in the spring of 1991, Kertes pointed out that “in the area 50 kilometers from the Drina River everything will be Serbian, purely Serbian.”⁶⁴

All these preparations, including the implementation of Variant B, resulted in areas with a simple majority of Bosniak population - as was the case with the cities of Podrinje at the very beginning of the war - fell under the control of the YPA, military and paramilitary forces from Serbia and Montenegro and military and police forces of the SDS collectively. These Bosnian border towns along the Drina river had already been occupied in first days of April, even before the aforementioned Banja Luka session of the Assembly, stated their strategic goals related to the elimination of this river “as the border between Serbian states.” After the Serbs had seized power in the cities along the Drina River, numerous crimes against humanity and international law were committed, including both mass and individual murders, rapes, the burning of dozens of victims in private homes. Detention facilities were formed, where detainees were tortured in

62 ICTY, Karadžić, para. 852.

63 On November 23, 1993, the commander of the 2nd military district of the YPA, Lieutenant General Milutin Kukanjac, stated the following for the Belgrade Borba: “The YPA has moved more than 90% of weapons, lethal means of all kinds and other equipment to safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and everything was handed over to the Republika Srpska, which armed its army with it.” See: “*Chronology of events*” in: S. Biserko (ed.), *BiH – jezgro...*, pp. 36 – 37. In his speech at the 50th session of the Assembly of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, on April 15-16, 1995, Karadžić pointed out: “Weapons were dispersed thanks to the YPA, everything that could be extracted was extracted and scattered throughout the Serb territories and distributed to the people, but the SDS organized the people and created the army.” See Donia J. R, *Extracts...*, para. 235.

64 Witness Statement: Miroslav Deronjić, ICTY, para17; http://www.icty.org/case/slobodan_milo_sevic/4,

various ways.⁶⁵ These crimes were committed with the intention of achieving previously defined goals related to the creation of “ethnically clean” areas along the Drina River.

The opinion of the majority of Bosniaks and many citizens of B&H that these types crimes belonged to the past, and their perpetrators to a different era and that the killing of people for belonging to a national, ethnic, religious or racial group was left deep in the past, soon established itself as a great misconception. For believing in coexistence and good relations, for trusting the YPA corps, based in near-by Užice, Bosniaks in eastern Bosnia paid a heavy price. Subsequent generations of perpetrators, on the threshold of the 21st century, were committing crimes against the next generation of victims. Dragiša and Mitar Vasiljević are known for their crimes in the Višegrad region, the first as a “celebrated” Chetnik major from World War II,⁶⁶ and the second, half a century later, for the killing of Bosniak prisoners from the banks of the Drina, the crime in Pionirska Street, and finally as a convict of the Hague Tribunal.⁶⁷

Following the examples set in World War II, new generations of perpetrators again used a particularly brutal practice of killing Bosniaks on the bridges across the Drina and throwing the bodies of the victims into the River.⁶⁸ The Mehmed Pasha Sokolović Bridge in the town of Višegrad, a masterpiece of Ottoman architecture, built by Mimar Sinan with the intention of connecting people, served as a place of execution for numerous executions against the Bosniaks of Podrinje,

65 More about crimes against humanity and international law in Podrinje: Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54); Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, June 16, 2004; Momčilo Krajišnik (IT-00-39), First Instance Verdict, September 27, 2006, p. 111 – 141; 223 – 254; Biljana Plavšić (IT-00-39 and 40/1); IT-95-5/18-T, before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, 24 March 2016, p. 225 – 255. Krnojelac (IT-97-25); Janković and others. (IT-97-23/2); Kunarac and others. (IT-96-23 at 23/1); Todović and Rašević (IT-97-25/1). Višegrad: ICTY, Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (IT-98-32/1); Vasiljević (IT-98/32); Miroslav Deronjić (IT-02-61); Nikolić Dragan Jenki (IT-94-2); Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: X-Krž-05/122 - Bastah Predrag and others; S1 1 K 002680 18 Kri - Radomir Šušnjar; X-KRŽ-07/478 - Momir Savić; X-KRŽ-05/165 - Nenad Tanasković; S1 1 K 003541 15 Kžk - Turtle Milun; S1 1 K 003833 13 Krž - Živković Milorad et al.; S1 1 K 017259 17 Krž - Jovanović Stevo et al.; S1 1 K 003807 14 Kžk - Babić Savo; See also: Agić, Nusret (1995). *Hronika desetog genocida nad Bošnjacima I počeci otpora naroda općine Rogatica*, Sarajevo: Hod, (1995); Omerović, Husejin (2016). *Žtrve genocida na području Vlasenice 1992 – 1995*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunaordnog prava, Džananović, Muamer (2015). *Zločini nad djecom u Goraždu tokom opsade 1992 – 1995*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunaordnog prava.

66 Major Dragiša Vasiljević was the commander of the Višegrad Chetnik Brigade in World War II. http://www.znaci.net/00001/11_81.htm

67 ICTY, IT-98-32-T, Before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, 25 February 2004.

68 On these crimes in the Second World War see: Čekić, Smail, (1996). *Genocid nad Bošnjacima u Drugom svjetskom ratu*, Sarajevo: Udruženje muslimana za antigenocidne aktivnosti, pp. 82 – 84.

and some of the victims were “forced to walk to their deaths on the banks of the Drina river and to stand along the edge of the river while their executioners discuss whether to shoot them with single shots or burst fire.”⁶⁹

After mass executions of Bosniaks on Drina bridges, which were particularly intensive during June 1992, the management of the Bajina Bašta hydroelectric power plant in neighboring Serbia sent an “extremely unusual request” to the inspector of the police station in Višegrad. Given that dead bodies were being collected at the dam at such a rate, the hydroelectric power plant director could not gather enough workers to remove them, and “asked if those responsible could slow down the dumping of bodies down the river.”⁷⁰

In another part of Bosnia, the implementers of the Serb state west of the Drina also committed numerous crimes against humanity and international law, with the intention of achieving strategic goals regarding the corridor between Semberija and Krajina, as well as the border on the Una River. In the area of Bosanska Krajina, in BiH’s north-west, the Bosnian Serb nationalists’ list of crimes included mass killings, various forms of torture, and the creation of concentration camps reminiscent of World War II Nazi camps.⁷¹ This kind of comparison was made by UNHCR, ICRC officials, journalists, and other representatives of international organizations after visiting some detention facilities in Bosanska Krajina.⁷²

69 Findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Mitar Vasiljević Case: ICTY, IT-98-32-T, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Before Trial Chamber II, 29 November 2002, para. 279, footnote 673.

70 Bećirević, Edina, (2009). *Na Drini genocid: istraživanje organiziranog zločina u istočnoj Bosni*, Sarajevo: Buybook, p. 201.

71 On mass crimes in the area of Prijedor, Sanski Most, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Bosanski Novi, Skender-Vakuf, Bosanska Krupa, see more in: ICTY, IT-99-36-T, before Trial Chamber II, 2004, Verdict, Radoslav Brdanin; p. 144-187; ICTY, IT-08-91-T, 27 March 2013, before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Miće Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Judgment, p. 42-261; ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, 24 March 2016, p. 553-814; Stakić (IT-97-24) Prijedor; Banović (IT-02-65/1) Camps Omarska and Keraterm; Borovnica (IT-95-3), Prijedor; Kovačević and Drljača (IT-97-24) Prijedor; Kvočka and others. (IT-98-30/1) Camps Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje; Mrđa (IT.02-59) Mountain Vlašić; Sikirica and others. (IT-95-8) Camp Keraterm; Tadić (IT-94-1) Prijedor. Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Prijedor X-KRŽ-06/200 - Željko Mejakić and others; X-KRŽ-05/07 - Samardžija Marko; S1 1 K 016065 17 Krž - Vlasenko Mitar and others; S1 1 K 024175 17 Kri - Taranjac Slobodan and others; S1 1 K 011967 14 Krž - Soldat Dragomir and others.; S1 1 K 025339 17 Krž - Gavrilović Milan; S1 1 K 003472 12 Kžk - Zoran Babić and others.; S1 1 K 020448 17 Krž - Zmijanjac Dragoje; S1 1 K 003365 12 Krž - Čivčić Petar and others; S1 1 K 018013 17 Kžk - Mrđa Goran and others.; S1 1 K 008161 14 Krž - Prošić Predrag; X-KRŽ-05/40 - Kovačević Nikola; S1 1 K 003420 14 Krž - Dronjak Ratko; S1 1 K 005207 Kžk - Kličković Gojko and others.

72 ICTY, Press Release, no. 92/21, August 2, 1992, BiH: ICRC growing concern; ICTY, 04600977, Geneva, 29 July 1992, Cornelio Sommaruga; Gutman, Roy, (1993). *A Witness to Genocide: the 1993 Pulitzer Prize-winning dispatches on the “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnia*, New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., p. 36.

Preparations for the takeover of power in this area had been well organized in advance by the leadership of the parastatal organization, the Autonomous Region of Krajina, headed by Radoslav Brđanin and a member of the Crisis Staff ARK Stojan Župljanin. With the help of the YPA,⁷³ Serbian military and police forces seized power in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanska Krupa, Ključ, Kotor-Varoš, Bosanski Novi, Skender-Vakuf and other cities of Bosanska Krajina.⁷⁴

Mass graves for the Bosniak dead that came as a result of this seizure of power, in just this region (surrounding the towns of Sanski Most, Prijedor and Ključ), were subsequently uncovered in Tomašica, Jakarina Kosa, Stari Kevljani, Korićanske stijene, Hrastova Glavica, Redak I and II, Sasina, Greda I, Vrhpolje, Bunarevi, Lanište I and II, Crvena zemlja I and II, Botonjić.⁷⁵

This area – the municipalities around the three towns mentioned above - was under the control of the First and Second Krajina Corps of the ARS, which were created by the transformation of the 5th, 9th, and 10th Corps of the YPA, inheriting their infrastructure, combat, personnel, material, technical resources and other resources.

During a meeting with officers of the First Krajina Corps held at the end of May 1993, it was mentioned that about 5,000 Muslim corpses were “buried” at the Tomašica mine site. A certain Colonel Bogojević informed Mladic about this, stressing that the head of the Prijedor Police department, Simo Drljača, had asked him to dispose of these “corpses by burning, grinding or otherwise”. During this address to Mladić, Colonel Bogojević said that Drljača had intended “to attack us”, thinking that the police would “step up” to the army. The young man tried to distance himself from the whole case by stating: “As they killed them, so let them get rid of them, and an investigation should be launched in connection with this case and keep the data well so that they do not get into the hands of uninvited persons.”⁷⁶ But instead of launching an investigation, a few months after this discussion, in early July 1993, several remains from Tomašica were excavated and transferred to another, secondary mass grave - Jakarina Kosa.

73 IT-95-5/18-T, before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, 24 March 2016, para. 1347, 1380, 1427, 1463, 1498, 1501, 1580, 1582, 1583, 1586, 1589, 1590, 1592, 1613, 1659, 1721, 1722, 1723, 1921. 1923,1926, etc...

74 On the crimes committed in the territory of Bosanska Krajina, see: *Ni krivi ni dužni. Knjiga nestalih općine Prijedor*, 2nd ed., (2000). Sanski Most, IPC Patria (et. al); Medić, Jasmin, (2013). *Genocid u Prijedoru*, Medić, Jasmin, (2016), *Pripreme, tok i razmjere napada na Kozarac 1992. godine*, in: Prilozi 45, Institut za historiju, pp. 297-313; Medić, Jasmin, (2019). *Zločini nad djecom i maloljetnicima u Prijedoru od 1992 do 1994*, in: ČSP, no. 2, Zagreb, pp. 445-464.

75 See: Odobasic, Jasmin, (2015). *Hiljadu grobnica u Bosanskoj Krajini 1992 – 1995*, Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2015, p. 707, The book provides information on 1,132 graves, of which 128 are mass graves, 116 joint and 886 individual, where 4,697 victims were found; on this see also: Karčić, Hikmet., and Muminović, Safet (2018)., *Genocid-Dolina San: Ključ, Sanski Most, Prijedor i Bosanski Novi*, Preporod, 11 July 2018;

76 ICTY, Diary of Ratko Mladić for the period 02/04/1993 – 24/10/1993, Banja Luka, 27/05/1993, Meeting with the Elders of the 1st KK and ViPVO ARS, pp. 151 – 152.

In post-war exhumations at the site, 373 cases were exhumed, of which 305 people were identified.⁷⁷ According to an ICMP official from Sanski Most, “it was a very difficult and demanding job. After the excavation of the bodies in Tomašica, which were carried out with excavators, their rough dumping into trucks and dumping them on this site, and then blasting it, it was difficult to assemble a single complete body.”⁷⁸ Despite previous warnings that there was a mass grave at the Tomašica site, about which a Swedish journalist made a report in 1996, superficial excavations were carried out only eight, or 10 years later (2004 and 2006), when 16 bodies were found.⁷⁹ The wider availability of Ratko Mladić’s diary, in which the aforementioned excerpt of the discussion on Tomašica was published, accelerated and encouraged the re-excitation of this site in 2013,⁸⁰ resulting in the exhumation of 435 corpses, of which only 275 were actually complete mortal remains of the victims.⁸¹ However, the remains of the victims, which were originally “dumped” in Tomašica, are still being searched, and in 2015, a search of the Jakarina Kosa site was repeated, after which 622 skeletal remains and two complete bodies were exhumed.⁸²

One of the Six Goals, the “division of the city of Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim parts and the establishment in each of the parts of effective state power” was also partially realized in the first months of the siege.

An intercepted phone conversation between Serb Police Commanders Čedo Kljajić, Stojan Župljanin reported on how the urban part of Sarajevo – the area which the Serbian army managed to capture - became a ‘real reserve’, and they then commented: “Watch out, you have to keep them starving well. (...) and it is good that they thirst ... there is no worse locality for them under the firmament. (...) Keep them, just on their straw, just on straws, water and some air. (...) to breathe in a straw...” And he said he needed to shut down the water to the city for a little while “to overthrow the sick government (...) You need to close nicely for 10, 12 hours. ... Let them think... And to know who holds the water sources...”⁸³

And indeed, during the entire period of the siege, it was clearly known who “holds the water sources”, and in addition to this important life energy source, the citizens of Sarajevo were deprived of other existential conditions necessary

77 Begić, Mujo, Ramić, Senadin, Ališić, Zlatan, (2015). *Tomašica – masovna grobnica*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, p. 50.

78 Musić, Sudbin (2015). *Eho Tomašice: Masovna grobnica Jakarina Kosa*, 20 September 2015, Novo vrijeme, <http://novovrijeme.ba/eho-tomasice-masovna-grobnica-jakarina-kosa/>

79 Ibid.

80 ICTY, Diary of Ratko Mladić for the period from April 2, 1993 to October 24, 1993, Banja Luka.

81 Begić M. [et al], 2015. p. 50.

82 Jakarina Kosa mass grave: 622 skeletal remains and two complete bodies found, 29 October 2015, <http://www.prijedoranas.com/?p=32042>

83 ICTY, Intercepted Telephone Conversation, Stojan Župljanin and Čedo Kljajić, 7 May 1992; Karović-Babić M. (2014), p. 47.

for everyday life, such as food, medicine, electricity, firewood, gas. Since the city was subjected to systematic and indiscriminate shelling, sniper operations and bombing from the air, civilians were killed en masse or seriously injured whilst attempting to obtain things necessary for survival.⁸⁴

French, Egyptian, Russian, and Ukrainian troops of UNPROFOR (the UN peace-keeping force),⁸⁵ UN MILITARY OBSERVERS (UNMO), as well as numerous press crews, both witnessed and recorded these crimes. Footage and photographs of citizens of Sarajevo, waiting in lines for bread, and water with canisters in their hands, waiting for humanitarian aid, as well as footage of mauled civilians, were shown on the BBC, CNN, and many other world's electronic and print media, all of course in accordance with the rules of "well-intentioned care for viewers."⁸⁶

In the interim verdict against Slobodan Milošević of 16 June 2004, the ICTY Trial Chamber was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was "superior to certain persons whom he knew or had reason to know were preparing to commit genocide against a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group in Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključ, and Bosanski Novi and that he did not take the necessary measures to prevent the execution of genocide or punish the perpetrators."⁸⁷ However, since the proceedings were adjourned due to Milošević's death, i.e. there was no final verdict, the issue of genocide committed in B&H in 1992 in the cases prosecuted before the ICTY remained sketchy. Despite the fact that the Tomašica evidence was included in the trial at the Ratko Mladić trial,⁸⁸ Mladić was acquitted by a final verdict on the first count of genocide in five Bosnian municipalities in 1992, including the acquittal for genocide in Prijedor in the period from April to December 1992, noting that

84 On crimes against civilians in the part of the city under siege, see more in: Karović-Babić M. (2014); Čekić, Smail., Šestanović, Muhamed., Karović, Merisa., Košuta-Mastalić, Zilha, (2010). *Zločini nad djecom Sarajeva u opsadi*, Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, Sarajevo, 2010, ICTY, IT-98-29 (Stanislav Galić); IT-98-29/1 (Dragomir Milošević); According to a similar pattern, other towns in B&H that were located in the surrounding area, or towns that were besieged by Serb forces, were targeted with different lethal means.

85 By the spring of 1994, 2,569 troops from France, 472 from Russia, 460 from Ukraine and 418 from Egypt were stationed in the Sarajevo Sector. See: Filipović, Vladimir, (2015)., *Ispod plavih šljemova: motivi država za sudjelovanjem u misiji UNPROFOR-a 1992-1995*, Sarajevo, University Press; Zagreb: Plejada, p. 107. Also, UN Military Observers (UNMO) and a slightly smaller number of soldiers from other countries were in the city area.

86 Martin Bell, a BBC correspondent from Sarajevo, states that only some of the recordings could be shown on the BBC. See: Bell Martin, (1996). *In Harm's way. Reflections of a war - zone Thug*, London: Penguin Books, p. 278.

87 *Miloševiću dokazan genocid u Bosni: Međupresuda Haškog tribunala od 16. juna 2004.*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava.

88 <https://balkans.aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2014/10/23/protiv-mladica-i-dokazi-iz-grobnice-tomasica> (Complete ref and insert in Bib); ICTY, Case No: IT-09-92-T, In Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Judgment, Volume IV of V, 22 November 2017, para. 4071-4093.

“the Council was not satisfied that the only reasonable conclusion was that the physical perpetrators possessed the required intention to destroy a significant part of the protected Bosnian Muslim group.”⁸⁹

Immediately after the end of the war in B&H, several verdicts were pronounced in courts in the Federal Republic of Germany for crimes committed in Foča, Osmaci, Doboj and Kotor Varoš, and it was established that genocide was committed in these areas. Proceedings were conducted in the period from 1997 to 1999 against Novislav Đajić, Maksim Sokolović, Nikola Jorgić, Đurađ Kušljić. Of particular importance is the verdict in the Nikola Jorgić case, because it was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights.⁹⁰

Srebrenica – *slow motion genocide*

Far from the media crews, in a completely different part of the country, the inhabitants of eastern Bosnian enclaves were also forced into primitive and pre-civilizational conditions of life. Describing the situation in the enclaves of Cerska and Konjević Polje, The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki reported this to his superiors at the UN: “The medical conditions were medieval, with little or no medicine or anesthetic. Amputations were performed without anesthesia. The bandage, if there were any at all, was used multiple times, without prior rinsing or disinfection.” For the amputation of body parts, doctors had to use saws. The wounds were cleaned with homemade brandy, diapers and sheets.⁹¹ At the end of December 1992, in an attempt to seize territory controlled by the Army of the Republic of B&H in Tuzla or Kladanj, “a group of 2000 civilians was attacked with machine guns in the village of Baljkovica. Those fleeing into the woods were followed by the attackers. Women who had more than one child left one or more children behind so they could run away. It is not known how many people died in this attack.”⁹² Previously, in November 1992, Ratko Mladić, commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, issued a Directive which, among other things, ordered the Drina Corps: “In the wider area of Podrinje, to exhaust the enemy, to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible and to force them to leave the premises of Birač, Žepa and

89 ICTY, IT-09-92-T, Summary of the Judgment of the Trial Chamber of Ratko Mladić, 22 November 2017, 5.

90 Karčić, Hikmet, (2015), *Genocid nad Bošnjacima i njemačko pravosuđe: univerzalna jurisdikcija za genocid*, “Preporod” Yearbook, 2015/59, pp. 59-65; Higher Regional Court Dusseldorf, In the name of the people: Judgment, IV-26/96, 2 StE 8/96; General Federal Prosecutor’s Office, against Nikola Jorgić; 1999; ICTY, 00678234, 3ST 20/96, 2 BJ 85/95-5, Bavarian State Court of Appeals, Judgment, The third Appeals Chamber of the Bavarian State Court of Appeals, Novislav Đajić.

91 Mazowiecki *izvještaji 1992-1995*, (2007). University of Tuzla and Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo, p. 166 – 167.

92 Ibid, p. 169.

Goražde... To offer the disarmament of combat capable and armed men beforehand, and if they do not agree – destroy them.”⁹³

As Srebrenica, and the smaller territories of Bratunac, Zvornik and Vlasenica remained under the control of the Army of the Republic of B&H, formed a special command for the armed forces of the Srebrenica sub-region, in order to fully defend it from the ARS, which had surrounded it, but had not yet defeated it. In order to bind the territory under its control, the Army of BiH carried out occasional incursions into areas controlled by Serb forces.⁹⁴ In reaction to these incursions, chief of ARS’ General Staff, General Života Panić complained about the loss of territory, noting that was “a disgrace to the Serbian people” that “they are fleeing, leaving everything; that assistance we give in armaments, ammunition, is found in some houses in the village; We couldn’t get it out: we were preparing to destroy it. We help to the maximum; The army should not go to other people’s territory. But we need to find volunteers, some people who will save that part of the territory. (...) This is where you, on your part, should do everything and bring in the army to be very disciplined in the execution of the task. I don’t want to talk about the problems, but it must – at the cost of shooting. The area on the left bank of the Drina River is abandoned by people; They leave everything and run away. It’s probably because of this map. They knew that this was not their territory and they wanted to leave the area as soon as possible. It needs to be explained to them.”⁹⁵ It was after this that the forces of the Yugoslav Army, which until then had been treated as the “reserves of the ARS General Staff”, were introduced into combat on the territory of the Republic of B&H in Podrinje.⁹⁶

93 ICTY, No. 04386450, Main Headquarters of the Army of the Republika Srpska, highly conf. no. 02/5-, 19 November 1992; Very urgent; Further actions of the Army of the Republika Srpska, Directive, delivers. – To the person of the commander (Chief of Staff); Directive op. no. 4.

94 In Nijaz Mašić’s book, these actions are presented in detail, hour by hour, with clarification of the context in which they were undertaken, as well as stating the number of dead members of the Army of the Republic of B&H and Serbian forces. Mašić, Nijaz, (1999). *Srebrenica: agresija, otpor, izdaja, genocide*, Municipality of Srebrenica, Srebrenica. See also more: ICTY, IT-03-68-T, Before Trial Panel II, Prosecutor vs. Naser Orić, Verdict; June 30, 2006; ICTY, IT-03-68-A, Before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor vs. Naser Orić, Judgment, July 3, 2008, VII disposition, 67. (Evidential materials from the aforementioned judgments are significant because they consider a whole series of details related to the very circumstances in which Srebrenica was, and all attacks on villages that were under the control of the VRS are explained in detail.); Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, S1 I K 014977 15 Kri, Case of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH vs. Naser Orić, First Instance Verdict, 9 October 2017, p. 4; Second instance verdict, 30.11.2018, p. 4.

95 ICTY, 02944123, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Stenographic notes from the extended session of the Council for Harmonization of Views on State Policy - January 21, 1993, Belgrade, p. 34; Also see: Tromp, Nevenka, (2019). *Smrt u Hagu: nezavršeno suđenje Slobodanu Miloševiću*, Sarajevo; University Press, p. 213.

96 On the participation of the Yugoslav Army in the January offensive on Podrinje, see more: Šadinlija, Mesud, (2018). *Između pravde i realpolitike: odnos mirovnih planova i vojnih operacija u Bosni i Hercegovini: 1992-1995*, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava. pp. 380-381.

At the end of January 1993, during the offensive against the enclaves in Podrinje, General Dragoljub Ojdanić, commander of the Užice Corps of the Yugoslav Army, informed the Command of the Drina Corps that his Corps would continue “advanced operation until 31 January 1993, no further than 12 hours; the reached line that we will obstruct, you should accept and possess it with forces from your composition until 12.00 pm on January 31, 1993; It is necessary to provide teams for the rehabilitation of the battlefield because there are a large number of corpses left in the mastered area. It is necessary to include journalists and cameramen to gather evidence necessary for use for propaganda purposes and documentation of crimes against the Serbian people.”⁹⁷ Dragoljub Ojdanić was subsequently appointed commander of the newly formed Romanija Task Force, through which the Yugoslav Army supplied the Serbian forces in region with material and technical support, and thus controlled their consumption.⁹⁸

Thanks to the engagement of the Yugoslav Army, and intense pressure, shelling, heavy artillery action on civilian targets, Serbian forces occupied Cerska on March 1, 1993. And at that moment when the Command of the Drina Corps was working on the “stabilization of the line of defense” in Cerska,⁹⁹ the commander of UNPROFOR forces in B&H, General Morillon, together with representatives of UNHCR, a world health organization WHO, international committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), military observers of the United Nations (UNMO) and members of UNPROFOR visited this village on March 5 and 6, 1993. The conclusion of Morillon’s report relating to Cerska was: “Cerska has fallen, abandoned and does not need humanitarian assistance.”¹⁰⁰ However, after the village had been taken, they still threw humanitarian aid from the plane, and “four kilometers of the trail in the valley from Konjević Polje towards Cerska was covered with empty MRE packages.”¹⁰¹ After Morillon’s departure from Konjević Polje, shelling continued, followed by the occupation of the village, thus tightening the perimeter around Srebrenica.

97 AIIZ, 2-3258, Užice Corps Command, highly conf. no. 174-2, 10:00 a.m. on January 29; Deliver immediately; Notice on the further engagement of the Užice Corps. Delivers - to the Main Staff of the Serbian Army and the Drina Corps (For your information). Karović, Merisa., Omerović, Husejin., Alicković, Ešref,. (2011) *Genocid na području opštine Vlasenica 1992-1995* in: *Genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini: posljedice presude MSP: Zbornik radova Međunarodne naučne konferencije.*, Sarajevo; Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, p. 942; Šadinlija, Mesud (2018). p. 383.

98 Šadinlija, Mesud (2018). pp. 385-386; Čekić, Smail, (2012). *Genocid i istina o genocidu u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, Univerzitet: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, p. 91.

99 ICTY, 04267531, Drina Corps Command, highly conf. No. 04/4-133, 4 March 1993, URGENT, Regular combat report, submitted to the Headquarters of the Army of the RS.

100 ICTY, 7D13-0003, BH Command Headquarters Sarajevo, Urgent, Confidential; SUBJECT: Report - General MORILLON’s visit to Cerska - March 5/6, 1993.

101 Ibid.

Since mid-March 1993, the territory in eastern Bosnia that remained in the B&H Army's control had been shrunk to only three enclaves: Srebrenica, Žepa and Goražde. The United Nations Security Council mission, which was in Srebrenica at the end of April 1993, after it was declared a safe zone, stated that a "slow-motion genocide"¹⁰² was taking place.

In the following period, the inhabitants of the eastern enclaves were under constant pressure with the aim of "extorting the enemy", as specified in Directive No. 4, from November 1992.

By 1995, the humanitarian situation in Srebrenica was so bad that "some of the inhabitants of the enclave went after a truck that was driving garbage from the base of the Dutch battalion to the landfill and trying to get food and clothes out of the garbage. It was estimated that without new food supplies, almost half of Srebrenica's population would be left without food in mid-June."¹⁰³ Earlier, in early March 1995, the ARS Headquarters issued Directive No. 7, according to which "daily planned and planned combat activities should create conditions of total insecurity, intolerability and hopelessness of further survival of the lives of the locals in Srebrenica and Žepa".¹⁰⁴ Although this part is excluded in somewhat corrected directive no. 7.1, issued at the end of March by Ratko Mladić,¹⁰⁵ the above examples are, among many others, an indication of the continuous aspirations to impose conditions of life that would convince the inhabitants in the mentioned enclaves of the hopelessness of their survival. By gradually tightening the encirclement around the city, with the capture of UNPROFOR watchtowers, Ratko Mladić victoriously entered Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. The fate of the 40,000 inhabitants of this city¹⁰⁶ was extremely uncertain. Many of them, about 25,000 people, sought refuge at the Dutch battalion base in Potočari.¹⁰⁷ However, taught by previous experience, a large number of Srebrenica residents

102 UN, Security Council, Distr. General, S/25700, 30 April 1993, Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819 (1993). Letter of Transmittal, Letter dated 30 April 1993 from the Security Council Mission established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993) addressed to the President of the Security Council.

103 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 24 March 2016, VOL IV, 4988.

104 ICTY, 00823159, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Srpska, dr. No. 2/2-11, 8 March 1995, National Defence, State secret, Very urgent: Commands 1st and 2nd KK, SRK, IBK, HK, DK, ViPVO and CMS ARS, Directive for further actions op. no. 7.

105 On the interpretation of the differences between directives 7 and 7.1. see: Nettelfield, Lara J. and Wagner, Sarah E. (2015). *Srebrenica nakon genocida*, Sarajevo: Institut za historiju, p. 228.

106 ICTY, IT-98-33-T, 19 April 2004, before the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor vs. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, para. 15, notes 25 and 26.

107 Mazowiecki..., para. 10, p. 506. (Report on the genocide in Srebrenica, Fall of Srebrenica and resignation).

(about 15,000)¹⁰⁸ set out from Srebrenica for free territory, under the control of the Army of the Republic of B&H. They fled through forest and mountains on a path where the military and police forces of the RS/FRY were waiting for them, setting up many ambushes, shelling, throwing poison gas and killing people from the column.

Following the fall of Srebrenica, Mladić's forces began killing the Bosniak men and boys from Srebrenica. The football field in Nova Kasaba, the banks of the Jadar River, the Cerska valley, the warehouse in Kravica, the meadow in Sandići, the Vuk Karadžić school in Bratunac, the school in Grbavci, the school in Ročević near Zvornik, the banks of the Drina near Kozluk, the school and dam near Petkovac, the School in Kula and the Cultural Center in Pilica, the Military Economy Faculty in Branjevo, Snagovo, Bišina, Trnovo - are some of the locations where mass executions of the Bosniak population were carried out. In some of these locations, up to 1,000 people were shot at the same time.¹⁰⁹

At that time, although well-informed of the mass executions against Bosniaks,¹¹⁰ United Nations officials spent time negotiating with military and political leaders of the FRY and the RS.¹¹¹ This was done with no ambition to do anything concrete to prevent a "manhunt"¹¹² around Srebrenica however. Their efforts were aimed at rescuing the 429 Dutch battalion soldiers, who were stationed at Srebrenica at the time. In doing so, the United Nations failed to prevent genocide - the killing of more than 8,000 Bosniaks in and around the "Safe Zone of Srebrenica", including those people who intended to seek protection and refuge in Potočari, and who, in front of the UNPROFOR members, were imprisoned and killed by ARS troops.¹¹³

Then, ten days after Srebrenica, another Eastern Bosnian enclave – Žepa was occupied.¹¹⁴ This meant that the Bosnian Serb goal vis-à-vis the Drina river was al-

108 Ibid, para. 29, p. 509.

109 ICTY, IT-95-5/18-T, before the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 24 March 2016, VOLUME IV.

110 Mazowiecki, para. 10, p. 503-514. (Report on the genocide in Srebrenica, Fall of Srebrenica and resignation)

111 Bildt, Karl (1999). *Zadatak mir*, Belgrade: Radio B92, pp. 103 – 106.

112 This construction 'Manhunt' was used by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Krstić case to describe a chase in which there was almost no chance of escape. They referred to the description of the merciless pursuit by the military and police forces of the RS/FRY, after the people from the column who were headed through the forests toward the territory of the RBiH Army. See: ICTY, Krstić, IT-98-33-T, 02/8/2001, paragraph 546.

113 It was about 300 people. A list of 239 names was published, while another 60 people refused to be on this list. See: *Edicija Srebrenica 1995*, vol. 1, Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, (1998). p. 363; GS report according to General Assembly resolution 53/35 (1998), 'Report on Srebrenica', 11/15/1995, para. 348.

114 See more about the genocide in Žepa in: ICTY, IT-05-88/2-T, 12.12.2012, before Trial Panel II, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Judgment, p. 279-315; 333-350; 436-471; before the Appeals Council, 08/05/2015.

most fully achieved. Radovan Karadžić, during the RS assembly in August 1995, said about this that they had achieved significant gains for RS. Citing the examples of some cities in eastern Bosnia, Karadžić noted: “If we are right, there are cities that we have grabbed, and there were only 30% of us, I will list them as many as you want. ... Don’t let this be heard, but remember how many of us were in Bratunac, how many of us were in Srebrenica, how many in Višegrad, in Rogatica, as much as in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, etc., i.e., and that because of their strategic importance had to become ours and almost no one asks the question anymore.”¹¹⁵

The results of the genocide are reflected, among other things, in the fact that the Bosniak population, during 1992, completely “disappeared” from certain parts of the RBiH. This can be concluded from relevant sources the 1991 census and voting lists from 1997. An expert working for the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office in the Slobodan Milošević case, regarding the municipalities of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Foča, Srebrenica, Višegrad and Zvornik, Ewa Tabeau came to the following conclusions: “By 1997-98, Muslims almost disappeared from all seven municipalities in the RS in area 7 in the Milošević case. This result is completely reliable in both absolute and relative terms.”¹¹⁶

Conclusion

Srebrenica – the symbol of genocide in B&H is without any doubt an indisputable fact proven in numerous court rulings before the Hague Tribunal, the Court of B&H, and other national and international courts. Detailed descriptions of mass executions, along with data on the number of victims, forensic evidence, evidence of mass graves of primary, secondary, and tertiary character, can be found in the verdicts pronounced in the aforementioned processes. The significance of these verdicts for the historiography of the Srebrenica genocide is immeasurable. They are an important historical source and the starting point for any further research. Documents held by the ICTY used in the aforementioned processes are available in the Tribunal’s electronic database and are also very important for historical science.

However, as the distance in time since 1995 progresses, it is a generally accepted view in public discourse that genocide was committed only in and around the United Nations safe zone of Srebrenica in the period from July 11 to July 19, 1995. Respect for the question of the legal qualification of the crime itself

115 ICTY, IT-00-39-T, before Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Judgment, 27 September 2006, para. 894.

116 Tabeau, Ewa, (2009). *Rat u brojama. Demografski gubici u ratovima na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije od 1991. do 1999* Belgrade, Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava, Zagorac, pp. 849-1028.

depends on the will of the individual and the moral responsibility of the investigator in relation to the facts established by the court. Instead of the term genocide, some legally undefined terms such as horror or barbaric crime are often used, as well as terms that can be classified as crimes against humanity or war crimes, such as mass murder.

In our work, we tried to deal with crimes committed in other parts of B&H, in the period from April to December 1992. Before the German national courts, the crime of genocide was proven in the areas of Foča, Osmaci, Doboј and Kotor Varoš. However, the Hague Tribunal has left the issue of committing the crime of genocide in other Bosnian cities unclear and sketchy. Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključ and Bosanski Novi are the new towns mentioned in the interim verdict against Slobodan Milošević, as areas where genocide was committed against “a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group.”

Nevertheless, in the absence of a final verdict in the Milošević case, this issue at the ICTY remained sketchy, especially given the fact that in the final verdicts Karadžić and Mladić were acquitted on the first counts of genocide in 1992 in seven Bosnian and Herzegovinian municipalities.

The last phase of genocide, its denial on the territory of B&H, is still ongoing and is manifested in the statements of political officials in the part of the country created after the crimes and expulsion of Bosniaks and Croats – Republika Srpska, which directly offends the dignity of the victims.

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BOSNIA  N
S STUDIES
SARAJEVO
1

MERIMA ČAMO

EDVIN OMERAGIĆ**

MERIMA JAŠAREVIĆ***

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Summary

Culture is a multi-generic term that encompasses a world of phenomena. To offer a definitive explanation of this term has already proven to be pre-entensive. Nevertheless, every definition of culture, regardless of the time of creation, stylistic era and scientific direction has a dose of value, because it depicts and confirms man, his development and his social (co)existence. The goal of this paper is the chronological deconstruction of “outdated” anthropological ideas, theories and directions published in modern scientific publications. Secondly, it offers a concise sociological insight into intertextuality by questioning the independence of new theoretical and ideological directions in the field of culture. The use of the attributes, and/or an outdated theory should be corrected by the fact of “contemporaneity” as the present of the past, which implies a permanent and systemic tendency that places the researcher in a time that is different from the present, that is, the time of the producer of the discourse that the researcher analyses based on the assumption of its scientific relevance. By reviewing the available literature, we concluded that the thought and theoretical continuum fostered by researchers in the scientific multiverse, with its cognitive reach, encourages a thematic and terminological archetype as well as interdisciplinarity in current and future cultural discourses. In addition to the above, we also approached the sociological understanding of art as a correlational term for culture, through the vision of early postmodernists who see these related terms as a specific anthropological, social and civilizational medium. The epilogue paper links ideas about software freedom as determinants of scientific and cultural production in the 21st century.

Keywords: *anthropology, evolution, culture, tradition, style, art, modernity, post-modernism, transculturalism, social anthropology, cultural anthropology;*

The text is dedicated to our professors *Hidajet Repovac (1945-2018)* and *Nedžad Hadžidedić (1931-2023)*, who introduced us as students to the complex and specific world of culture and art.

Introduction

There are many starting points, theoretical, cognitive directions and formulations of culture, and each of them had a tendency, according to the ideological and methodological standpoint of the definer, to finally come up with culture, to re-discover it, to offer a new interpretation, to penetrate into its essence. It is an indisputable fact that the interpretation of culture should be observed through a geotemporal dimension, but when it comes to problematizing culture on theoretical and empirical level, researchers, by self-understanding, profile themselves

through favouring a certain theoretical current, regardless of the different location of its origin, in relation to their activity. In the text that follows, we will try to find out to what extent the “old” ideological and theoretical origins of culture and society represent a preliminary stage of the complete ripening of an intriguing and fluid truth, accepting it as a given predisposition and/or a guide for its criticism, upgrading, adaptation and actualization. And at the end, the modernization of the same-bearing status that the realization of cross-culture carries over time, according to the standards of the scientific discourse in which that heritage is regenerated. The task of science is to imagine the world in concepts (Socrates), and in that context we can classify culture as a universal concept that has been appropriated and materialized by all social sciences, mostly accepting it in the primary scope as predilection. To be precise, in the universal attributions of culture, and one of them is that it contains all defined values as desirable states of affairs. These defined values might be understood to comprise things such as worldview, beliefs, value systems, and customs, regulations that protect values, standards of authority and patterns that teach behaviour. Culture is reflected in rituals and routines; it traces the paths through which symbolic representations of the world are adopted. It is naturally reflected in art, it is stable and explicable in criticism, it offers conditions and an atmosphere for nurturing, cultivating and ennobling society, in which we find the indisputable truth about culture itself.¹ The primordial nature of culture, which is closely related to human existence, has stimulated a multitude of thoughts, ideas and concepts, as well as theoretical directions about its eternal nature. Of course, the 19th century theories from the 19th century will not be applicable to information technology, but the concept of culture in its original, semantic and real fullness will certainly be understandable in the phrase “informativna kultura” (e.g. informativna obrazovanje). From the nomenclature of the science of man — anthropology, within which the concept of culture was born, a set of names used for concepts, objects and actions specific to the profession, cultural area, as well as special branches of science, was derived. Every scientific work that aims outside those frameworks, because the given issue requires a special interpretation, needs a more flexible terminology that will allow new insights to be expressed and terminology to develop in step with the progress of the work. In addition to the above, it should be kept in mind that there are traditional terms that are appropriate and unchangeable when it comes to certain scientific fields.² Following what has been said, we will explain terms such as anthropology, ethnology, ethnography, tradition, custom, art and style, which are interconnected and which ontologically generate a cultural complex.

1 Alić, Amel (2018). *Kulturni modeli odgajanja – uvod u antropologiju porodice*. Sarajevo: Perfecta, p. 13.

2 Katičić, Radoslav (1966). *Osnovni pojmovi savremene lingvističke teorije*. Jezik: časopis za kulturu hrvatskoga književnog jezika, no. 13. Zagreb: Hrvatsko filološko društvo, p.134.

Anthropology as a science, unlike many other natural and social sciences, emerged relatively late. As a discipline that has a scientific tendency, as Alan Barnard states, it dates back to the beginning of the 16th century and was known as antropologium, a term in Latin that covers anatomy and physiology. One example is the work of the Leipzig professor Magnus Hunt, *Antropologium* from 1501. In 1656, Johannis Sperlings published his voluminous work called *Anthropologia Physica*. At the end of the 18th century, the German word *Anthropologie* was used as a semantic term to refer to the cultural characteristics of ethnic groups.³

According to Erlich. St. Vera, in the Anglo-Saxon sense, anthropology as the science of man includes the following disciplines, all of which have developed over time: social and cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, archaeology and linguistics, anthropology of education, forensic anthropology and urban anthropology, etc.. In Europe, the name ethnology is used for anthropology (often also for sociocultural anthropology), and in England, America (as well as in Spanish, especially in Latin America) and in other English-speaking countries, it is called anthropology. In German-speaking countries, the terms *Volkskunde* (science of one's own people) and *Voelkerkunde* (science of all other peoples) are used. St. Vera stated: "Ethnology encompasses the overall material and spiritual culture of a people as well as social organization. This includes economy, technology, handicrafts, art, customs, law, institutions, beliefs, values. Ethnography is the descriptive part of ethnology."⁴ The very name ethnology (Greek *ethnos* - people and *logos* - word, speech) was first used by the Slovak Jesuit, associate and later librarian of the Vienna Court Library, Adam Franz Kollar von Keresztén in the book *Historiae iurisque publici regni Hungariae amoenitates*, 1783 (Beauties of Law and folk history of the Kingdom of Hungary).

The British theoretician Raymond Williams perceives culture through four meanings - individual spirituality, the state of intellectual progress of society, art and the whole way of life that is constantly searching for new alternatives⁵ while he interprets tradition as that which connects the (experienced) culture and the culture of the period - the culture of a selective or chosen tradition, as a permanent option, that is, the choice of one's own predecessors.⁶

During the ancient period, art was placed before philosophy and historiography, and in a narrower sense it denoted ability or skill. It was considered that what is beautiful is absolutely beautiful always, for everyone and in all times, but also that aesthetic categories experience changes according to the styles, tastes and sensibilities of different eras, and the societies that developed in them did so primarily through culture. In the later accepted sense, art is the ability to use sensory

3 Barnard, Alan (2000). *Visions of Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

4 St. Vera, Erlich (1978). *U društvu s čovjekom*, Zagreb: SNL, p. 345.

5 Williams, Raymond (1963). *Culture and Society 1780-1950*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 16.

6 Williams, Raymond (1965). *The Long Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 69.

symbols to express a certain vision and understanding of the world. The origin of art is found in the human need to design one's own existence using various means of expression (word, symbol, colour, movement, tone, plastic form, etc.). It is an act of communication because it implies a relationship between the creator of the work and the audience, which depending on the type of art, i.e. the potential of its representativeness, can be an individual, a group and/or a wider social community.⁷

Tradition is an accumulated collective experience within which past ecological, territorial, political, religious, economic, aesthetic and other experiences are preserved and reinterpreted. Cultural elements grow and travel, when they grow in time, we call that process tradition, when they travel in space, we call it diffusion. Customs as a practice of repetition on special occasions, which are slow to establish and difficult to change, taken over by tradition and moral understanding adopted in childhood, are typical for almost every cultural community. In anthropology, the concept of tradition was rarely mentioned because it was semantically vague and was used for a long time as a so-called technical term.⁸ Hidajet Repovac believes that style⁹ is a timeless category in the anthropo-social sense, it transcends space and time, it is transformed into the spirit of an era and becomes a source of inspiration (activity according to the existing model) for the birth of new artistic ideas, fashion, the very style of life. But at the same time, a serious epochal marking is looming, styles help crystallize social ideas, achieve a certain degree of development of awareness of social processes and relationships, validate technical achievements and new scientific skills. Some consider styles as an ossified form; some elevate it to a metaphysical level, to identify with self-awareness, to reduce it to the level of ethnic and national cultures and their cultural expressions.

However, in their "constant fluidity," styles take hundreds or even thousands of years to form and help define cultural identity. Style is a dynamic category because it relies on already acquired experiences of consciousness, reworking them and raising them to a higher level, but it also becomes the basis for new spiritual and material forms and for strong social upheavals.¹⁰

7 Group of authors (1982). *Sociološki leksikon*, Belgrade: Savremena administracija, p. 712.

8 Hadžidedić, Nedžad (1997). *Etnografski pregled naroda Bosne i Hercegovine*, (unpublished work - script) Sarajevo, p. 29.

9 Cheney presents the lifestyle as "...a manner, a fashion segment, a way of using certain goods, places and times, it is a feature of the urban space in which it originates, but not its entire social experience. Lifestyles represent socio-cultural fragmentations that gain meaning only in certain contexts". Cheney, David (2003): *Lifestyles*. Belgrade: Clio, p. 217.

10 Repovac, Hidajet (2003). *Sociologija simboličke kulture*, Sarajevo: Magistrat, p. 68.

Anachronistic metaphysics and/or transcultural cognition

With its semantic development, culture follows the historic shift of humanity from the first human settlements, through the early villages and towns to the ubiquity of cities. In literature, it was often equated with civilization (lat. *cives-citizen*). Huntington sees civilization as the broadest cultural entity. He believes that civilization is an emphasized culture: "...both include: values, norms, institutions, ways of thinking and behaviour to which successive generations in a given society attach primary importance". Civilization is a space (materially and socially shaped), a cultural area, a set of cultural characteristics and phenomena of a certain climate.¹¹ We have a more pessimistic approach in the view of one of the early postmodernists, O. Spengler, who believes that cultures (co)exist one after the other or side by side, and the average lifespan of a culture is about one millennium. Every culture expresses itself in art, while in civilization as a cultural end; the work of art loses its inner value, its aura. The state of stiffness occurs at the moment when the *vitalis* (life force, as well as the artistic spirit) of a certain culture is exhausted, weakened and worn out. Stiffness is essentially the destiny of every culture. For Spengler, it is the moment when cultures pass into a state of "pure civilization" ("pure retro-tradition"), as a historical event, which consists of the complete decomposition of cultural elements that have taken on an inorganic content, and therefore decay and die. By dying, culture turns into civilization. While culture directs its strength inward, civilization directs it outward, it is expansive (technicism, militarism, etc.).¹²

The persistence of culture originates from the verb of broad lexical spectrum, concrete, abstract and affective, which unites anthropoactivity such as nurturing, protecting, domesticating, growing, cultivating, building, nurturing interpersonal relationships. In the same way, it refers to the processes of work, residence, constant refinement, the sifting of the loose to an artistic form, respect as a spontaneous expression and demonstration of good will, the sacred and the sacrosanct. Through a generational procession in honour of previous generations and their knowledge of the world, culture is destined to voluntarily cause the reappearance of the contents of consciousness that are more or less similar to the original experience (art of memory), repetition, use of cultural property, practice (value system, customs, norms, rules, etc.), preservation, creation, improvement and finally to be transmitted to the new generations (enculturation, tradition). Haviland points out: "Every culture is learned, not inherited biologically." People learn their culture by growing up with it, and the process by which culture is passed from one generation to another is called enculturation.¹³ Enculturation, by nature

11 Huntington, Samuel (1998). *Sukob civilizacija*, Podgorica: CID, pp. 44-45.

12 Spengler, Oswald (2000). *Propast Zapada*, Volume 2: *Svjetsko historijske perspektive*. Zagreb: Demetra, p. 501.

13 Haviland, William A. (2004). *Antropologija i proučavanje kulture*. Zagreb: Naklada Slap, p. 39.

draws from an integral cultural fund, which is tradition. Tradition as the history of culture (it accumulates cultural goods, maintains mechanisms of value transmission and multigenerational “layers” of culture) was often exposed to all kinds of social resistance (although it is flexible for changes that do not conflict with the backbone of the value system of a certain social community) but like some mystical, self-given, cyclical process, and the resisters themselves sow the seeds of their own tradition (an individual or a group creates a tradition within a tradition in its own unique way). As stated by Terry Eagleton, culture with its semantic development follows the very historical shift of humanity from rural to urban existence, from domestication to Picasso, from agricultural cultivation to splitting the nucleus of an atom, from the past to the present. It is polyvalence united in diversity.¹⁴

The issue of culture, after philosophical atomistics (harmony of the universe, transition and beginning from chaos according to the purposeful plan of the divine mind in Hellenic thought), and through the prism of anthropology (Greek *antropos/man*, *logos/science*) was more seriously addressed by the sophists (“man is the standard of all things...”, Protagoras), who offered citizens the possibility of theoretical preparation through rhetoric, grammar, logic and dialectic for experiential, social-cultural and political life. They sought to create a new form of aristocracy, an aristocracy of mind and proactivity. Sophists came under the critical scrutiny of philosophers and society because of their scepticism, subjectivism and relativism, as well as theorizing and vain wisdom. Their charge of pure eristics (something that is purpose for itself) and unskilful attempt to re-educate/”self-humanize” citizens, especially young people, stood out in particular. The understanding that nothing is absolutely and necessarily valid, but only valid in relation to something else, and that knowledge is alive and interactive, opposed sophistry through the teachings of Socrates (“we know that we know nothing”), Plato (“the ultimate goal of cultural and spiritual education culminates to the love of the beautiful”) and Aristotle (“the goal of man’s action and actions is some good, and that good that is chosen for its own sake”).¹⁵ Ancient constructive thinking (developing thoughts about a problem, intellectualizing), which was aimed at forming minds instead of informing them, as well as the thought tradition, was, and remains, a significant object of interest, especially within the framework of culture, art styles and politics, as in medieval as well as modern thought constructs. Caliphate scholars translated ancient cultural heritage into Arabic (in the first two centuries of the existence of Islam, all important works from Greek philosophy, medicine and mathematics were translated into Arabic). Scholastic theological-philosophical dialectics (8th century) developed on (co) relation *ancilla theologiae* — servant of theology and the so-called Aristotelian

14 Eagleton, Terry (2002). *Ideja kulture*, Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, p. 8 and 14.

15 Blažević, Robert (2011). *Uvod u povijest filozofije*, Rijeka: Izdavački centar, p. 37.

Christianity, born out of the fear of the apocalypse of the Romanesque (11th century) and authentic Gothic (12th century) is spatially dislocated. It opens the way to humanism and the Renaissance as the threshold of the modern age (second decade of the 15th century) which encourages the study of ancient/Latin works considering their cognitive reach as a human science that will balance the theophobic collective consciousness and reveal being, complete realization in existence, multi-layered Baroque and later Rococo (end of the 16th century) a noticeable contradiction in the relationship between mannerism, illusory - sophistication, embellishment, relax, the first by prefiguring traditional forms and Renaissance achievements, and the second by decadence into a short-lived empiricism that applies ancient elements in culture and there is also a Middle Eastern influence, and the Renaissance, classicism (second half of the 18th century) that searched for patterns of harmony, rationality and idealization such as classical Greece had through the rebellious and visionary romanticism (late 18th century) and all under the auspices of the Enlightenment spiritual and intellectual movement (half of the 17th century) which represents the self-criticism of the inaccessible "I" who is intolerant towards the helpless ratio in freedom of thought and speech. Through the works of Nietzsche, Hegel, Kant, Adorno, Kierkegaard, Spengler and others we enter into the individual philosophical visions of "Euclid's postulate", a legacy worth knowing and revising. In line with what has been said, it should be emphasized that some scientists prefer the ideas inherited from the Middle Ages and modern times, as a purely theoretical and abstract process, in contrast to the ancient thought heritage, which does not tend toward theoretical post-construction, but to nurturing the idea of spiritual exercise and educational method for a new way of living and looking at the world.¹⁶ Time cannot stop living knowledge and its interactivity, that 'timeless dialogue of minds' but it can influence it through the theoretical and/or ideological orientation of the scientist, which is shaped by his situational identity. According to Milanović, "The people of the late Middle Ages believed that antiquity was like a giant, but also that the dwarf sitting on his shoulders - they recognized themselves in that dwarf - could see further than the giant himself".¹⁷ The perspective, openness and possibility of science means precisely the awareness that our current knowledge can be refuted by future knowledge, but supported in terms of a theoretical basis and/or a starting point for new knowledge. We are always in the phase of the present past in multipotent ways. This successful paradigmatic interpreter of ancient and medieval heritage, which with its timeless quality, periodizationally interfered in every social, cultural, stylistic, artistic and ultimately civilizational construct, is the promodus ("sequence of earlier sequences") of transmission, above all of spiritual property, which in some other intellectual variants will be edited as a source,

16 Ado, Pjer (2015). *Duhovne vježbe i antička filozofija*, Belgrade: Fedon, p. 31.

17 Milinović, Dino (2019). *Zašto antika? Povjesničar umjetnosti i antička umjetnost danas. Latina et Graeca*, Vol. 2 No. 36 Zagreb: Institut za klasične jezike i antičku civilizaciju, p. 44.

rule, postulate, method, starting point or choice in the modern world, the epoch of modernity (end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century). There are stages in science where its holistic turning point (the principle according to which science represented a whole, integrated through cognition), which was confirmed by the theoretical contribution through the work of many sociologists, philosophers, psychologists, physicists, theologians, biologists, etc. Habermas defines the complexity of modernity as a set of problems and solutions related to the issue of time, problems arising from the transfiguration of European society in accordance with what Hegel called the final phenomena in his temporal coincidence, which oppose subjectivity with the movement of thought and internal movement, becoming an interest and purpose in itself. This freedom from all forms of external authority, established social rules, traditionalism (which differs from tradition in its closedness) and conservatism means that the subject must create its normativity from itself because it is free, it cannot accept any value or law that it does not recognize as its own.¹⁸

Antiquarian and medieval philosophical treatise on art and culture

From an anthropological point of view, as pointed out by Vučetić: “Anthropology is human speech about man, art, on the contrary, is the truth of human expression that rests on the engagement of all human, and not only purely rational, elements and, as such, is not subject to rationalization and rational reductionism. Through art, man comes out of the closedness of his self, he wants to meet himself in another.”¹⁹ If we seek confirmation of art as such in rigid theological attitudes, as they did in medieval Europe. Let’s recall Thomistic metaphysics (research into the principles of reality that transcend the six disciplines established by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century), speculative and conceptual, which sees art as a referential potency, considering it non-contradictory. Art is not a weapon in the hands of the artist but an anthropological, ontological, axiological and ethical medium. This does not mean that the work of art does not speak about the disappearance of creative forces and the distancing of the creative essence in reality. However, this departure is not approached from the perspective of destroying reality. Concretely, art thematically deals with dishonesty, marital infidelity, stinginess, fornication, depression, drunkenness, rebellion, snobbery, but as the antithesis of virtue, not as its apology (Greek: apologia, defence, justification).²⁰ If art is to nourish the roots of our culture, society must free the artist to follow their vision wherever it takes them. Inseparable from culture, art is the creative use of

18 Habermas, Jürgen (1988). *Filozofski diskurs moderne (dvanaest predavanja)*, Zagreb: Globus, p. 14.

19 Vučetić, Marko (2018). *The Relationship between Anthropology and Art in the Works of Raimundo Kupareo*. SIC A Journal of Literature, Culture and Literary Translation No. 2. Year 8. Zadar: Univerzitet u Zadru, p. 2.

20 Kupareo, Čovjek i umjetnost (1993). p. 48. according to Vučetić Marko (1990), *ibid*, p.4.

human imagination in order to interpret and understand life and find satisfaction in it. Through practice, the opinion that art refers only to a special category of people (art for the masses as elitist confusion), which turned out to be incorrect, because this type of merging of the symbolic representation of forms and the expression of feelings has long been incorporated into social behaviour and every person can participate in it (verbal art, painting, music, etc.). Namely, until the triumph of a wise man over the circumstances in which he lives and the forces that prevent his true supremacy in the world around him is achieved, art will be the only realization of that triumph, but of course, only an imaginary, symbolic realization. People have no other way to get the idea of an ideal life other than to see it symbolically presented in art. Art appears as a socio-cultural reactive because it fictitiously reconciles opposites and solves the problems facing man in a specific way. It resolved the opposition of spirit and matter, individual and general interest (a work of art is created for all people and gives everyone the same pleasure without distinction), freedom and necessity in human activity (free determination of the role of things, people and events based on imagination and the way that corresponds to the artistic vision) etc. Therefore, art is an ideal, humane reconciliation of opposites that have not really been resolved yet, i.e. art is an imaginary world of humanity that encourages man to fulfil and realize the ideal, to call it from the realm of the symbolic to reality.²¹

One of the examples that in a specific, inspiring and philosophically-antiqued way synthesizes the concept of art, antiquity and modernity, complementary to culture, is the book *The Birth of Tragedy* from 1872 by Friedrich Nietzsche. For the purposes of this paper, the references of the work are presented in an interpretive sketch, anticipating another critical-metaphysical dissolution of Western (anti)historicism and its immanent culture contained in Spengler's understanding of the spirituality of man in the modern age, which, among other things, leads to the downfall of the West through Goethe's *Faust* (drama to sacrifice spiritual values for the sake of power, knowledge, worldly pleasures and/or material gain). Spengler was greatly influenced by Goethe (a writer, physicist, biologist and statesman whose output had a great impact on European culture) and Nietzsche (Spengler's lectures on Nietzsche and his century are well-known). From Goethe he took method (a premeditated procedure for value judgment) and from Nietzsche, questions like his sage Zarathustra. On one of her pages of the book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, the author noted the following: "...to a prudent man, I offer two cultural styles with a convincing presentation (style is treated in this excerpt as a constructed form of expression; thought, feeling, volitional and perceptive content): Apollonian and Dionysian, as separate artistic worlds, the worlds of dream and drunkenness, because I believe that between these physiological phenomena there is a noticeable contrast that exactly corresponds to that between

²¹ Jeremić, M., Dragan (1965). *Kritičar i estetski ideal*. Titograd: Grafički zavod, pp. 170-172.

the Apollonian and Dionysian styles”.²² A dream is a real semblance of the inner world of imagination, explains Nietzsche, of fantasy and the unreal (imagination) in which every person at least occasionally resides, it is the most hidden part of our being, which, whether we want to admit it or not, we experience with deep enjoyment and joyful necessity. The Hellenes expressed this joyful necessity through Apollo. Apollo is the ancient Greek deity of the sun, poetry and music and a great patron of the arts. Acting in Apollo’s way (Apollonian style) implies harmony, sobriety, beauty, etc. Affirmation of life itself even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to live, the joy in the sacrifice of the greatest achievements for the sake of one’s own inexhaustibility, Nietzsche called this the Dionysian style in which the entire system of affects is awakened: man frees himself from all restraints and at the same time expels from himself the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration (transformation, pretence, etc.). Nietzsche approaches the Dionysian world using the analogy of drunkenness. Being drunk is to be subjectively lost to complete oblivion. His, until then, repressed, in reality alienated, hostile and subjugated nature is again celebrating the holiday of reconciliation with its prodigal son, man. The term Dionysian is derived from the cult of the wine god Dionysus, which is associated with a specific ritual behaviour characterized by licentiousness, a state in which the being is “drunk with joy”. These two styles emerge from nature itself, without the intervention of man, the creator, who is at the same time an artist of dreams and drunkenness, whose unity with the deepest basis of the world is revealed in one allegorical dream (pictorial, “twisted” dream). And along with the aesthetic need, derived from the primordial human aspiration for the realization of a beautiful, sensory and sensuous act, which examines the appearance of creation and experience in art, there is a demand: the harmony of life is achieved in the knowledge (noumenon) of oneself. In addition to the Apollonian and Dionysian styles in the sphere of the spiritual, there are various artistic forms whose effectivity (reach, realization, profit, effectiveness...) varies depending on numerous factors. The dimension towards which all these styles gravitate is culture. Culture is the unity of artistic styles in all life manifestations of a people, that is, it is the diversity that flows into the unity of style. This metaphysical exploration and insight into the soul could be completed with another style — the Faustian style, imitatively derived from the dramatism (action tension, conflicts... similar to ancient tragedies) of Goethe’s Faust (drama from 1808, Johann W. Goethe).²³ This style is based on an archetypal configuration of the human spirit that reflects the incessant, simmering conflict in man — the eternal struggle between good and evil, or rather the clash of two forces with opposing tendencies. In the first, one can see man’s searching spirit, creatively restless, a spirit that carries him towards the new and unexperienced, which forces him to search and find the unknown, even if it is at the cost of wandering.

²² Nietzsche, Friedrich (1997). *Radanje tragedije*. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatske, pp. 21-26.

²³ See Goethe, Johann Wolfgang (1970). *Faust. Part I and II*. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska: Zora.

On the other hand, there is the spirit of negation: denying, refusing, not giving, thwarting, which tries to disable man in his searching aspirations. He leads him to a crossroads with a false signpost, leads him into a world of delusion where it is difficult to find a way out or salvation. And man can only come to salvation through action, rational and humane action in his own world, and not by passively waiting for resolution, alienation, self-serving, ignorance and helplessness as a socially imposed sin, which will lead man, sooner or later, to his phantasmagorical Mephisto. Not infrequently, precisely, “Faustian characterology” was used to explain the spirituality of modern man. That is how O. Spengler in the *Decline of the West* from 1918 attributed the same characteristics to the Western cultural circle of that time with which Goethe embodied his Faust in literature. Spengler clarifies this interpretation of culture by stating that through Faust we can very accurately express our sense of the world. A man of culture is a dreamer, a creative soul, and a man of civilization is a sober, factual and reckless man. The present can no longer promote anything of value, only copies and kitsch are possible.²⁴

Multidiscursiveness of culture

One of the first definitions of culture within the European framework, established in Germany (by Samuel von Pufendorf, in *De iure naturae et gentium*, 1688) and Johann Gottfried von Herder *Thoughts on the philosophy of history* (*Philosophy of history*, 1784) and had a dual definition. The first implied the rule of man over nature by means of science and crafts, and the second referred to culture as the spiritual wealth of a person. Perceived as a developmental category, culture in this country went through three phases: at the end of the 18th century, culture was associated with ideas of progress, the second phase implies the reflections of Kant, Fichte, Herfer, Hegel, while the third phase represents the elaboration of the universal scientific concept of culture, thanks to G.E. Klemu, who published the *General Science of Culture* in the middle of the 19th century, in which he talks about the stages of its development, its goals, and about material and spiritual culture. In relation to the ultimate contemplative elaboration of the concept in the second phase, in which it is equated with beauty, goodness and truth, in which man overcomes the limitation and immediacy of his experiential existence with the power of his spirit. The third phase is characterized by the treatment of historical facts and relies on facts from the cultural history of individual peoples and greatly opposes transcendental criticism of mind, antithetical dialectic and dialectic of totality.²⁵ Under the influence of Clem’s works in England, anthropologist Edward B. Tylor (1832 – 1917) publishes *Primordial Culture*, which presents to the scientific public of the time the most cited definition of culture: “Culture and

²⁴ Spengler, Oswald (2000). *Propast Zapada* Volume 2: *Svjetsko historijske perspective*. Zagreb: Demetra, pp. 503-505.

²⁵ Sokolov, E. V. (1976). *Kultura i ličnost*. Belgrade: Prosveta, pp. 19 - 20.

civilization are a complex whole, which includes knowledge, science, beliefs, art, law, morality, customs and all other skills and habits acquired by man as a member of the social community.”²⁶ Introducing the concept of culture into the active lexicon of the English language, E.B. Tylor becomes the formal founder of the science of culture — culturology.²⁷ Almost half a century later, this term will be rehabilitated by F. Wilhelm Ostwald in 1915 (“everyone is thrown into the magnetic field of the culture of his country at birth, which then shapes him according to its laws”), while in 1939 Leslie A. White, would in a more extreme way (as culturally deterministic — opposing culture to man and society) introduce this term into social theory, believing that culture can be explained by itself, and that it must be studied outside of social interactions and independently of individual - psychological reactions.²⁸

The methodological indeterminacy of cultural reality understood in this way also had its critics, who, like the more “reduced culturalists”, A.L. Kroeber (American cultural anthropologist) and K. Mannheim (influential Hungarian sociologist of the 20th century) believed that cultural determinism leads to a scientific detour, and that it is theoretically unsustainable and debatable in relation to the actual situation in society.

According to Tylor, the most common approach to understanding culture comes from anthropologists who associate culture with a common, developed and complex pattern of societal life and a non-conservative tradition as well as other characteristics. Through the lens of intellectualism and unilinear evolutionism encouraged by the Enlightenment and Darwinian evolutionism, Tylor believed that the progress of society requires unfettered reason, and the science of culture is in fact a reformatory science because its role is to demystify the hidden idealessness that has crept into every pore of society. Rational thought as an instigator of progress, cultural change and evolution itself prevails sooner or later. It is interesting that concepts such as tradition and customs in his theory were categories that take place without the participation of the intellect; they are traces of earlier evolutionary stages that interfere with the natural thought processes of human beings. In this context, it should be noted that two approaches to tradition were represented in anthropology: the first is the passive idea of tradition (it was considered useful in attracting attention to society and human beings, but too inert and stable to influence the creation of culture, and its empirical research); the second is active (there had to be at least two generations in the tradition process to fulfil the requirement of an active tradition, which is mostly represented in the ethnograph).²⁹

²⁶ Tylor, (1871) according to Kale, Eduard (1988), *ibid*, p.40.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 19-20.

²⁸ White, Leslie (1970). *Nauka o kulturi, sudija o čovjeku i civilizaciji*. Belgrade: Kultura, p. 365

²⁹ Kroeber, A.L., Kluckhohn, C. (1952). *Culture A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Peabody Museum Press, p. 94.

Taylor started the theory of cultural evolution with the method of so-called temporal comparisons (the existence of creation through time), and after that he applied the procedures of reconstruction and valorisation of the surviving elements in the concrete community. This includes cultural relics that initiate the process of researching the development of culture through institutions and detecting cultural elements from the past that also exist in our cultural reality. In this discourse, evolutionism linked every social phenomenon and process that underwent a gradual development from simple to more complete and better adapted forms, the essence of which was ultimately reflected in the starting, initial stage. At the same time, unidirectional development is advocated and denied through a form of subtle retrogradation (retreat, backward movement), which is a kind of tautology. Taylor uses the term 'regress of cultural evolution' for changes in culture.³⁰ If by evolution we mean the gradual changes of a certain species over a period of time, i.e. after several generations, where it is implied that a given species becomes more complex and improved over time, passing through delicate changes of a different nature such as biochemical, physiological, morphological and anatomical, then it is clear why Tylor saw it as a setback. Evolution (in this case culture) can include progression, but also stagnation. We find an explanation in biology, within which this process is called the degradation of species, and we detect the source in Charles Darwin's naturalistic proto-anthropology established by the first modern theory on the development of living beings in 1859. On the other hand, the development (and not the evolution) of society has a positive connotation of direct improvement of our species, that is, of social communities and cultures, towards more and more complex forms.³¹ The social dimension, or social Darwinism, as an extremely complex set of intellectual positions (often disputed and problematized to this day) is the application of the idea of evolution towards a more developed type of society based on competition between "capable" and "incapable" groups and individuals, whose characteristics, as already developed possibilities, determine the level of success of certain activities (mental, sensory and psychomotor) depending on how society defines them.³² According to the representatives of unilinear evolutionism and social Darwinism, among whom, in addition to Tylor, there are also the works of the American anthropologist L.H. Morgan and the English philosopher and sociologist H. Spencer, evolution has a single-line trajectory and every human community is subject to development, moving ever higher, adapting to continuous changes that are already predetermined. A kind of inconsistency in the question of predestination, is read in the views that

30 Supek, Olga (1987). *Status pojma običaja u angloameričkoj antropologiji*, Narodna umjetnost: hrvatski časopis za etnologiju i folkloristiku 24. Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, p. 105.

31 Trigger, Bruce G. (1998). *Sociocultural Evolution. New Perspective on the Past*, Oxford: Blacwell Publishers, p. 9.

32 Claeys, Gregoy (2000). *The "survival of the fittest" and the origins of social darwinism*. Journal of the History of Ideas, 61 (2)., p. 223.

man is static in his own dynamics of development, unless he has the alpha drive for survival. The course and outcomes of evolution are not predetermined and cannot be predicted. Since most theorists and evolutionists did not confirm their claims with direct experience in the field, they based their conclusions rather, on the basis of European civilization, and all forms of life within folk-society, small, homogeneous and isolated communities or societies that mainly function through primary contacts and which are very attached to their traditional way of life, and which, in relation to such organizational characteristics, differ from their world and reality, i.e. civilization as seen in that way, they placed at the beginning of evolution. Between these two points, they theoretically constructed a scale that shows the order of development, predetermination, but also retrogradation as a process of returning to its renewed origin. As long as one accepts the reversibility and backwardness of natural, evolutionary phases because there is no revolution at the cumulative point of devolution (as the agricultural revolution happened), it primarily refers to nature, but not to man. We must have in mind that the theory of evolution did not figure out the transition phase in the development of the species. It is the missing link in the evolutionary chain. Insufficient research, the theoretical vagueness that accompanies the phenomenon of culture in these frameworks is associated with anthropological stochastics (learning about what is probable, guessing) and reasoning that has no basis in practical experience, and relying on old thematic models as well as current theories of natural sciences. Eurocentric people with an axiological understanding of culture took the state of their time as being the top of the development ladder, and they considered other cultural traditions, local variations of customs, cultural areas and co-areas invalid. Research in the field refuted many of their claims because they showed that evolution is not linear, but that cultures are diverse and that not everything can be subordinated to speculative stages of progress.³³ On the other hand, this intellectualist-evolutionist trend in anthropology is also attributed to the credo of positivist determinism, which means that everything can be objectively observed because the world functions in accordance with natural laws. Everything should be based on facts that are analysed through the optics of natural sciences (physics, biology and chemistry) because the evolution of society follows immutable laws. Evolutionism is an important feature of the theoretical concept of Auguste Comte (through the writings of Saint-Simon and Comte, we are presented with the ideal of a society organized on scientific principles), the founder of social physics, i.e. sociology. He believed that social progress is influenced by various factors, primarily climate, political activity etc., while its fundamental driver is intellectual evolution. Intellectual development, i.e. the development of the human spirit, which goes through three stages of development: theological (being unable to answer the questions about the origin of natural phenomena, man

33 Steward, Julian (1976). *Teorija kulturne promjene*, Belgrade: Beogradsko-izdavačko-grafički zavod, pp. 27 – 28

imagined the gods, who create these series of miracles), metaphysical (each stage of gradual development implies a certain human maturity reason) and scientific. For Comte, the scientific era is precisely the last period, which concludes the historical movement and retroactively determines its meaning. A positive spirit does not ask “why”, but investigates “how”, by which mode natural phenomena are realized. Society is not formed based on the interests of individuals, but, on the contrary, society itself is an “authentic being”. Comte tries to separate the science of society from the theological or metaphysical picture of the world, that is, to analyse society based on the observation of social phenomena, the character of which is not pre-determined by religion or metaphysics. In an effort to subordinate the entirety of knowledge to scientific methodology, he began to organize the science of society modelled after physics.³⁴ In sociology there is no place for passionate and emotive value judgments, just as there are none in the natural sciences, which would be nothing more than fantasies of the kind we find in the theological or metaphysical age. It is interesting that Comte does not see in this primacy of natural laws a contradiction to his basic principle, that all absolute knowledge must be replaced by relative knowledge: “This inevitable transition from the absolute to the relative is truly one of the most significant results of all intellectual revolutions.”³⁵ When it comes to seeing culture, Comte taught that culture moves only in the direction of its perfection, and on that path, all incorrect information that makes up certain knowledge disappears, that is, all incorrect knowledge disappears. Reason transcends any error, Comte points out, and continues: “No matter how disordered and illogical man’s rational reasoning may be, and no matter how slowly he improves it through verification by experience, the law of human progress is that thinking tends to clarification.”³⁶ This shows that Comte did not deny the empirical approach to phenomena, which will be one of the foci of our criticism.

Arch-positivism in the atmosphere of (de)constructive criticism

The methodological unity of the natural and social sciences is one of the most hotly contested positivist assumptions. The reduction of the science of society to a methodology built on the model of the natural sciences was faced with serious criticism, especially by the Vienna Circle founded by the Austrian philosopher Moritz Schlick in 1921, which opposed Comte’s positivism with a philosophical triptych: logical positivism, logical empiricism and neopositivism (which was later considered a philosophical trend at the same time as the ruling philosophy of a narrow circle of scientists, “criticism of critics!” - as consistent with science)

34 Kolakovski, Lešek (1972). *Filozofija pozitivizma*, Belgrade: Prosveta, p. 97.

35 Comte, Auguste (1998). *Kurs pozitivne filozofije*, Nikšić: NIO “Univerziteteska riječ”, p. 125.

36 Comte, A. (1830). according to Hatch, Elvin (1979): *Antropološke teorije 1*. Belgrade: Beogradsko izdavački-grafički zavod, p. 37.

while the originator of critical rationalism, K. Popper, will represent the opposing opinion of postpositivists who, unlike supporters of logical empiricism (who believe the development of knowledge encourages the increase of experiential content in empirical generalizations, and this increase is achieved by the method of induction — a logical method; from the individual to the general; any other variant is meaningless and inexplicable) believe that reality can only be known imperfectly, probably and hypothetically. His evolutionary cognitive theory holds that every new theory, even if we consider that its bearer is making scientific error, poses new problems to the academic world (support/accept, deny/reject, correct/expand and so on...) which is the essence of centuries-old dialectics in scientific circles and thus the ubiquity and development of science in society.³⁷ Science tolerates (often desires) criticism, but also revision and/or change in theoretical position. However, Comte's social physics was also touched by his art of critical judgment by his contemporaries such as Karl Marx (“...a man should engage in the difficult and painstaking work of transforming the world according to his own measure, and not according to the measure of any objective criteria”), there were challenges in the works of later sociologists such as Max Weber (“man is an animal that hangs in the webs of meanings that he has woven”), and philosophers, sociologists and antipositivists of the recent era who developed a critical theory of society (especially representatives of Frankfurt School, Horkheimer and Adorno).³⁸ Noetics was presented (criticism of cognition in the 20th century) as a process of thought intervention of an individual in society and an avant-garde, innovative scientific view of social phenomena and processes characteristic of the 19th century, which led to the formation of sociology as an independent discipline, simultaneously created conditions for analysis culture and constitution of the science of culture — culturology. After the French civil revolution in 1789 (in that period of strong changes that followed, Comte also created) in which world history reached its fulfilment (Hegel), man was no longer satisfied with the role of a mere observer in society, but wanted a social world to understand so that he could change it, he strove for self-affirmation. Postmodernity is the defeat of modernity, of an epoch but not of science, and in this sense, criticism (analysis through experience and understanding) should be seen in the light of the difference between the concepts of revaluation, polemization and problematization, and what results from this is the creation of new theories, i.e. the thematization of post-theories.

37 Popper, Karl: (1973). *Logika naučnog otkrića*, Belgrade: Nolit, pp. 70–73.

38 Đurić, Radomir (2016). *Kont i ideja pozitivne društvene nauke*, ‘Sociološka luča’ časopis za sociologiju, socijalnu antropologiju, socijalnu demografiju i socijalnu psihologiju. X/2. Nikšić: Filozofski fakultet u Nikšiću, pp. 48-53.

Social and cultural anthropology

Anthropology as a scientific discipline developed on the platform of European discoveries, colonialism, natural sciences (especially biology) and of course in an atmosphere of criticism. Speaking about the objects and subject of anthropology research, St. Erlich states the following: “The objects of anthropology are all living (primarily exotic and wild peoples, and later rural and urban communities) and extinct peoples, their cultures, their production relations, their emergence, development and disappearance. On the one hand, unique historical phenomena are investigated, and on the other hand, generalization and regularities are sought by comparing groups and analysing the conditions that determined the differences in cultures”.³⁹ At the beginning of the 20th century, British anthropologists under the influence of the French school of thought established by Emil Durkheim (one of the founders of scientific sociology, the first to fix its peculiar subject and consistently introduce experience as the basis of the sociological research method) developed a special branch of anthropology. On the trail of his deviation from the intellectualist, reductionist and utilitarian theory of culture, where he emphasizes the sensible and emotional basis in culture and behaviour, applying a certain measure of relativity to the study of human institutions, a direction is established that refutes classical evolutionism, which is the theoretical approach of the historical school, and the diffusionist trend that tends towards cultural relativism, that is, historical particularism. Historical particularism observes every cultural entity through the optics of a unique configuration that stands out for its uniqueness and originality.⁴⁰ On that basis, social anthropology appeared in England and cultural anthropology in America. Representatives of social anthropology (Redcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard, B. Malinowski, R. Firth, M. Fortes, J. G. Frazer and others) depicted and analysed the entire culture of a certain community from the point of view of social organization and its functioning. They looked at culture as a social product in the function of the group (to satisfy needs). Although the intellectual supporters of social anthropology over time rejected the evolutionists’ generalization about the stages of human development, they still kept the basic idea, trying, in another way, to discover the laws of the social and cultural life of man. According to R. Firth, anthropology is close to sociology, and according to its subject and methodological approach, it could be called microsociology. For J. Frazer and B. Malinowski (who introduces the rule for field research into anthropology - observation with participation, advocating a functionalist approach), social anthropology is a branch of sociology “applied to primitive tribes”. Given that it deals with social structure (partial structures), it is a sociological discipline. A special theoretical direction within social anthropology, with the intention of

³⁹ St., Vera, Erlich (1978). *ibid*, 346.

⁴⁰ Hatch, Elvin (1979). *Antropološke teorije 1*, Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački-grafički zavod, p. 219.

including other social sciences, is structuralism, which was developed by the French ethnologist C. Levy Strauss in the middle of the 20th century.⁴¹

Unlike social anthropologists, cultural anthropologists, like their founder F. Boas (1858–1942) detect and appreciate changes in culture. Boas explains cultural patterns by special historical circumstances, not by general cultural regularities. After research in the field, it was found that in each place there are other “historical accidents” that direct the culture (e.g. technology does not progress everywhere in the same way). They developed a multitude of diverse approaches explaining culture and cultural phenomena, and several theoretical directions and methodological approaches are developing within cultural anthropology. The works of R. Benedikt, M. Mead, J. H. Steward, L. White, A.L. Kroeber, R. Linton, C. Kluckhohn, etc. were published on the platform of diffusionism, relativistic and neoevolutionary understanding of culture, cultural ecology, utilitarian functionalism, cultural determinism, psychological orientations, etc., with a touch of academic revolutionism.⁴² Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn collected (and published in 1952) over 256 different definitions of culture. This number in the literature varies depending on whether culture, in the definitional sense, was equated (or not) with the term civilization.⁴³

Symbols of (trans) cosmopolitanism

A strong impetus to the further development of anthropology was given by semiotic theory (C. Geertz, who through the semiotic-interpretive discourse, brings the Oxford concept of dense description of culture into practice and introduces new terminology) and poststructuralism. In the framework of semiotics, culture is perceived as an object, that is, a text that can be read using the method of hermeneutics, more precisely by applying the skills of interpreting what is written. Human behaviour derives its meaning from the “graphostyles and figures of speech”, often unconscious or implicitly structural codes/symbols embedded in them.⁴⁴ The main representatives of such conceptions are H. Bauzinger, G. Marcus, R. Fisher and J. Clifford. Poststructuralism was actualized in the second half of the 20th century and is a postmodern philosophy that refutes traditional theories about language and culture, and with them, traditional starting points that analyse man through ontological questions, the answers of which reflect in his existence (the “catchword” of poststructuralism — “being is irreducible to

41 Firth, Raymond (1958). *Human types: an introduction to social anthropology* / 1901-2002. New York: New American Library, pp. 156 – 159.

42 Hatch, Elvin (1979). *Antropološke teorije 2*. Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački-grafički zavod, pp. 219-233.

43 Kale, E., *Uvod u znanost o kulturi*, ibid, p. 40.

44 Bonnell, E. Victoria Hunt, E. Lynn (1999): *Beyond the Cultural Turn, New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*. Berkeley - Los Angeles - London: University of California Press, p. 8.

identity”, J. Derrida). There is a deconstruction of Western European metaphysics, especially logocentrism and traditional contradictions such as nature - culture, the basic terms of thought (dis)courses/trajectories that look at the world through the lens of diversity. Poststructuralists include: R. Barthes, M. Foucault, L. Althusser, G. Genette, J. Baudrillard, J. Derrida and others.⁴⁵ One of the most significant changes in modern anthropological theory is that, from being the subject of anthropological analysis, culture has become a crucial cognitive tool for understanding the achievements of the modern world. Anthropological debates related to globalization processes marked the last decade of the 20th century. During this time work was done on the intensification of changes in anthropology, and that period also coincides with growing complex transfigurations on a planetary level, as well as with the understanding that the phenomenology of culture must find a new theoretical refuge. Language, cultural identities, tradition, art and religion were the biggest obstacles to globalization on the cultural level. The development of global culture encouraged the development of trans-culturalism, which seeks to be a mediator between European cultural history and new global trends.⁴⁶ Referring to this term, Ateljević states: “The more complex the subject of study, the more disciplines are needed for its study. Transculturalism would be a critique of both modernism and postmodernism, but which takes the best elements from those two systems as well as from traditional pre-modern knowledge marked by different cultures around the world and which enables the progress of human evolution and creates a new global consciousness.”⁴⁷ So, transmodernism (a kind of transcospopolitanism) is a tendency, with an agenda, that tries to overcome the negativity of postmodernism, to take the best from modernism - the progress of science, technology, economy, and culture and to pass it on to new visions. Transmodernism, as a new cultural concept, appears as a demand and not a need, as an intellectual tendency of global, interdisciplinary equilibrium and not as a new, intriguing, critical, thought narrative to some new futuristic theory (or is it?). The “anthropological turn to explicit research of the future takes place in a global political-social macro-context that marks the awareness of the influence of man to fundamentally and permanently change the world through his actions, from nuclear danger to genetic modification, which were, from the perspective of the time, “unprecedented challenges to human experience on earth”.⁴⁸

45 Belsey, Catherine (2003): *Postkulturalizam*, Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, pp. 4 -5.

46 Milenković, Miloš (2007). *Istorija postmoderne antropologije*. Belgrade: Etnološka biblioteka, p. 158.

47 Ateljević, Irena (2015). *Na temeljima dekonstrukcije*, Zarez. October 16, year X, number 241. Zagreb: Dvotjednik za kulturna i društvena zbivanja, p. 9.

48 Zrnić, Gulin, Valentina, Poljak Istenič, Saša (2022). *Etnologija i kulturna antropologija budućnosti*. Magazine Narodna umjetnost 59/1. Ljubljana, Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folklorna istraživanja, cit. Robert Textor 1980, p. 141.

Digital cosmopolitanism or alienation

The sudden “upheaval” and spread of a different way of living or social existence in general, following the introduction of a technological - informational “sense” on a global level annulled the traditional - linear model of sense as a critical (self) reflection of man. Media tools, programs, applications, networks, etc. as (de)constructors of reality are an essential redefinition of human existence and originality. If today’s man does not live without media, then the consideration of multimedia, which consists of several media and acts as a whole through an initiative function (whereby elements from the domain are mapped into mutually different elements from the co-domain) opens up unlimited media spaces with the concept that man is the metamedia of the media. The (meta)media man is an inhabitant of unfulfilled space and non-events, he exists in the unreality of the virtual illusion of the world of the same (non-)event. Such an “event” is a semblance of “reality” and the voluntary consent of man to (co)existence with it. In the world of (meta) media, the sum or aggregate of all that is real exists only in the installation of the potential of reality, there is no reality, no differentiation, no Otherness. In essence, the postmodern limitations of the phrase ‘human spirituality’, which could reach beyond and transcend reality, tangible, meaningful, cultivated and anthropomorphic, it could become part of the profit-manipulating zone of the media, in which the futuristic existing Other is reflected and gazed upon. Nothing beyond the digital record that has surpassed the limit of human senses, and the acronym net, is not (re)recognizable as analogous to the nature of anthropos.⁴⁹ One add-on to the previous paragraph is a slightly more optimistic version of seeing viral everyday life. Namely, the human experience in the 21st century is the experience of the media as an imperative for all vital spheres of society and vigilance in terms of monitoring accelerated digital transformations. What we can call the modernization of tradition and culture is an option: choose and activate it in the viral world, which does not mean that the mentioned phenomena are neglected, on the contrary, they are ubiquitous, and they are merely being created and presented in a different way. As a result, heritage in all its social branches exists in an (un)reality that seeks cultural accommodation. Media influence is a process in intensity, particularly expressed in the age of mobile media and the coverage of the globe “by the network of all networks”, however, a constant woven into the intensity that we do not see and which has the quality, is that the universe of media, i.e. digital, is nominated as culture or at least one of its constituent parts. This is primarily read in the ontology of information sciences (about artificial intelligence, semantic web, software engineering, information architecture, “cybernetization of the spirit”, etc.). Thus, the progress of technology and technology itself can be

49 Rutović, Željko (2015). Čovjek (*meta*)medij? (*brzina promjene – (ne)upitni identitet*) In *medias res: In medias res: časopis filozofije medija*, Vol. 4 No. 7., Direktorat za medije. Ministarstvo kulture Crne Gore, p. 1044

viewed as a material positioning that supports broader aspects of society and culture, and not as a separate phenomenon that exists independently of the social totality and is externally influenced.⁵⁰

Instead of a conclusion

Given that we conceived the text so that each titled part has a conclusion derived from the premises of the multi-permeating and simultaneously self-interpretive status of culture in the social sciences and their theoretical constructs, this final part of the paper is more in the form of an affirmative syllogism - "culture is a phenomenon within a phenomenon" temporally adaptable and socially multidimensional.

Participation and intervention in the culture, or the presence of a certain social community, can only be adequately viewed if the mechanism of passing down cultural elements and inherited practices immanent to that community is considered, as well as the accumulated collective experience - a tradition that summarizes time and human spiritual and material achievements. Tradition sublimates cultural production through time, which, again, as a continuous sequence of changes in which a moment, hour, day, month, year (or their transformations) can be imagined as a continuous series of forms that permeate, invoke, purify and cancel each other, remains cultures judge and biggest critic. Culture is changed by internal (e.g. inventions, discoveries, substitution, etc.) and external (e.g. diffusion, acculturation, etc.) factors, and the resulting quality is always a novelty that tradition does not cancel, but possibly corrects and includes in its fund, excluding however, conservative communities. "Cultures are the selected experience of a series of generations, and thanks to the processes of acculturation, enculturation, hybridization, transculturation and many other processes, they are essentially polyvalent, polychromic, polyphonic, but, nevertheless, they all have their distinctive regulators, which separate them from each other."⁵¹ Therefore, we cannot talk about tradition without referring to previously formed cultural patterns, without refined, distinctive, authentic, eclectic, inventive layers of culture and its products which are transmitted, learned, adopted, modified and enriched from generation to generation. The dynamics of culture are unpredictable as well as its transformation. It is always on the edge of traditional, internal and individual, but it tends towards questioning, progress, application, openness, tolerance and harmonization. From what has been said, it follows that culture is common to the members of a society, but that does not mean that it is uniform. Within the

50 Levy, Michael (1997). *Computer-assisted language learning. Context and conceptualization*. Oxford University Press.

51 Becirović, Fikret. *Kultura i civilizacija: Polivalentnost, suživot, "susreti" i sukobi*. Časopis Znakovi vremena. Spring-summer. Vol. 12. Double number 43/44. Sarajevo: Ibin Sina, Scientific Research Institute, p. 181.

broader culture, individual, gender (sex), age, family, subgroup, ethnic, religious, national, and other variations can be observed that make up the cultural continuum characteristic of a certain geographical area, society (state), city (settlement) and way of life. This cultural diversity/fragmentation is especially pronounced in pluralistic societies, and it functions according to the principle of a network (networking) of different cultural entities, with such a social arrangement that extends this multilaterality/multiculturalism patronizingly into a value-integral, i.e. into cultural identity. All cultures change over time, although not always as quickly and as strongly as is the case with this so-called “digital culture”. Changes occur in response to events such as environmental crisis, post-global cacophony, migration, conflict, poverty, or the modification of behaviour and values within a culture due to technological progress.⁵² In the literature, it is often stated that the future is not an explicit object of research within sociocultural anthropology, but anthropologists have shown scientific zeal in the domain of interculturalism, multiculturalism and transculturalism. It has been confirmed that the anthropological (as well as the sociological) conceptual apparatus can contribute to the mastery of basic concepts in the field of interactional relations, using its own corpus of knowledge as well as logical operations and technical-research procedures within the discipline, all enhanced by the agile development of software and models delivered by various tools that simplify certain methods and techniques thus contributing to both their precision and quality. Transformations in technology are accelerating, along with growth in the ability of electronic devices to digitally store, process and transmit information. Methodologies within each individual field of scientific research are aligned with this change in a way that accepts opportunities that greatly facilitates the processes of scientific work, both theoretical and empirical, through “simultaneity of information”, more purposeful intertextuality, and the implementation of “technological logistics”.⁵³

Thinkers from the Victorian era were never close to an audience of several billion people, which to some extent nullifies the prefix of “old” to theories, studies, debates, books... about culture, that body of thought and theory is constantly updated. Although we can rightly talk about the risk that “virtual sociability” brings us, because the scientist was never more alienated from the “local” academic community, the individual never at a greater distance from everyday life (“...everyday life had to become problematic to be problematized”⁵⁴) and closeness, the human intellect has never been in a greater isolation and the target of the public as in “our” era, but as a justification for that “disinterested politeness and involvement” we can cite the fact that we can get information, faster than ever before that is, “full information” and required content that we receive, process,

52 Haviland, William A. (2004), *ibid*, p. 49.

53 Zrnić, Gulin, Valentina, Poljak Istenič, Saša (2022), *ibid*, pp. 139-140.

54 Heller, Agnes (1978). *Svakodnevní život*, Belgrade: Nolit.

use, exchange, supplement, thanks to, as Hegel states, “the cunning of our mind”. Man adapts to “social givens” which like centuries ago, will probably be perceived differently by future generations. Precisely, the concept of transience constructs and deconstructs everything that we think is on the pedestal of erudition.

This notion of tradition (“Akademía”) can be applied to scientific-theoretical heritage as well as insight (penetrating something with thought) in the way it is perceived by the academic community. In this context, Milosavljević and Radosavljević state: “A critical judgment about any conceptual and theoretical approach in social research should start from at least two basic criteria: what was it and how much did it contribute at the time of its creation? - and secondly, what will happen after the passage of time and period of the development of science remains as a permanent contribution to theoretical and methodological activity,” and what, in the end, has been overcome (possibly wrong in the sense that there are no stimulating thought guidelines) or remains unresolved (value neutrality that has no ideological basis), and what knowledge becomes the basis for a new theoretical discourse, and what is wrong. Any analysis of the theoretical context must, first of all, rest on an individual rational understanding, then on the pluralism of values, as well as on the possibility of becoming an object of criticism within the same formal-logical framework and methodological approach.⁵⁵ According to Mejvošek: “the goal of science is the continuous verification of existing theories, their addition and the creation of new theories, it is a permanent process and that is why a large number of scientific researches are in progress all over the world.”⁵⁶

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⁵⁵ Milosavljević, Slavomir, Radosavljević, Ivan. (2003), *Osnovi metodologije političkih nauka*, II edition, Belgrade: Official Gazette p. 310.

⁵⁶ Mejvošek, Milko (2008), *Metode znanstvenog istraživanja u društvenim i humanističkim znanostima*. Jastrebarsko: Naklada Slap, p. 12.

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